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Going Private at the Intersection of
the Market and the Law
By Faith Stevelman*
Delaware's fiduciary doctrine governing going private transactions by controlling share-
holders is presently in disarray. Controllers generally select between single step cash-out
mergers and tender offers followed by short-form mergers to do these freezeouts, and they
are subject to very different equitable standards depending on the format selected by the con-
troller Furthermore, the courts' longstanding commitment to applying strict scrutiny in the
adjudication offreezeouts is in tension with the popular disfavor towards private class-action
litigation. This disarray threatens minorities' interests infreezeouts and capital market values
more generally. This Article reviews the foundations of freezeout doctrine and proposes that
the Entire Fairness doctrine should apply as the standard of review in all freezeouts unless
prior to accepting the controller's offer the target company's independent directors conducted
an auction or market check to ascertain if better offers were available.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the legal doctrines governing "freezeout" transactions.
Freezeouts are a form of going private transaction1 in which a person or entity that
1. Freezeouts are a subset of the broader going private phenomenon which is sweeping the cor-
porate landscape. See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, The New Face of Capitalism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4,
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has the status of a controlling shareholder
2 at a company purchases its remaining
publicly-traded shares.3 Minority shareholders usually receive cash for their shares
in freezeouts, which terminates their financial interest in the corporation. The stakes
for minorities are thus quite high. As for the target company, after the freezeout it
will either continue to exist as a privately held entity owned by the controller, or
be merged into another business entity owned by the controller, according to the
controller's preference.
As recent headlines suggest, controllers stand to make substantial profits from
purchasing minorities' shares in freezeouts.
4 In contrast to the direction signaled
in certain high profile decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery,
5 this Article
2006, at 48 ("Private buyers are gobbling up some of the premier names in Corporate America.");
Andrew Ross Sorkin, ICA Buyout Highlights Era of Going Private, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at Al.
The academic commentary on going private transactions is burgeoning. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson
and Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs and Complete Capital
Markets, (forthcoming Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=991352. Claims
have been made that costs associated with the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (Supp. IV 2004) and in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.) have influenced firms to delist. For an analy-
sis of the influence of Sarbanes-Oxley in this regard, see, e.g., Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, &
Eric L. Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, USC
CLEO Research Paper No. C06-5, USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 06-10 (August 2006). However,
broader macroeconomic forces, and especially the availability of low cost debt capital and sophisti-
cated securities markets are more significant factors influencing this phenomenon.
2. Delaware corporate fiduciary doctrine currently includes two different definitions of control-
ling shareholders and affords them equivalent treatment in freezeouts. Most obviously, a controlling
shareholder is one who owns the shares required to control the outcome of shareholder votes, includ-
ing votes on director elections and fundamental transactions including mergers (referred to herein
as "true majority holders"). Secondly, the doctrine allows that shareholders who own less than such
absolute voting power may be considered controlling shareholders as a result of their possession and
exercise of direct and indirect managerial authority (referred to herein, "defacto controllers.") See, e.g.,
In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 551-53 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("... the analysis of whether
a controlling stockholder exists must take into account whether the stockholder, as a practical matter,
possesses a combination of stock voting power and managerial authority that enables him to control
the corporation, if he so wishes."). For the argument that the distinction between true majority con-
trollers and defacto controllers should be more salient in corporate legal doctrine, see Mary Siegel, The
Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1999).
3. To clarify further, as used herein, the term "freezeout" refers to a transaction in which a control-
ling shareholder effectuates the buyout of the remaining publicly traded common stock of a company
through (i) a combination of a tender offer and short-form merger (the short-form merger governed
by DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (2007)), or (ii) a long-form, one-step, negotiated, cash-out merger (gov-
erned by DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws. ch. 145 (2007)). (Citations to the
Delaware Code are to the official online version at http://www.delcode.delaware.gov/ (last accessed on
August 1, 2007). For purpose of linguistic convenience, the impersonal pronoun "it" is used herein
to refer to a controlling stockholder-irrespective of whether it is a person or a corporate entity; and
"controller" is used as an abbreviated form of "controlling shareholder."
4. Most commentators believe that the risks of minorities receiving too low a price in a freezeout is
substantial. For a study contending otherwise, see Thomas W Bates, Michael L. Lemmon and James S.
Linck, Shareholder Wealth Effects and Bid Negotiation in Freeze-Out Deals: Are Minority Shareholders Left
Out in the Cold? 81 J. FIN. ECON. 681 (2006).
5. See infra notes 32-34. For two deferential treatments of freezeouts that also favor deferential
review, i.e. applying the business judgment rule upon minority shareholder and independent director
consent to the transaction, see Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L. J. 2, 48-64 (2005)
[hereinafter "Fixing Freezeouts"]; Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Share-
holders, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 785, 838 (2003) [hereinafter "Gilson & Gordon"].
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contends that the "Entire Fairness"6 standard should govern, with one important
exception, in all fiduciary claims filed against controllers in freezeouts. 7 In future
freezeout suits, as minorities present their claims of unfairness to the courts, the fun-
damental legal question will be whether the courts will employ the heightened
fiduciary standards developed under the rubric of "Entire Fairness" to ensure that
controllers do not profit at the expense of minorities in these transactions.
As a matter of legal structure, freezeouts occur most commonly through cash-
out mergers8 or tender offers combined with short form mergers (a "tender offer
freezeout"). 9 These structural features of freezeouts are straightforward. In fact,
the statutory consent requirements do not differentiate between controllers and
third party acquirers. What makes freezeout transactions distinctive, and highly
significant for corporate fiduciary law, is that controllers' formal and informal
authority over the target's board-in conjunction with their other legal and mar-
ket power advantages-effectively gives them the ability to operate at both sides
of the freezeout transaction. That is, while controllers are buyers in freezeouts,
they can also influence the sell side of the deal in their private interest.
Most importantly, under present law, controllers can inhibit the target company
directors from initiating an auction to sell the company, and from pursuing other
financial or transactional alternatives more consistent with the minorities' best
interests.'° Controllers' dominating influence over the board is complemented by
their legal powers to affect other corporate transactions." The result is that con-
trollers can pressure minorities to sell in a freezeout through the omnipresent if
implicit threat that they could be made worse off by the controller if they oppose
the freezeout. Courts have named this concept "inherent coercion." 2 Controllers'
capacity for overreaching operates both in freezeouts based on tender offers and
those structured as cash-out mergers. Both transactional forms present substantial
6. For discussion of the "Entire Fairness" standard for freezeouts, see infra notes 94-104 and
accompanying text.
7. In Delaware, most corporate claims are heard as "equitable" claims brought before the court of
chancery As used herein "equity" or "equitable review" refers to the adjudication of corporate claims
by the court of chancery consistent with principles of fiduciary duty For further discussion of the
chancery court's equity jurisdiction and the nature of equitable standards, see William T. Quillen and
Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery 1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. COP. L.
819 (1993).
8. This Article exclusively discusses cash-out mergers by controlling shareholders. For this reason,
the terms "controllers' cash-out mergers" and "cash-out merger freezeouts" are avoided for purposes
of brevity
9. Alternative mechanisms for freezeouts include reverse stock splits and asset sales, but these
are far more uncommon. For further discussion of the mechanical aspects of going private, see e.g.,
Michael J. McGuinness & Timo Rehbock, Going-Private Transactions: A Practitioner's Guide, 30 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 437 (2005).
10. See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 446 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("... the bet-
ter rule is that there is no duty on [the controller's] part to permit the target board to block the bid
through use of the pill. Nor is there any duty on the part of the independent directors to seek blocking
power.").
11. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Citron v. E. 1. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 584 A.2d 490, 500-02 (Del. Ch. 1990). For
further discussion of the concept of inherent coercion, see infra text accompanying notes 121-27.
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dangers of procedural and substantive unfairness-that is, coercion and over-
reaching by controllers-as-insiders.13
As a general matter, corporate law affords controllers discretion to pursue their
self-interest in selling and voting their shares.'
4 However, once a controller's author-
ity to manipulate the company's board is relevant to a corporate transaction, the
courts depart from such deference and apply heightened fiduciary standards to
the controller's conduct."5 Most significantly for this Article, the Delaware Supreme
Court has adjudged controllers' opportunity for self-dealing in cash-out mergers as
being so substantial it has mandated that the courts apply the "Entire Fairness" stan-
dard in reviewing minorities' claims of unfairness in these transactions ("the Lynch
Doctrine").' 6 Nevertheless, because the Entire Fairness Standard, like other fiduciary
standards, is inherently open-ended,
17 and because freezeouts involve complex
13. The prohibition on secret and otherwise unfair profit-taking by corporate insiders is validated
as the core concept of corporate fiduciary loyalty doctrine. See, e.g., Austin W Scott, The Fiduciary
Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 879 (1988). For discussion of the laxness in courts' enforcement of the
prohibition on self-dealing outside of transactions involving controllers, see Victor Brudney Contract
Versus Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Thorpe by Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996) (affirming control-
lers' right to vote against sale of substantially all assets consistent with their private interests); Bershad v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) ("clearly a stockholder is under no duty to sell its
holdings in a corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale would profit the
minority"); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (allowing controller to shape
dividend policy and corporate development plans of subsidiary in ways beneficial to it, irrespective of
the minority's preference); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (111. Ct. App. 1968) (applying business
judgment rule broadly to accommodate controllers' view of company's best interest).
15. This limit on controllers' discretion rests on the axiom that the corporate board, and not any
shareholder constituency, has authority over corporate-level transactions. As stated in the landmark
case of Aronson v. Lewis, "A cardinal precept of the General Corporate Law of the State of Delaware is
that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation. DEL. CODE
ANN tit. 8, § 141(a)." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
16. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). For further discussion see infra Part I. With respect to the fiduciary stan-
dards applied to self-dealing transactions involving controllers outside of freezeouts, see, e.g., Kahn v.
Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 93 n.52 (Del.
2001). The limitation on self-dealing by controllers is similar to but more idiosyncratic than that
applied to directors and officers. On the latter, see e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 ("When direc-
tors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate
their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. The requirement of
fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the
burden of establishing its entire fairness sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts."
(citations omitted)). For the lesser fiduciary standards applied to controllers' tender offers, see Solomon v.
Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 672 A. 2d 35 (Del. 1996), as discussed in depth infra Part Ill.
17. Much scholarly debate is inspired by the open-ended texture of corporate fiduciary standards.
See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Stan-
dards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287 (2001) (suggesting ways that corporate
fiduciary doctrine should be streamlined and simplified); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory
of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 CoLuM. L. REv. 1908 (1998) (describing the "network effects" that
foster indeterminacy in corporate fiduciary law); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of
Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437 (1993) (suggesting ways that
the duality between standards of conduct and standards of review in corporate fiduciary law may be
fruitful); Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 HoFsTrA L. REv. 469 (2006) (arguing that the dual-
ity between standards of conduct and standards of review produces unproductive complexity).
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valuation disputes,' 8 their adjudication requires courts to address fundamental
questions in corporate law. In particular, the courts must balance their historic obli-
gation to protect vulnerable parties-minority shareholders in freezeouts-against
the goal of facilitating wealth producing corporate transactions.19 The quality of the
fiduciary doctrine governing freezeouts is especially important because it is princi-
pally state corporate fiduciary law,2° rather than state statutory or federal law,2 that
defines the scope of controllers' rights and duties and minorities' entitlements in
freezeouts. And Delaware's freezeout doctrine is preeminently influential because
a majority of the largest U.S. public companies are incorporated in Delaware,22 and
because many jurisdictions model their corporate laws on Delaware's. 23
18. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 834 ("... the result is likely to be dueling experts, each
applying the tools of modem finance to end up at vastly different valuations.").
19. The court in Pure expressly notes this tension and responsibility Pure, 808 A.2d at 434
("... judges must supplement the broadly enabling features of statutory corporation law with equitable
principles sufficient to protect against abuse and unfairness, but not so rigid as to stifle useful transac-
tions..."). There is no more contentious subject in contemporary, "private" law than the definition
of fairness and the role of the courts in promoting it. For a law-and-economics inspired critique of
the problem, see Louts KIaPow & STvV SHtvEL_, FAiRNESS VERsus WEtFA, (2002); compare e.g., Martha C.
Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of a (Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHi. L.
REv. 1197 (1997) (arguing that the law and economics movement has failed adequately to account
for the importance of nonpecuniary values in its consideration of "fairness"); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud and September 1, 2001, 76 TULANE L.
REv. 1579 (2002) (arguing that capital market regulation fails to take account of democratic notions
of fairness at the peril of strong markets and a strong economy). The growing behavioral law and
economics literature attempts a richer account of motivation that includes concerns over fairness. See,
e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
20. Corporate legal scholars increasingly affirm the benefits of regulating controlling shareholders'
actions through the application of more flexible judge-made standards as opposed to more rigid statu-
tory ones; as well as the importance of legal limits on controllers' self-dealing as a foundation of strong
capital markets. See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origns, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 IARv. L. REv.
460, 470 (2006) ("The first link between legal origins and financial markets is said to be how the legal
system protects small investors. '[Clommon law countries protect shareholders better than do civil
law countries and especially better than French civil law countries.' If small investors fear that insiders
could rob them, they will not invest in the insiders' firms. If outsiders do not buy, then a deep stock
market does not develop, and the big owners-founding families and their successors-are locked
in. Common law systems protect minority stockholders well via judge-made fiduciary duties, while
civil law systems, the theory goes, are too rigid to protect minority stockholders." (citations omitted)).
For further refinements to this idea, see also Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy (August 2005) (ECGI-Law Working Paper
No. 49/2005), available at http//ssm.com/abstract=784744 and Ronald J. Gilson, Background Paper:
Corporate Governance, The Equity Contract and the Cost of Capital: Incremental and Accretive Reform Strat-
egies (International Corporate Governance Meeting-Hanoi Vietnam, December 6, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/58/34081304.pdf.
21. The SEC initiated a program of rule-making that would have regulated the substantive fairness
of freezeout transactions, but backed away from so doing in the end. For this history and discussion of
the role of federal law (mostly in regulating disclosure) in freezeouts see infra Part I, C.
22. The website for Delaware's Division of Corporations states that: "[mlore than half a million
business entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-
traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500." Del. Dep't of State, Div. of Corps., Why Choose
Delaware as Your Corporate Home?, available at http://www.corp.delaware.gov/default.shtml.
23. For evidence and analysis of Delaware laws predominant influence on freezeouts, see, e.g.,
Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory & Evidence (May 2005) (Harv. John M. Olin
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Nevertheless, Delaware's freezeout doctrine is presently in disarray Courts
apply the exacting Entire Fairness standard to controllers' cash-out mergers; con-
sistent with the decisions in Weinberger v. UOP Inc.
24 ("Weinberger") and Kahn v.
Lynch Communications Systems, Inc. 25 ("Lynch"); while they apply far more minimal
constraints on controllers in tender offer freezeouts--consistent with Solomon v.
Pathe Communications Corp. ("Solomon")
2 6 and Glassman v. Unocal Exploration
Corp. ("Glassman").27 Perhaps most significantly, consistent with these cases, con-
trollers have a duty to pay a fair price to minorities in cash-out mergers, but not in
tender offer freezeouts.2
8 These doctrinal traditions apply very different standards
of fair process to these two forms of freezeouts. Moreover, these disparities have
arisen without adequate judicial recognition that the two principal structures for
freezeouts afford controllers similarly broad scope for coercion and overreach-
ing.29 The disparities in the protections afforded minorities in these transactions
is undermining the conceptual integrity of corporate fiduciary law, while it is also
unsettling the ability of deal planners, the minorities, and the capital markets, to
value minorities' interests.
Yet controllers stand to profit from these doctrinal irregularities, at least in the
near term. To clarify, because controllers, rather than target boards or minor-
ity shareholders, initiate freezeout transactions, it is controllers who determine
their formal structure. This means that controllers have broad leeway to arbi-
trage transactional structures and their attendant legal rules in their freezeout
bids. Indeed, controllers can reconfigure the structure of the proposed freezeout
even after the commencement of the transaction in order to obtain the maxi-
mum benefits. Given the complexity inherent in contemporary freezeout doc-
trine, and controllers' incentives and freedom to engage in structural arbitrage
in freezeouts, it is likely that controllers are benefiting from some measure of
market failure in their freezeouts. In this respect, the perpetuation of different
equitable standards in freezeouts, and different legal price criteria especially, is
Discussion Paper Series No. 472), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/
papers/pdf/Subramanian 472_revised.pdf. For a broader discussion of Delaware's dominant influence
on corporate law, see, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Marketfor Corporate
Law, 162 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 134 (2006). Delaware's influence on corporate law is sometimes
described as a 'race to the bottom," and sometimes as a "race to the top." For the landmark treatment of
the former claim, see William Cary's Yale Law Journal article discussed infra note 112 and accompany-
ing text. The locus classicus of the race to the top literature is Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). For discussion of the policies
that have shaped the evolution of Delaware corporate legal doctrine, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The
Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1749 (2006). Federal law's complex
influence on this "race" is presently receiving deserved attention. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's
Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588 (2003); William W Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium
Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006).
24. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
25. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
26. Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
27. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
28. See infra Part I.
29. The first explicit treatment of the issue by the Delaware Court of Chancery appears in In re
Siliconix, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
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undermining minorities' welfare and may even be increasing the costs of raising
publicly traded equity stakes.
30
The Delaware courts have become increasingly sensitive to the current disarray
in freezeout doctrine, and in a recent trilogy of opinions the court of chancery
has proposed sweeping reform. 1 These decisions are In re Pure Resources, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation ("Pure"),32 In re Cysive Inc. Shareholders Litigation ("Cysive"), 33
and In re Cox Communications Inc. Shareholders Litigation ("Cox"). 34 In Pure, Cysive
and Cox the court of chancery has proposed unifying freezeout doctrine-a pro-
posal also endorsed by this Article. More problematically however, the court of
chancery also proposed that the controller-friendly, deferential "business judg-
ment rule"35 standard of review should apply to both forms of freezeouts, so long
as certain requirements have been met. In specific, if the proposals outlined in the
Cox decision are followed by future courts, the Entire Fairness standard would
apply only if the controller's freezeout was rejected either by the independent
directors or minority shareholders, and the controller nevertheless proceeded with
the transaction (the "Cox Reforms"). 36 The Cox opinion proposes that a freezeout's
receipt of the consent of both the target's independent directors and a majority
of the minority shares ("Dual Ratification") constitutes adequate evidence of the
30. This insight has tremendous relevance to the going private phenomenon because the private
equity funds that are purchasing formerly public companies will wish to profit from issuing minority
equity stakes. Before purchasing such minority interests, however, outside investors should demand
assurance regarding courts' willingness to scrutinize controllers' conduct in freezeouts and other self-
dealing transactions.
31. Notably, the Pure, Cysive and Cox opinions, infra notes 32-34 were each authored by Vice-Chan-
cellor Leo E. Strine, Jr., who is noted for his bold efforts to reshape Delaware corporate legal doctrine.
Biographical data for Vice-Chancellor Strine is available at http://sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocessi
bio052507/lestrine.pdf. Although this Article is critical of the positions the Vice-Chancellor takes
in Pure, Cysive and Cox, the attention it devotes to them reflects their likely seminal importance. In
addition to deciding many high profile cases in his nearly ten years as a vice chancellor, and author-
ing numerable law review articles, Vice Chancellor Strine is teaching at Harvard Law School and has
taught at University of Pennsylvania School of Law. In reviewing his remarkable achievements, the
Financial Times referred to Vice-Chancellor Strine as the "Wunderkind of US Corporate Law." John
Gapper, Capitalist Punishment, FIN. TiMES, Jan. 29, 2005, available at http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?query
Text=capitalist+punishment&y=9&aj e=true&x= 12&id=050129000270.
32. Pure, 808 A.2d 421.
33. In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).
34. In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
35. The business judgment rule is a protean concept in corporate law. As a presumption in favor of
the challenged transaction in shareholder litigation, the business judgment rule mirrors the statutory
principle that the business affairs of corporations should be run by or under the direction of the board.
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007). So long as the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a material conflict of
interest, a noncorporate motivation for the decision or egregious failure of attentiveness on the part of
the decision-maker, the business judgment rule will insulate a challenged transaction from any search-
ing (indeed virtually any meaningful) substantive judicial review. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (the business judgment rule "operates as both a procedural guide
for litigants and a substantive rule of law") [hereinafter "Cede II"]. For academic discussion, see, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83 (2004).
The recent litigation involving the Disney's board's approval of Michael Ovitz's termination package
provides a fascinating, high stakes account of the application of the business judgment rule. See In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
36. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
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freezeout's fairness." So long as there has been Dual Ratification of the freezeout,
Cox opines, strict scrutiny for fairness wastes valuable resources and invites abuse
by plaintiffs' lawyers.38 A further, unstated assumption in the Cox opinion is that
controllers will obtain Dual Ratification in almost all instances-otherwise the
proposed reforms would not have the intended effect of reducing litigation against
freezeouts. Hence, if the Cox Reforms are followed and ultimately made binding,
freezeout doctrine will be "going private."
3 9 Freezeouts will be subject to less fre-
quent and less vigorous judicial review. Consistent with Cox's express objectives,
most shareholder claims would be dismissed on the 
pleadings. 40
This Article devotes careful attention to the reasoning in Pure, Cysive, and Cox
because these decisions are likely to have a profound influence on minorities'
welfare in future freezeouts, and especially the relevance of the Entire Fairness
standard therein.41 The Cox opinion contends that allowing deferential review
in freezeouts that receive Dual Ratification will more squarely situate freezeout
doctrine within the core framework of corporate law.
42 The trilogy of cases high-
lighted herein also promote their reforms as pragmatic measures that will reduce
37. Id. at 646-47.
38. Id. at 643 ("... Lynch has generated perverse incentives for both defense and plaintiffs' counsel
that cast doubt on the integrity of the representative litigation process.").
39. Within the academic discussion of corporate law, the superiority of "private ordering" to formal
law is an important subject of debate. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public versus Private
Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 414 (2006). The promulgation of new director
independence criteria by the stock exchanges and NASD are examples of this favored, "privatized"
mode of governance. See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.01-02 (2007).
40. As described and discussed in the text, promoting controllers' ability to obtain dismissals on
the pleadings is an explicit objective of the Cox Reforms. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 646 
(arguing
in favor of judicial deference in the review of claims in freezeouts because "... this incentive would
enable transactional planners to know that they can structure transactions in a way that affords them
the opportunity to obtain a dismissal on the complaint"); id. at 646 ("It was thought preferable 
in Pure
Resources to keep the strands separate until there is an alteration in Lynch, lest the less than confidence
inspiring pattern of "Lynch litigation" replicate itself across-the-board in all going private transactions,
thereby deterring the procession of offers that provide valuable liquidity to minority stockholders 
and
efficiency for the economy in general."). See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How 
We Do Cor-
porate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 678 
(2005)
("Delaware tries to respect the business judgment of disinterested directors and stockholders. How?
By invoking the protection of the business judgment rule if an interested transaction is 
approved
by a majority of the independent directors or by a majority of the disinterested stockholders, 
after
full disclosure. The idea, of course, is that the investment of ultimate power over the transaction 
in
impartial directors or stockholders suffices to police the conflict. By this instrumental 
means, Dela-
ware law can protect the resulting business decision without any loss of integrity, because the decision
was made or ratified by persons whose interests were aligned with those of the corporation 
and its
stockholders.").
41. On his blog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog, Professor Larry E. Ribstein refers 
to the
Cox opinion as a "classic-to-be"... "so interesting for so many reasons."
42. Cox, 879 A.2d at 646 ("In this way, the alteration [of the standard of review for freezeouts]
brings this area of our law into harmony with the rest of Delaware corporate law that gives substantial
deference to decisions made by disinterested, independent directors and approved by disinterested,
non-coerced stockholders. That deference is consistent with the central notion of our law, 
which
respects business judgments made by impartial directors and approved by unconflicted 
stockhold-
ers."). This line of reasoning fails adequately to grapple with the problem of coerced consents, 
and
especially the difference between a director's ratification of a controller's transaction and an indepen-
dent board's proposal of a transaction in the best interest of all shareholders.
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meritless litigation, 43 benefit minority investors, 44 and strengthen the capital mar-
kets. 45 However, as Part IV of this Article demonstrates, most of the criticisms
of Entire Fairness review they present are exaggerated or even erroneous. These
opinions also disregard many positive consequences that arise from applying the
Entire Fairness standard to freezeouts.
It is also important to note that the Cox Reforms coincide with two sweeping
contemporary trends affecting corporate law and the capital markets. The first is
the widespread acceptance of public companies-even major public companies-
being taken private.4 6 The second is the widespread success of law reforms
intended to curtail class actions against corporations.47 In just this vein, the Cox
Reforms are expressly aimed at encouraging freezeout transactions and expressly
hostile to shareholder class actions against freezeouts 8 (as well as the members of
43. See, e.g., Pure, 808 A.2d 443 (endorsing expanding Solomon's anti-coercion prohibitions to
freezeouts because it "provides a relatively non-litigious way to effect going private transactions...");
Cysive, 836 A.2d at 549 ("These realities suggest that the Lynch doctrine, if it is to be perpetuated,
could be usefully simplified."); Cox, 879 A.2d at 606 ("...it is most probable that the defendants
settled simply because they had, under Lynch, no other economically efficient option for disposal of
the lawsuit.").
44. Cox, 879 A.2d at 644 ("This alteration would promote the universal use of a transactional struc-
ture that is very favorable to minority stockholders..."); id. ("Importantly, this revised standard would
not diminish the integrity enforcing potential of litigation in any material way, in my view").
45. Id. at 624 (doctrine that encourages freezeouts is favorable because it creates "more rationally
organized corporations"); id. at 646 ("Lynch litigation" and review for Entire Fairness should be limited
because they inhibit freezeouts that create "efficiency for the economy in general").
46. See, e.g., Roane, supra note 1, at 48 ("Time was, America's largest corporations would fight tooth
and nail (and with poison pills) to remain public companies. No longer."); A Growing Aversion to Ticker
Symbols, in DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin, ed., N.Y. TIMS Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://dealbook.
blogs.nytimes.comi2007/01/29/a-growing-aversion-to-ticker-symbols/ ("'Everyone, it seems, is hop-
ping on the buyout bandwagon these days. Even the big public companies once thought untouchable
are now wistfully talking about the success of firms like the Blackstone Group."); Serena Ng, Gregory
Zuckerman & Michael Hudson, Ready to Deal: $60 Billion in Two Days; A Spate of Mergers, Buyouts
Announced Across the Globe; Borrowing Stretches Targets, WALL ST. J, Nov. 21, 2006, at Cl.
47. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Alison Frankel, It's Over-Tort Reformers, Business Interests, and
Plaintiffs Lawyers Themselves Have Helped Kill the Mass Tort Bonanza and It's Not Coming Back, AM. LAW-
YER, Dec. 2006, at 78; Michael Orey, How Business Trounced the Trial Lawyers, Bus. WK., Jan. 8, 2007,
at 44. The proper scope of private litigation and its effect on the economy are huge issues in contem-
porary American law and public policy See, e.g., Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Trial Lawyers,
Inc.: A Report on the Lawsuit Industry in America, 2003, available at http://www.triallawyersinc.com; cf.
THOMAS E BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS AND LEGAL RIGHTS, THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
(2002); James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 3 (1999); Anita Ber-
nstein, The Enterprise of Liability, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 27 (2004). On the federal courts' receptiveness to
class action claims by individuals against national corporations, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (Oxford University Press
1992) (studying changing litigation patterns and particular features of the federal courts' resolution
of individuals' claims against national corporations). For recent empirical data documenting a nearly
100% decrease in securities class action filings over the past two years, see reports of the Stanford
Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, available at http://securities.stanford.edu (evidence
shows that class action lawsuits filed for securities fraud reached an all time low in 2006).
48. Cox, 879 A.2d at 624 (praising reliance on Solomon standards rather than Lynch in recent court
of chancery cases because this approach offers "the utility of providing a non-litigious route to effect-
ing transactions that often were economically efficient both for the minority who received a premium
and in a sense of creating more rationally organized corporations").
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the plaintiffs' bar responsible for filing them).
4 9 A comprehensive analysis of the
Cox Reforms thus requires not only an understanding of contemporary freezeout
doctrine, but also some consideration of the broader role of private litigation in
shaping mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") and the capital markets."
0
The proper scope to be afforded investors' claims of fraud and overreaching has
been a longstanding matter of controversy in corporate law.
1 The contemporary
push to limit shareholder class actions began at the national level with Congress'
enactment of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").
52
The PSLRA imposed significant procedural hurdles to plaintiffs' proceeding with
securities class actions.
3 Shortly thereafter, in the name of preventing savvy
49. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 (proposing that its reforms would allow plaintiffs' lawyers to earn fees
only by "actually prosecuting meritorious claims, and not by free riding on a special committee's
work"). This negative view of the plaintiffs' bar was reinforced the summer after Cox was decided
when the law firm Milberg Weiss Bershad & Shulman was indicted, along with two of its partners, 
for
allegedly making payments to plaintiffs in class action suits. See, e.g., Anthony Lin, Milberg Weiss, 
Two
Partners Indicted in Kickback Probe, 235 N.Y.L.J., May 19, 2006, at 1 That summer (2006) Congress
also considered a bill that would have imposed increased sanctions in cases where plaintiffs' lawyers'
conduct in class actions had been adjudged too aggressive. See Securities Litigation Attorney Account-
ability and Transparency Act, H.R. 5491, 109th Cong. (2006).
50. This general issue was present in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 25 10
(2007) decided by the Supreme Court on June 21, 2007 (To qualify as "strong," as required 
by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, an inference of scienter must be more than merely
plausible or reasonable-it must be "cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference 
of
nonfraudulent intent."). With respect to litigation touching on minorities' interests, there is substantial
empirical evidence supporting a link between strong securities markets and robust legal protections
for minorities. See, e.g., Michael S. Weisbach & Willam A. Reese, Jr., Protection of Minority Shareholder
Interests, Cross Listings in the United States and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. EcoN. 65 (2002);
Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 781 (2001); Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny,
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (finding least developed capital markets in countries
providing the weakest protection to investors and minority owners).
51. Both federal legislation and the Supreme Court's decisions have increasingly limited the 
scope
of litigable claims by investors. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v First Interstate Bank, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 201 (1994) (holding that no aiding and abetting liability applies under Rule lOb-5);
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (affirming a very limited understanding of the term
"prospectus" and thus substantially limiting the scope of the cause of action under Section 12(a)(2)
of the Securities Act); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs'
purchase of securities at inflated price is insufficient to demonstrate loss causation). According 
to
Professors Thompson and Thomas, the "focus of policy debate" shifted to limiting federal securities
litigation once efforts to limit derivative litigation had proven largely successful. See Robert 
B. Thomp-
son & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions,
57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 136 (2004) [hereinafter "Thompson & Thomas II"].
52. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
as
amended at scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "PSLRA"]. For recent research on the role 
of law-
yers and law firms in securities class actions, see StephenJ. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities 
Litiga-
tion and Its Lawyers: Changes during the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 CoLtum. L. REv. 1489 (2006).
53. For analysis of these hurdles, see, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class 
Actions
Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 497, 519-20 (1997) ("The Reform Act's tightened pleading requirements
and narrowed discovery rights more than any other feature probably account for any 
decline in the
number of class action securities suits initiated since its enactment. As an effort to prevent the filing
of a complaint from becoming the attorney's ticket to "flesh out" her pleadings through discovery, 
the
Reform Act stays any discovery during the pendency of any motion to dismiss. The bar to discovery
compounds the class action attorney's task in satisfying the Reform Act's heightened pleading stan-
dard." (citations omitted)).
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plaintiffs' lawyers from circumventing the procedural requirements established
by the PLSRA, Congress enacted The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 ("SLUSA").5 4 SLUSA preempts most private investor class actions alleg-
ing misrepresentation under state securities law and common law fraud.5 5 And
notwithstanding the sweeping corporate governance reforms it enacted in the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX"),56 Congress eschewed provisions that might have
increased investor class actions against corporations or corporate executives
7.5
In SLUSA, Congress left intact state equitable (that is, fiduciary) actions for
fraud, including shareholder claims alleging misrepresentation by controllers
in freezeouts .5  Nevertheless, many commentators and legal scholars claim that
shareholder suits impose gratuitous costs on corporations and the economy-so
that they should be radically limited. 9 They have argued that corporate fiduciary
law can function adequately as an essentially hortatory normative force. On this
rationale courts would impose concrete sanctions, or even allow claims to pro-
ceed to trial, only in the most egregious cases. 60 In line with these sentiments, the
54. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (cod-
ified as amended at scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "SLUSA"].
55. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (held that
SLUSA bars class actions brought under state law even by persons claiming to have been misled into
holding securities, as opposed to purchasing or selling them). For a thoughtful analysis of SLUSAs
effects and the rationales invoked for its enactment, see Richard W Painter, Responding to a False Alarm:
Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).
56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (Supp. IV 2004) and in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29
U.S.C.) [hereinafter "SOX"].
57. The exception is that in SOX, Congress restored the former, slightly longer statute of limitations
for class actions alleging securities fraud. See SOX, supra note 56, § 804, 116 Stat. at 801 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. IV 2004)).
58. The so-called "Delaware carve-out" preserves state jurisdiction over corporate fiduciary misrep-
resentation claims where plaintiffs allege that disclosure was presented to them in connection with a
shareholder vote, in response to a tender or exchange offer, or in a context where appraisal rights were
available. See SLUSA, supra note 54, § 101(a)(1), 112 Star. at 327-29 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p
(2000)) (amending section 16(d) of the 1933 Act). If Congress had not allowed for that safe harbor
from preemption, then fiduciary suits against controllers for misrepresentation in freezeouts would
not be litigable in equity
59. For a thoughtful analysis of this mainstream, largely disapproving view of shareholder deriva-
tive actions, see Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (2004) [hereinafter "Thompson & Thomas I"]. For consideration of
the relative paucity of traditional derivative claims as a portion of the docket of the Delaware court of
chancery, and comparatively greater number of class action claims contesting acquisitions, see Thomp-
son & Thomas 11, supra note 51.
60. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1607 (2001) (providing an overview of scholarly work in the area of corporate law and norms);
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001) (emphasizing the secondary role of law in corporate
governance); but see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253
(1999) (providing a "thicker" account of the interplay between corporate law and corporate gover-
nance norms); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability
in Corporate Governance, 92 IowA L. REv. 105 (2006) (arguing that norms governance is less effective
than scholars suggested pre-Enron, and proposing a scheme of proportionate liability to give corporate
governance norms more traction). For a seminal, early analysis of norms governance in commercial
communities, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
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courts have increasingly limited shareholders' ability to pursue both derivative
and direct class action suits under Delaware corporate law
61
In sum, the jaundiced view of shareholder class actions and the lawyers who
bring them reflected in the Cox opinion mirrors the popular viewpoint in which
investors and markets are represented as being naturally "free" and apt to increase
wealth with minimal legal "intrusion. '62 Cox contends that the piece-work of
equitable review is rarely worth the cost in freezeouts; its proposed reforms are
intended to promote controllers' ability to have freezeout claims dismissed on
the pleadings.63 In this regard the Cox Reforms seem inspired at least as much
by this "pro-market/deregulatory" ideology than by hard empiricism or doctrinal
pragmatism.64 For this reason-in the interest of minimizing the role of ideol-
ogy or fads in corporate law-future courts and especially the Delaware Supreme
Court should proceed cautiously before limiting application of the Entire Fairness
standard in freezeouts.
In advocating in favor of retaining the Entire Fairness standard of review as the
presumptive standards for freezeouts, this Article parts company with commen-
tary that portrays shareholder suits in unqualifiedly negative terms. It rejects the
61. DEBORAH DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
See also Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 59; Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v.
Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049-52 (Del. 2004) (pre-suit demand on board not excused on account of
mere existence of personal or business relationships among directors); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5
(Del. Ch. 2002) (allowing application of business judgment rule instead of Entire Fairness standard in
the context of a merger with an unaffiliated third party notwithstanding the presence of a controlling
shareholder at the seller and the controller's continued involvement in the post-merger firm); Harbor
Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999) (granting motion to dismiss in claim against
corporation's acquisition through merger, notwithstanding that four of seven directors had a conflict of
interest, on the rationale that disinterested shareholders had ratified the transaction and the complaint
failed to allege facts that would constitute "waste"); In re Aquila, Inc. S'Holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184
(Del. Ch. 2002) (allowing business judgment deference to apply to the tender offer freezeout because
the shareholders could freely choose whether or not to tender to the controller, notwithstanding that
they had no independent advocate negotiate on their behalf in the offer); In re Staples, Inc. S'Holders
Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 952 (Del. Ch. 2001) (denying permanent injunction against reclassification
transaction involving conflicted directors, and affirming relevance of business judgment rule standard,
but granting preliminary injunction to afford shareholders better disclosure).
62. The backlash against SOX is an expression of this policy perspective. See, e.g., Commission on
the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21" Century, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 27-28 (March
2007) (produced by a Commission established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). For an account of
the unfolding policy debate over amending or repealing portions of SOX, see Greg Ip, Kara Scannell &
Deborah Solomon, In Call to Deregulate Business, A Global Twist, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at Al.
Even the Wall Street Journal noted the ambiguous evidence behind the claim that SOX is to blame for
decreasing foreign listings on U.S. exchanges; the maturation of those foreign markets being a more
plausible explanation.
63. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 (proposed reforms would give "defendants the real option to get rid of
cases on the pleadings...").
64. The reforms proposed in the trilogy of freezeout cases analyzed herein are consonant with the
themes addressed in many of Vice Chancellor Strine's other judicial and academic writings, in which
he appeals for streamlining corporate legal doctrine under the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Allen,
Jacobs & Strine, supra note 17; Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There Are
Circumstances in Which it is Equitable To Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v.
Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. LAw. 877 (2005); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundations of
the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002).
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view that the M&A and capital markets would thrive under a system of minimal-
ist fiduciary safeguards and radically reduced room for shareholder suits. In the
alternative, Delaware's seminal M&A jurisprudence has validated a set of best
practices that have helped to balance the concerns and interests of controllers
and minorities, and the welfare of bidders and targets in general. 61 In the tradi-
tion for freezeouts established by Weinberger the Delaware courts have validated
the employment of special committees, independent legal and financial advisers,
aides to accurate disclosure and other procedures intended to promote "fairness,"
"candor," impartial decision-making by boards and voluntary consent by minori-
ties. 66 In freezeouts, as in other high-profile M&A transactions, the courts have
assumed the role of "transactional choreographers, ' 67 and this transactional cho-
reography has the character of a public good.
8
Returning to doctrinal specifics: the transactional choreography applied in cash-
out mergers and tender offer freezeouts represents different judicial responses to
three related legal questions. These are (i) whether controllers have a legal duty
to pay at least a minimum "fair price" for the minorities' shares in a freezeout,
(ii) whether public stockholders have adequate freedom and ability to reject and
defeat an unfair freezeout offer, and (iii) whether target directors are unduly con-
strained in their ability to act in minorities' interests in freezeouts. Furthermore,
while Delaware decisions appears to endorse different approaches to these issues
depending on the structure of the freezeout, both strands of the doctrine allow
that if a controller has adhered to the established transactional choreography, it
will receive more favorable judicial treatment if litigation ensues. This promise of
comparatively more favorable (i.e. lenient) treatment in litigation provides the
incentive for controllers to adhere to the transactional "steps" prescribed by the
courts.
To recap, under doctrine evolving from the Solomon decision, in tender offer
freezeouts so long as controllers refrain from affirmatively coercing or deceiving
the minority shareholders, the transaction will be reviewable under the deferential
business judgment rule standard.6 9 In the alternative, under doctrine evolving
from the Weinberger and Lynch decisions, the courts allow controllers merely
65. For an account of this favorable view of corporate fiduciary doctrine-and the positive con-
tribution of equitable adjudication, see, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What
Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Legal
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (2005).
66. For a discussion of corporate fiduciary law's important role in supporting investors' capacity
to trust in the legitimacy of the system of corporate governance see, e.g., Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance to Corporate Disclo-
sure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505 (2000); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); William T. Allen, Our
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992).
67. The term and concept are the author's.
68. As defined in WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 169 (7th ed.
1997), a public good is "a commodity or service whose benefits are not depleted by an additional user
and for which it is generally difficult or impossible to exclude people from its benefits, even if the
people are unwilling to pay for them."
69. Solomon, 672 A.2d 35, 39-40. See infra Part III for an in-depth analysis of Solomon.
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a beneficial shift in the burden of proof if the freezeout is approved by informed,
disinterested directors or a majority of the minority shareholders.7 ° Hence either
form of ratification mandates that the plaintiffs must prove the unfairness of the
freezeout in order to obtain a recovery, instead of the controller-defendant hav-
ing to prove its fairness to avoid paying damages.7 However, this favorable shift
in the burden of proof is the maximum benefit that controllers can obtain from
disinterested ratification. Under the "Lynch Doctrine" the Entire Fairness standard
will apply to the cash-out merger irrespective of such consent.72
This Article contends that in endorsing business judgment deference for freeze-
outs that receive Dual Ratification, the court of chancery is allowing too relaxed an
approach to controllers' capacity to coerce unfair outcomes in freezeout negotia-
tions. It recommends in favor of unifying freezeout doctrine, as do the recent court
of chancery cases highlighted herein. However, it proposes that the Entire Fair-
ness standard should apply to a freezeout unless the controller allowed an auction
or market check to be conducted by the company's independent directors, and
agreed to be a seller rather than a buyer if its bid was bettered by a third party
73
A controller should be able to proceed with a freezeout without following this new
transactional choreography, but at the cost of facing the Entire Fairness standard if
shareholder claims are filed against the freezeout.74 If the controller was unwilling
70. Lynch, 638 A2d at 1116 ("Entire fairness remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in exam-
ining an interested merger, irrespective of whether the burden of proof remains upon or is shifted away
from the controlling or dominating shareholder, because the unchanging nature of the "interested"
transaction requires careful scrutiny").
71. The usual rule, once self-dealing or other conflict of interest has been demonstrated by the
plaintiff, is that the defendant has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v Berlin, 726 A.2d
1215, 1222 (Del. 1999) ("Once the entire fairness standard has been implicated, as here, the defen-
dants, at least initially, bear the burden of demonstrating the two basic aspects of fair dealing and fair
price." (citation omitted)); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989)
("When faced with such divided loyalties, directors have the burden of establishing the entire fairness of
the transaction to survive careful scrutiny by the courts."); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 909 (Del.
1938) ("In the second place, dealing as they did with another corporation of which they were sole direc-
tors and officers, they assumed the burden of showing the entire fairness of the transaction.").
72. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116; Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985) (holding that
the informed vote by a majority of minority shares shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the
conflicted merger entirely to the plaintiffs).
73. It is crucial that the directors conduct an auction of the entire company; otherwise they test
only the value of the minority equity stake, rather than the company's "full value" or "going concern
value." Importantly, this Article does not propose any new substantive regulations or limitations on
freezeouts. The reforms it endorses, as described in Part V infra, speak only to the standard of review
that should apply-and hence the factors and incentives that will affect the parties' choices in weigh-
ing either making or accepting a freezeout offer. If the controller has impeded an independent board's
evaluation and pursuit of alternatives to the controller's offer, then the residual ambiguity surrounding
the allocation of gains in the freezeout warrants imposing the burden of proving fairness on the con-
troller. In the alternative, the Cox opinion presumes that with Dual Ratification there is only a minimal
chance of unfairness, so that litigation is wasteful and unwarranted. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 647 ("If both
the independent directors and the disinterested stockholders are given the ability to say no and do
not, ought we not presumptively assume the transaction was fair?"). The parallel Cox draws between
genuine arms'-length dealing and Dual Ratification in freezeouts does not comport with Weinberger's
tenets, however. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (action taken "as if" at arms'-length will serve merely
as "strong" but not dispositive evidence of fairness in a cash-out merger).
74. Proving entire fairness in such a circumstance is certainly possible. For cases in which the
sale process was held defective but the transaction was deemed fair in its entirety, see Kahn v. Lynch
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to agree to or failed to comply with these conditions, then it is unreasonable to
presume that the transaction was beneficial to the minority In such a case a con-
troller should have to demonstrate the freezeout's fairness upon a shareholder
challenge. Consistent with corporate law's role in protecting minority shareholders
and reducing the agency costs of capital, the courts should not presume the fair-
ness of a freezeout that has not been tested against genuine market forces.
7 5
Part I of this Article reviews the doctrinal framework for cash-out mergers
established by Weinberger76 and Lynch, 77 and then the alternative doctrinal frame-
work for tender offer freezeouts developed from Solomon7" and Glassman. 7, Part II
elucidates the disparate legal price regimes relevant to freezeouts, and controllers'
capacity to exploit them.8 Part III critiques the reforms to tender offer freezeout
doctrine proposed in the Pure81 and Cox 2 decisions. Part IV returns to the analysis
of cash-out merger freezeout doctrine. It first describes the hyperbole and short-
comings in Cysive's"3 and Cox's criticisms of Entire Fairness review in cash-out
mergers. Part IV next describes how the Cox Reforms would undermine minori-
ties' bargaining leverage by marginalizing the relevance of the fair price standard
in freezeout negotiations. Part IV's discussion concludes by examining the under-
pinnings of the Lynch Doctrine's concern about "fair dealings" and the presence or
absence of valid consents in freezeouts. Part V presents this Article's proposals for
unifying freezeout doctrine under the Entire Fairness standard of review.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE DOCTRINES GOVERNING FREEZEOUTS
A. WEINBERGER V. UOP ENDORSES THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS
STANDARD FOR CASH-OUT MERGER FREEZEOUTS
The Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") requires approval by a
majority of a company's directors and a majority of its outstanding voting shares
Communc'n Systems, Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 87 (Del. 1995); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d
1156, 1180 (Del. 1995).
75. At least they should not do so without scrutinizing the target board's rationale for accepting the
freezeout over competing alternatives, as the best alternative for the minority For recent law review
articles contending that corporate law should protect minority shareholders in freezeouts, as part of its
role in reducing the agency costs of capital, see Brett A. Margolin & Samuel J. Kursh, The Economics of
Delaware Fair Value, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 413, 414 (2004) (describing the importance of an expansive
interpretation of "fair value" in appraisal actions); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The
Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31J. CORP. L. 119, 146-74 (2005) (noting the impor-
tance of the corporate opportunity doctrine as incorporated into the fiduciary doctrine applicable to
freezeouts); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 837 ("... the concern is to ensure that the minority
receives a premium that reflects a fair share of the synergy gains").
76. Weinberger, supra note 24.
77. Lynch, supra note 25.
78. Solomon, supra note 26.
79. Glassman, supra note 27.
80. As the risks of holding a minority equity stake increase, the cost of issuing minority equity
stakes will increase for companies, unless the market is unaware of the true risks. See infra text accom-
panying notes 169-72.
81. Pure, supra note 32.
82- Cox, supra note 34.
83. Cysive, supra note 33.
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as a condition to the company's sale through a merger.8 Because the controller
owns the shares required to determine the outcome of director elections,85 the
minority shareholders' voting power cannot stop a controller intent on effectuat-
ing a cash-out merger. The controller's stock ownership also affords it power to
effectuate amendments to the bylaws, 86 approvals (or disapprovals) of sales of
substantially all corporate assets,8 and amendments to the certificates of incor-
poration.88 Hence, when a controller presents a freezeout proposal, its power to
compel the transaction, or to take action injurious to the minority if it fails, is
quite apparent to the target board and minority shareholders.
But it is the controller's power over the target's board that places freezeouts
in the infamous category of self-dealing transactions. If the board operated with
genuine independence from the controller, the controller would only be on the
"purchase" side of the transaction, and the heightened fiduciary protections the
courts apply to self-dealing transactions would be inapplicable. Corporate law
provides that directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to all sharehold-
ers equally, not just those who elect them.89 But once a controller is present, the
directors are in a difficult, fundamentally conflicted situation. If they act in ways
that conflict with the controller's plans, their tenure on the board will probably be
limited. Moreover, because people generally seek to avoid confrontations unless
they have something concrete and significant to gain, most boards will have devel-
oped a cognitive bias in favor of approving a controller's offer.90
84. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 §§ 4-7 (2007).
85. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 216(3) (2007) ("Directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the
shares in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of direc-
tors...."). In any matter submitted to the shareholders for voting, because not all shares are voted,
the outcome may often be determined by a shareholder owning less than a genuine majority of the
outstanding voting stock-i.e. by a defacto controller.
86. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 216(2) (2007) ("In all matters other than the election of directors, the affir-
mative vote of the majority of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and
entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act of the shareholders."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 109(a) (2007) ("... the power to adopt, amend or repeal by-laws shall be in the stockholders
entitled to vote....").
87. DEL CODE tit. 8, § 271(a) (2007) ("Any corporation may... sell, lease or exchange all or sub-
stantially all of its property or assets... as its board of directors or governing body deems expedient
and for the best interests of the corporation, when and as authorized by a resolution adopted by the
holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon....").
88. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2007).
89. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919 (Del. 2000) ("The...Board owed fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty and good faith to all.., shareholders."); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 ("There is
no dilution of this obligation where one holds dual or multiple directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary
context."); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power 53 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 561
(2006) (suggesting that intra-shareholder conflicts represent a further rationale for vesting primary
decision-making authority in the board).
90. Consistent with the status quo bias and the overconfidence principle, most directors will ratio-
nalize that they are doing the right thing for the company by avoiding conflict with a controller, and
maximizing their chance of remaining on the board. For scholarship applying the insights of behav-
ioral psychology to corporate law, see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499 (1998) (applying
behavioral psychology to different legal fields); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of
Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1233 (2003) (documenting the psychological pressures to squelch
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Controllers' freedom to use cash-out mergers to force minority shareholders
out of the corporation has been a persistently controversial question in corporate
law.91 In the late 1970s the Delaware courts required a "business purpose" for cash-
out mergers, in order to limit controllers' opportunity to use them to expropriate
wealth from minorities.92 However in Weinberger in 1983, the Delaware Supreme
Court rejected the business purpose requirement as being too indeterminate to
protect minorities from overbearing controllers. 93 The court endorsed the Entire
Fairness standard as the better approach to protecting minorities. Specifically, in
Weinberger the court held that duties of "fair price" and "fair dealings"-hence,
"Entire Fairness"-apply to controllers' cash-out mergers.
94
With respect to fair price, the Weinberger court held that controllers have a
fiduciary duty to pay minorities at least their pro rata share of the company
healthy dissent in groups); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35 RUTGERS
L.J. 1 (2003) (applying principles of behavioral psychology and human moral development to explain
Enron's demise); A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1 (2003) (discussing the overconfidence bias). For a pathbreaking work on group psy-
chology, law and the dynamics of the boardroom, see James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83, 99-108 (Summer 1985).
91. As late as 1976 and 1977, in Delaware and elsewhere, mergers intended to eliminate minorities
were presumptively wrongful. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Georgia Pac. Paper Corp., 227 F Supp. 719 (WD.
Ark. 1964); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976); Green v. Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc., 533 F2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, on other grounds, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Elliott J. Weiss, Balanc-
ing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1983)
(discussing progress from early legal prohibition on cash-out mergers to their gradual legitimization in
the last several decades of the 20th century).
92. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977); Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
93. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715 ("In view of the fairness test which has long been applicable to
parent-subsidiary mergers, the expanded appraisal remedy now available to shareholders, and the
broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion such relief as the facts of a given case may dictate, we do
not believe that any additional meaningful protection is afforded minority shareholders by the busi-
ness purpose requirement ... Accordingly, such requirement shall no longer be of any force or effect."
(citation omitted)).
94. The landmark definitions of "fair dealings" and "fair price," established in Weinberger, are as
follows:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces
questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, dis-
closed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and stockholders were obtained.
The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed
merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any
other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.... However, the
test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealings and price. All aspects of the issue
must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.
Weinberger 457 A.2d at 711 (citations omitted). As the second appeal in Kahn v. Lynch clarified, courts
have interpreted "Entire Fairness" to require that a transaction be "fair in its entirety" rather than "entirely
fair in every respect." See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 669 A.2d 79, 90 (Del. 1995) (despite problems
pertaining to the Special Committee's approval process, the disputed cash-out merger was judged ben-
eficial to the shareholders, hence fair). See also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1180
(Del. 1995) [hereinafter "Cede III"] (despite problems with the sale process, including the absence of a
market check and a rushed review by the board, the company's sale through the merger was fair).
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valued as a going concern, as described further in Part 11. 91 And because fair
price is not a finite sum but rather a range, Weinberger requires that controllers
be accountable for the fairness of the process through which they effectuate
a cash-out merger-i.e., "fair dealings" on their part. 96 Weinberger's fair dealings
requirement encompasses factors relating to how the transaction was initiated,
structured, and timed by the controller, as described further in Part IV97 Despite
the controller's statutory authority to compel a cash-out merger, Weinberger
exhorted controllers to allow some qualified, independent party to negotiate
its key terms on the minority's behalf-in order to approximate "arms' length"
dealings.98 And Weinberger emphasized controllers' equitable obligation to make
complete and truthful disclosures in freezeouts, especially because these disclo-
sures also furnish the basis of minorities' decisions about whether or not to seek
an appraisal. 99
Beyond providing a benchmark for liability ex post, Weinberger's Entire Fairness
standard has influenced controllers' tactics in planning cash-out mergers."°° For
example, as mentioned above, the Weinberger opinion has encouraged control-
lers to establish special committees of independent directors to negotiate for the
minority shareholders," 1 and in so doing it established what is still the formative
95. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 ("Fair price obviously requires consideration of all relevant factors
involving the value of a company ... elements of future value, including the nature of the enterprise,
which are known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and are not the product of
speculation, may be considered."). The issue of which elements of future value should be excluded
in equity and in an appraisal, are significant open questions. For commentary, see Hamermesh &
Wachter, supra note 75.
96. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711-12. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134,
1153 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) ("Thus in assessing overall (or entire) fairness
in this instance the court must consider the process itself that the board followed, the quality of the
result it achieved and the quality of the disclosures made to the shareholders to allow them to exercise
such choice as the circumstances could provide.").
97. Weinberger, 457 A2d. at 711-12. In actuality, the Entire Fairness standard was first endorsed
for parent/subsidiary mergers by the Delaware Supreme Court in Sterling v. Mayflower, a case in which
the parent acquired its subsidiary in a merger using its stock as consideration. See Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952).
98. See, e.g., Weinberger 457 A.2d at 710-12; id. at 710 ("Given the absence of any attempt to
structure this transaction on an arm's length basis, Signal cannot escape the effects of the conflicts it
faced, particularly when its designees on UOP's board did not totally abstain from participation in the
matter. There is no 'safe harbor' for such divided loyalties in Delaware."); id. at 709 n.7 ("... the result
here could have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee
of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length.").
99. Id. at 711 ("Part of fair dealing is the obvious duty of candor required by Lynch I..."); id. at 710
("Completeness, not adequacy, is both the norm and the mandate under present circumstances." (cit-
ing Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977)). Weinberger is crucially important
in the evolution of the case law identified under the rubric of the "fiduciary duty of disclosure." For
commentary, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary
Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1087 (1996) (arguing that future courts should exercise caution in
expanding the significance of "fiduciary disclosure duties"); Kahn, Transparency and Accountability,
supra note 66 (arguing that corporate loyalty doctrine would be incoherent if it tolerated dissembling
in communications between directors and shareholders).
100. For a discussion of the twin life of standards of conduct (affecting behavior ex ante), and stan-
dards of review (affecting remedies ex post), see Eisenberg, Divergence, supra note 17.
101. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
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transactional choreography for cash-out mergers.' °2 Weinberger also encouraged
what is now the accepted practice of having outside, independent financial and
legal experts advise special committees during the pendency of the freezeout
negotiations.'03 And Weinberger's emphasis on full disclosure has encouraged con-
trollers to facilitate the flow of accurate information in freezeouts.'
04
As mentioned above, controllers' freedom to eliminate minorities through cash-
out mergers has proven highly controversial at times. 05 This "unsettledness" is
evident in the recent Pure, Cysive and Cox opinions, but was present even in
the mid-2Oth century in the earliest litigation over freezeouts.106 This controversy
sometimes flared into the public eye. During the bear market of 1973-74, for
example, controversy arose over the losses suffered by minority shareholders in
cash-out mergers and the issue achieved national attention. In a speech at the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer denounced controllers'
going private transactions as "serious, unfair, sometimes disgraceful, a perversion
of the whole process of public financing and a course that inevitably is going to
make the individual shareholder even more hostile to American corporate mores
and the securities markets than he already is."'0 7
After announcing a public investigation, the SEC proposed two rules to protect
minorities' interests in these deals. In contrast to federal securities regulation's
usual disclosure oriented approach, both proposed rules encompassed substan-
tive fairness standards for freezeouts. SEC Rule 13e-3A provided that a controller's
offer must "constitute fair value as determined in good faith by the issuer... and
shall be no lower than the consideration recommended jointly by two qualified
independent persons."'18 In addition to requiring that the offered consideration
must be "fair," proposed Rule 13e-3B provided that controllers' cash-out mergers
must be motivated by "a valid business purpose." 0 9 The rules proposed by the
102. See id. For data attesting to the employment of special committees in freezeouts-even in
tender offer freezeouts in many instances, see Subramanian, Theory & Evidence, supra note 23.
103. In Weinberger, the court scrutinized the work done by the investment banker representing
UOP (the target subsidiary), and was highly critical of its work. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 ("There
was no disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the rather cursory preparation of the Lehman
Brothers' fairness opinion. Instead, the impression was given UOP's minority that a careful study had
been made, when in fact speed was the hallmark, and Mr. Glanville, Lehman's partner in charge of the
matter, and also a UOP director, having spent the weekend in Vermont, brought a draft of the 'fairness
opinion letter' to the UOP directors' meeting on March 6, 1978 with the price left blank.").
104. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 938-39 (Del. 1985); Cinerama, 663 A.2d
at 1174, 1176-77.
105. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. The following discussion benefited from the
historical information provided in ARTHUR M. BORDEN &JOEL A. YUNIS, GOING PRIVATE (1982).
106. Weiss, supra note 91.
107. A. A. Sommer, Going Private: A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [ 1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,692, at 82,695 (Nov. 14, 1974) ("1 speak today of a newer and currently,
at least, more disquieting fad. That is the fad of 'going private.'").
108. Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation and Rulemaking Proceedings in the Matter of
"Going Private" Transactions by Public Companies and Their Affiliates, SEC Rel. No. 33-5567, 40 Fed.
Reg. 7947, 7949 (Feb. 24, 1975).
109. Id. at 7950. The "business purpose" requirement briefly endorsed by the Delaware courts was
probably a direct outgrowth of this SEC proposal. For a discussion of the business purpose require-
ment, see citations in note 92, supra.
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SEC also encompassed other safeguards of fairness, including a requirement that
the target company's counsel opine that the cash-out merger met the fairness crite-
ria applicable thereto under state fiduciary law.". In sum, in the mid to late 1970s,
the SEC was on the verge of imposing substantial limits on controllers' freedom
to engage in freezeouts.
While the SEC was considering these rules, the overall shape of corporate
"federalism" hung in the balance. Lawyers attending an ABA meeting on federal
securities regulation in the summer of 1975 discussed a Yale LawJournal article
recently published by Professor William Cary" ' Cary's article decried Delaware's
excessively permissive approach to corporate law, and called for federal mini-
mum standards to protect vulnerable public investors from abuse by powerful
corporate insiders." 2 Cary's claims are so famous that virtually all corporate legal
academics are familiar with them, but few appear to recall that they coincided
with and reflected broad-based disapproval of going private transactions and
Delaware's lax response to protecting minorities' interests therein.
Most significantly for this discussion, no recollection of this tumult, or the near
preemption of state fiduciary standards by federal regulations is reflected in the
chancery court's recent freezeout cases or the law review articles discussing them." 3
Nevertheless, the history is significant." 4 First, it illuminates that both the popu-
lar and legal acceptance of freezeouts is recent. Second, it reinforces that exces-
sively lenient state corporate legal standards invite federal regulation which may
be more heavy-handed. Once freezeout doctrine is considered from this broader,
historical perspective, it is harder to accept that loosening fiduciary standards for
freezeouts is the best course for investors and corporate law."5
In the end, the movement to federalize freezeout regulation was truncated. In
its final going private rule, Rule 13e-3," 6 the SEC backed away from its proposal
to promulgate substantive fairness standards for freezeouts, and hewed to its nar-
rower, disclosure-oriented approach. It may have been influenced to do so by the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Santa Fe v. Green, which broadly reoriented
federal securities law away from the substantive regulation of internal corporate
affairs." 7 In addition, the need for a federal "business purpose" requirement was
110. See 40 Fed. Reg. at 7951 (proposed rule 240.13e-3A(c)(1)(viii)).
111. BORDEN & YUNIS, supra note 105, at § 2.07.
112. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974).
113. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5; Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5; Peter V
Letsou & Steven M. Haas, The Dilemma That Should Never Have Been: Minority Freeze Outs in Delaware,
61 Bus. LAw. 25 (2005).
114. Consistent with Mark Roe's insights, freezeouts provide a fascinating context in which to
analyze the interaction of federal and state legal regimes in corporate law Roe, Delaware's Competition,
supra note 23.
115. As a further counterpoint to the present acceptance of going private deals, see Bevis Long-
streth, SEC Commissioner, Speech to the International Bar Association, Management Buyouts: Are Pub-
lic Shareholders Getting a Fair Deal?, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,436
(Oct. 6, 1983).
116. Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, SEC Rel. No. 33-6100,
44 Fed. Reg. 46736 (Aug. 8, 1979).
117. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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obviated by the Delaware courts' affirmation of a business purpose requirement for
cash-out mergers by 1977.118 Although the movement to federalize freezeout regu-
lation was side-lined even before Weinberger was decided, several crucially impor-
tant questions regarding freezeout doctrine remained unresolved even thereafter.
In the early 1990s, for example, a split developed in the court of chancery
over whether approval of a cash-out merger by the target's independent directors
was sufficient guarantee of a freezeout's fairness to obviate the need for vigorous
judicial oversight. 119 Weinberger had suggested that Entire Fairness would apply
irrespective of a controller's receipt of disinterested director consent to the freeze-
out, but not forcefully or expressly enough to preclude controversy 2 °
B. KAHN V. LYNCH HoLDs THAT INHERENT COERCION
MANDATES APPLYING ENTIRE FAIRNESS IN ALL
CASH-OUT MERGER FREEZEOUT SUITS
This question was resolved by the Delaware Supreme Court in Lynch (Kahn v.
Lynch Communications, Inc.). In its 1994 opinion in Lynch, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the coercive authority of controllers taints the reliability of even
seemingly freely given consents in cash-out mergers. On this basis Lynch held that
disinterested, informed consents by directors or minority shareholders are merely
strong evidence of fairness, and will shift the burden of proving unfairness to the
plaintiffs, but deferential judicial review along the lines of the business judgment
rule is never appropriate in freezeouts. 21' As stated earlier, this idea is referred
to as "inherent coercion" (viz. that neither the independent directors' or minority
shareholders' consents to a freezeout can legitimately be presumed freely given1 22).
118. See supra note 92.
119. Compare In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9844,1988 WL 111271,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct- 21, 1988) (advocating the business judgment rule should apply to cash-out merg-
ers if approval was obtained from a board with a majority of independent directors, a special commit-
tee, or a majority of the minority shares) with Citron, 584 A.2d at 499-502 (endorsing Entire Fairness
as the universal standard of review for controllers' going private mergers on account of their implicit
power to coerce such consents).
120- Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 ("However, where corporate action has been approved by an
informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts
to the plaintiff to show that the transaction was unfair to the minority"); id. at 709 n.7 ("Particularly
in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as though each of the contending
parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at arms' length is strong evidence that
the transaction meets the test of fairness." (emphasis added; citations omitted.)).
121. Lynch, 638A.2d at 1116.
122. For an in-depth discussion of inherent coercion and the Lynch Doctrine's concern about fair
dealings and free consent in freezeouts, see infra Part IV, F The concept of implicit coercion was first
described at length in Citron, 584 A.2d 499-502. The relevant part of Citron is cited in Lynch, 638 A.2d
at 1116-17 (citations omitted):
Parent subsidiary mergers.., are proposed by a party that controls and will continue to control,
the corporation, whether or not the minority stockholders vote to approve or reject the transac-
tion. The controlling stockholder relationship has the potential to influence, however subtly, the
vote of [ratifying] minority stockholders in a manner that is not likely to occur in a transaction
with a non-controlling party Even where no coercion is intended, shareholders voting on a par-
ent subsidiary merger might perceive that their disapproval could risk retaliation of some kind
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The logic behind the inherent coercion concept is that even independent directors
and the minority shareholders might consent to a freezeout offer at less than full
going concern value out of fear that the controller could take action even more
injurious to the minority if its freezeout was defeated. Validating principles earlier
affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger12 3 and Rosenblatt v. Getty
Oil Co.,' 24 Lynch held that Entire Fairness remains the appropriate standard of
review irrespective of the receipt of such consents. In so doing, the court veered
from court of chancery precedents that had allowed deferential review upon
receipt of disinterested, informed approval to a cash-out merger, 25 as well as cases
addressing ordinary self dealing transactions where disinterested ratification was
held to trigger deferential judicial review. 126 Before Lynch, the court of chancery's
opinion in Citron v. El. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.127 had affirmed this limited
view of the effect of independent director or minority shareholder consent, and
had expounded on the danger of inherent coercion. But it was the supreme court's
definitive treatment of inherent coercion in Lynch that stuck-so that Entire Fair-
ness has been applied in the equitable review of all cash-out mergers, even if
controllers obtained seemingly valid, disinterested consents.
by the controlling stockholder. For example, the controlling stockholder might decide to stop
dividend payments or to effect a subsequent cash out merger at a less favorable price, for which
the remedy would be time consuming and costly litigation. At the very least, the potential for
that perception, and its possible impact on a shareholder vote, could never be fully eliminated.
Consequently, in a merger between the corporation and its controlling stockholder-even one
negotiated by disinterested, independent directors-no court could be certain whether the trans-
action terms fully approximate what truly independent parties would have achieved in an arm's
length negotiation. Given that uncertainty, a court might well conclude that even minority share-
holders who have ratified a... merger need procedural protections beyond those afforded by full
disclosure of all material facts. One way to provide such protections would be to adhere to the
more stringent entire fairness standard of judicial review.
123. Weinberger 457 A.2d at 703.
124. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (holding that "approval of
a merger ... by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, while not a legal prerequi-
site, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the merger entirely to the plaintiffs").
125. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988).
126. Delaware decisions addressing self-dealing transactions, which do not involve controllers,
sometimes allow disinterested, informed ratification by directors or shareholders to cure a fiduciary
breach or at least trigger deferential review. The Delaware Supreme Court has not entirely resolved the
issue. Compare, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004)
(finding that the informed, uncoerced vote of company's disinterested public stockholders "extin-
guished" the plaintiffs' remaining breach of fiduciary duty claims in the context of a sale of the com-
pany); Cooke v. Oolie, Civ. A. 11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997) (suggesting
that Delaware Supreme Court has weighed in favor of giving limited effect even to proper ratification,
so that the business judgment rule is not "reinstated" due to ratification); Marciano v. Nakash, 535
A.2d 400 (Del. 1987) (stating in dicta that proper ratification would effectuate business judgment
deference so that plaintiff could recover only upon proof of 'waste').
127. Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. 1990).
128. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117 ("...an approval of the transaction by an independent committee
of directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue
of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.").
See Weinberger 457 A.2d at 703 (".. but in all this, the burden clearly remains on those relying on the
[burden-shifting] vote [i.e. the defendants] to show that they completely disclosed all material facts
relevant to the transaction.").
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Nevertheless, in order to encourage controllers to follow the generally salutary
practice of empowering either the independent directors or minority sharehold-
ers to accept or reject the freezeout's terms, the Lynch court provided for a shift in
the burden of proof where valid consent is obtained. 2 8 Upon such valid consent,
Lynch provides, the plaintiffs must demonstrate the unfairness of the freezeout,
instead of the controller having the burden to demonstrate its fairness-which
is the ordinary rule in transactions which involve self-dealing fiduciaries. 2 9 The
Lynch Doctrine's insistence on adherence to the Entire Fairness standard of review
in cash-out mergers is at the heart of Cox's vituperative against current freezeout
doctrine.
C. THE COMPLEX BACKGROUND TO MODERN TENDER
OFFER FREEZEOUT DOCTRINE
Tender offer freezeouts simply did not occur until the final years of the twentieth
century 30 Accordingly, tender offer freezeout doctrine did not exist. In 1996, in its
Solomon decision, the Delaware Supreme Court considered controllers' duties in
making a tender offer to purchase the minorities' shares-but the supreme court
did not address a true going private transaction therein.' 3' In 2001, in its Glass-
man decision, the Delaware Supreme Court held that fiduciary fair dealings cri-
teria are inapplicable to short-form mergers. But even Glassman did not address
a combined tender offer and short form merger engineered by a controller intent
on going private. 32 Hence, tender offer freezeout doctrine is still very new. Many
fundamental issues in tender offer freezeouts have never been addressed by the
courts, and none have been resolved by the Delaware Supreme Court. The con-
trast with cash-out merger doctrine is striking in this regard. The adherence to
the Entire Fairness standard in cash-out mergers is the outgrowth of decades of
judicial analysis. Furthermore, although the supreme court has not ruled on a
tender offer freezeout, in recent cases where it has addressed transactions posing
129. The wariness the courts show towards allowing ratification of potential fiduciary loyalty
breaches reflects the important stature of the duty of loyalty within corporate law. For a classic state-
ment of the importance of the duty of loyalty, see, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1944) ("The concept of loyalty, of constant, unqualified fidelity, has a definite and precise meaning.
The fiduciary must subordinate his individual and private interests to his duty to the corporation
whenever the two conflict." (citation omitted)).
130. For example, no prior tender offers by controllers are cited by the Delaware Supreme Court
in its landmark opinion in Lynch v Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (ruling that
"complete candor" was required in the controller's disclosures in its tender offer). Moreover, short form
mergers in tender offer freezeouts (i.e. combined tender offer/short-form mergers) are nowhere evident
in the myriad short form mergers reviewed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Glassman v. Unocal
Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
131. Solomon, 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996). For commentary on the absence of authoritative precedent
on tender offer freezeouts, see Letsou & Haas, supra note 113, at 45 ("... only one reported decision
between 1996 and 2001 attempted to invoke Solomon in connection with a freezeout transaction struc-
tured as a tender offer followed by a long or short-form merger, In re Life Technologies, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation [Civ. A. 16513, 1998 WL 1812280 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1998)1.").
132. Glassman, 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). Solomon and Glassman are discussed at length in Part Ill,
infra.
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a substantial risk of self-dealing by controllers, it has applied the Entire Fairness
standard of review to these suits, and has not been unequivocal in so doing.'33
Seen against this historical background, the recent rebellion against applying the
Entire Fairness standard of review in freezeouts appears anomalous.
Because the Delaware Supreme Court has never endorsed a departure from the
Entire Fairness standard for tender offer freezeouts, it is premature to conclude
that there are two genuine "tracks" in freezeout doctrine-with tender offer freez-
eouts falling outside the scope of the Entire Fairness standard. Nevertheless, the
court of chancery cases addressing freezeouts based on tender offers proceed as
if the existence of distinct, more lenient fiduciary standards for these transactions
is a certainty. They invoke Solomon's "no fair price duty absent malfeasance"'
' 34
admonition as their lodestar. Thus despite the fact that neither Solomon nor Glass-
man address a genuine tender offer freezeout, they have exerted a definitive influ-
ence on the development of Delaware's fiduciary doctrine governing tender offer
freezeouts. This influence is apparent in Siliconix,131 Pure, 36 and Cox,' 37 described
in detail in Part IlI.
The above discussion is not intended to suggest that either tender offers or
short form mergers were uncommon or unregulated throughout the twentieth
century. This is most definitely not true. In Delaware, short-form mergers were the
subject of statutory enactments and equitable prescriptions by mid-century, and
they became quite common thereafter.
3
With respect to the regulation of tender offers, federal law plays the leading role
through the Williams Act and the SEC's regulations promulgated thereunder.1
39
Enacted by Congress in 1968, the Williams Act focuses principally on promoting
full and accurate transactional disclosures to the recipients of the tender offer.
4
1
It also includes certain anti-manipulation requirements intended to bolster target
shareholders' ability to make unhurried, rational choices about whether to tender
or hold their shares as described below. With respect to disclosure, the Williams
Act and SEC regulations impose extensive disclosure requirements on bidders and
133. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del 1997).
134. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 40.
135. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 21,
2001).
136. In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
137. In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. 2005).
138. For detailed discussion of the early short-form merger statutes and case law, see Weiss, supra
note 91. The evolution of the case law is also explored in Glassman, 777 A.2d at 244-48 (attesting to
the enactment of the short-form merger statute in Delaware by 1937, with its modem version appear-
ing by 1957).
139. The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)) [hereinafter "Williams Act"] governs tender
offers for securities registered under the Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, Title I, § 12, 48 Stat. 881,
892 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)) [hereinafter "Exchange Act"].
See also infra notes 141-49.
140. For a survey of federal tender offer law and regulation, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 11 (5th ed. 2005); id. at § 11.1 ("The securities laws contained a regulatory
gap. By and large, there were no disclosure provisions applicable to tender offers.").
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target directors in tender offers,14 1 and substantial prohibitions on fraud to back
them up.'42 In of tender offer freezeouts, the disclosure requirements arising from
the Williams Act and attendant SEC regulations are complemented by the disclo-
sure mandated by the SEC's going private rule, Rule 13e-3.143 The Exchange Act
requires the target company's directors to take a public position on the offer by
filing a statement on a Schedule 14D-9.'44
With respect to the anti-manipulation rules, where the bidder's offer is for
less than all shares, there is a pro rata acceptance requirement which is designed
to limit the pressure on shareholders to make hurried choices.'45 By virtue of
Rule 14e-1(a) tender offers must remain open for at least 20 business days
146
which should reduce the pressure on shareholders to make hurried choices. The
SEC's rules also give shareholders the ability to change their mind by creating
withdrawal rights. 14 7 Furthermore, the Williams Act requires that if the offeror
increases the price before the expiration of the offer, the higher price must also be
paid to shareholders who have already tendered.
148
The legislative history of the Williams Act speaks loudly of Congressional intent
to favor neither bidders nor targets; t49 hence in tender offer freezeouts, neither
controllers nor minorities. Again, Congress' focus was on affording the target com-
pany's shareholders the information necessary to make rational, informed choices
in their self interest.10 Hence, the federal tender offer scheme is not intended to
141. Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2000)) requires that any
person planning a tender offer subject to the Exchange Act's registration and reporting requirements
must file all solicitations, advertisements, and any other materials used in connection with the offer
with the SEC prior to the distribution of the tender offer material. The tender offeror must file a long
form Schedule TO, 17 C.ER. § 240.14d-100 (2007).
142. See Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000)) and 17 C.ER.
§ 240.14e-1 (2007).
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). The disclosure called for by SEC Rule
13e-3, 17 C.ER. § 240.13e-3 (2007), applies to going private deals irrespective of whether they
are structured as cash-out mergers (where proxies or information statements are required to be
filed) or tender offer freezeouts (where tender offer filings must be made, consistent with 17 C.ER.
§ 240.14d-3 (2007)). Under Rule 13e-3, the bidder must file, update, and finalize a Schedule 13E-3
with the SEC. In both instances the Rule 13e-3 disclosures are adjunctive to the proxy or tender
offer statement disclosures.
144. See Section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (2000)); Schedule
14D-9, 17 C.ER. § 240.14d-101 (2007). Schedule 14D-9 is the disclosure document that must be filed
in connection with any recommendation for or against tender offers. 17 C.ER. § 240.14d-9 (2007).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 n(d)(6) (2000);17 C.ER. § 240.14d-8 (2007).
146. 17 C.ER. § 240.14e-l(a) (2007).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (2000); 17 C.ER. § 240.14d-7 (2007).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2000).
149. For analysis and citation to the legislative history of the Williams Act, see Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 30-31, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) ("The sponsors of this legislation were
plainly sensitive to the suggestion that the measure would favor one side or the other in control contests;
however, they made it clear that the legislation was designed solely to get needed information to the
investor, the constant focal point of the committee hearings. Senator Williams articulated this singleness
of purpose, even while advocating neutrality: 'We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales
either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids. S. 510 is designed
solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors.' 113 Cong. Rec. 24664 (1967).").
150. See id.
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preempt or displace state regulation of bidders (including controllers) or targets
(including special committee directors). Nothing in federal tender offer regulation
speaks to the appropriate allocation of gains arising from a freezeout tender offer
(that is "fair price") or the role of target directors in taking affirmative actions, as
opposed to taking a public opinion, in response to a tender offer. Congress, the
SEC, and the federal courts have allowed state corporate law to occupy the field in
this area-to decide the appropriate scope of fiduciary requirements for control-
lers and target directors in tender offers.
One explanation for why tender offers did not become popular earlier as vehicles
for freezeouts is that it is impossible wholly to eliminate the minority sharehold-
ers through a tender offer. To transform a tender offer into a freezeout, controllers
typically execute a short-form merger after the tender offer is completed. Through
the short-form merger, controllers are able to eliminate the last, holdout minority
shareholders. Section 253 of the DGCL facilitates this process by providing that
once a controller has obtained at least 90% of the outstanding voting stock of the
target, the controller can effectuate the short-form merger unilaterally and almost
immediately1 5 1 No agreement or negotiation with the target directors or vote by
the remaining public shareholders is required to effectuate the short-form merger.
Hence, if a controller obtains 90% or more of the target company's stock in the
tender offer, the second step of the tender offer freezeout is assured.
Given that the transactional technology to combine tender offers and short
form mergers had existed for decades, it is surprising that controllers had not
earlier combined them as a vehicle for going private. The best explanation for this
appears to be that the uncertainty over the applicable standard of review for the
short form merger discouraged this technique.152 In 2001 the Delaware Supreme
Court's Glassman decision resolved that the Entire Fairness standard would not be
applied to short-form mergers. 5 3 Many commentators believed that tender offer
freezeouts would quickly eclipse cash-out mergers as vehicles for going private,
but the evidence does not suggest that an overall shift towards tender offer freeze-
outs has occurred. 1
54
Part III of this Article is devoted to an in-depth analysis of tender offer freeze-
out doctrine, but some broad observations are appropriate at this juncture. First,
in tender offer freezeout doctrine before Pure state corporate fiduciary law in
essence yielded the floor to federal tender offer law and the bare statutory require-
ments applicable to short-form mergers under the DGCL. Prior to Pure and Cox,
the fiduciary prohibition on "fraud" and "coercion" in controllers' tender offers
added little to the protection afforded minorities under federal law. This is highly
uncharacteristic of corporate fiduciary law's role in high stakes M&A transactions,
yet consistent with the concept of transactional choreography described in the
151. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a) (2007).
152. This matter was resolved in the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Glassman, 777 A.2d
242, described infra Part Il.A.2.
153. Glassman, 777 A.2d 242.
154. See Subramanian, Theory and Evidence, supra note 23, at 1 (indicating that as of 2005, at least
2/3 of freezeouts proceeded through cash-out mergers).
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Introduction. The disclosure-is-enough approach that characterizes federal secu-
rities law does not "rub off" on corporate fiduciary law's oversight of mergers with
third parties,' or third parties' tender offers and boards' responses to them.5 6
In these areas extensive fiduciary requirements sit atop the state statutory archi-
tecture and the federal disclosure mandates. Delaware's failure to address target
directors' fiduciary duties in responding to a controller's tender offer certainly
cannot be explained in terms of defacto preemption therefore.
Perhaps an explanation for the comparatively laissezfaire character of Delaware's
tender offer freezeout doctrine is that the courts have assumed that the substan-
tive anti-coercion provisions in federal tender offer regulation (the all holders'-
best price, pro-rata acceptance, minimum 20 days' time provisions, etc. described
above) adequately protect minorities' interests in controllers' tender offers. There
are several problems with this conclusion however. First, none of the cases sug-
gest this rationale, either expressly or implicitly Second, the legislative history to
the Williams' Act evidences Congress' intent to favor neither bidders nor targets
but to maintain a "level playing field." This effort to favor neither bidders nor
targets, is also apparent in the federal cases interpreting the Act.' Because the
Williams Act's and SEC rules' substantive anti-coercion provisions are not aimed
at minorities in specific, they do not address the distinct power advantages pos-
sessed by controllers in tender offers. Third, state corporate fiduciary law affirms
target board's authority to defend against unsatisfactory and coercive third party
tender offers. 58 If the Delaware courts had reached a consensus that the anti-coercion
provisions present in federal law were sufficient to protect target shareholders in
tender offers, then such broad defensive authority for target directors would not
have arisen in the case law governing third parties' bids. Hence, the existence
of a scheme of federal regulation in the area of tender offers does not provide
a satisfactory explanation for the comparatively laissezfaire approach to minorities'
rights evident in Solomon'5 9 and the recent court of chancery tender offer freeze-
out cases.
To the extent that the court of chancery has furnished explanations for this com-
paratively laissezfaire approach and the rejection of the Entire Fairness standard
155. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (in evaluating a proposed
merger the directors must inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them).
156. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (defenses that are nei-
ther preclusive nor coercive fall within the permissible range of defenses available to target directors);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (directors can respond to threat
to corporation by adopting reasonable takeover defenses).
157. For example, in the landmark case of Piper v Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the
Supreme Court refused to afford a private remedy to the tender offeror who lost to the winning bidder.
158. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ("Finally, the board's power to act derives from its fundamental
duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm
reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source."); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1355 (Del. 1985) (approving target board's use of poison pill to defend against coercive or inadequate
tender offers).
159. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39-40; see also Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp. 537 A.2d 1051,
1056 (Del. Ch. 1987) (enumerating conduct that would be deemed coercive in controllers' tender
offers for preferred shares).
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in tender offer freezeouts in particular, it has pointed to the fact that the DGCL
is simply silent on the subject of tender offers.'60 It is true that the DGCL fails to
address whether target boards have a role in responding to a tender offer. This
statutory silence is startling in comparison to the extensive statutory provisions
governing mergers in the DGCL, and in particular, the requirement that mergers can-
not proceed without the assent of the target company's board. 6' The absence of
a DGCL requirement of target director approval for a tender offer has been inter-
preted by the Delaware courts as affirmation that no corporate level transaction
occurs in a tender offer freezeout-because otherwise the DGCL would require
some response from the board. 1
62
Prior to Pure, the Delaware courts assumed that minority shareholders (because
they faced only a personal decision about what to do with their own property, i.e.
their stock) were capable of fending for themselves in a tender offer freezeout and
did not experience coercion in a controller's tender offer. From a more formal per-
spective, it was possible to conclude that the controller's tender offer did not con-
form to the "at both sides" model of a self-dealing transaction, so that heightened
fiduciary safeguards were unwarranted. After Pure's affirmation of the coercive
forces inherent in tender offer freezeouts, controllers' power for overreaching in
these transactions is more apparent. Controllers' tender offers are not importantly
distinguishable from classic self-dealing transactions, and are more problematic
for minorities than third parties' tender offers. 163 Consistent with this view, neither
the Pure nor Cox opinion argues against Entire Fairness' application to tender
other freezeouts on the rationale that minorities are adequately protected under
federal law, or because tender offer freezeouts do not involve fundamental, corpo-
rate change that merits a board's attention. Rather they argue against applying the
Entire Fairness standard to tender offer freezeouts because this approach may
stimulate more freezeouts and discourage litigation. However, these two broad
160. In re Pure, 808 A.2d at 437 ("Tender offers are not addressed by the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law ("DGCL"), a factor that has been of great importance in shaping the line of decisions
addressing tender offers by controlling stockholders...."); id. at 437-38 ("Because no consent or
involvement of the target board is statutorily mandated for tender offers, our courts have recognized
that "[iun the case of totally voluntary tender offers.., courts do not impose a right of the shareholders
to receive a particular price."). From a statutory perspective, an activist role for the target board can
be grounded in the board's plenary authority under Section 141 of the DGCL. See DEL. CODE tit. 8,
§ 141 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, § 1 (2007). Moreover, in tender offers from third
parties, the Delaware courts have established a rich and nuanced set of equitable principles that affirm
target directors' duties to defend the company and the shareholders from inadequate or coercive bids.
No such equivalent equitable authority is recognized in the case law in relation to controllers' bids,
although they create an even greater risk of coercion and unfairness than tender offers from third
parties do. The paradox is explored in Pure, 808 A.2d at 429-31. Furthermore, consistent with the
landmark Schnell decision, courts have extended fiduciary principles based on the exigencies of
the context in the interest of protecting the parties and reducing the agency costs of capital. They have
very rarely been constrained by the statutory architecture. See id. at 434 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437,440 (Del 1971) ("[Ilnequitable action does not become permissible simply
because it is legally possible.")).
161. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(b) (2007).
162. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 441.
163. For further discussion of controllers' ability to act coercively in a tender offer freezeout, see
Part III.B., infra.
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policy goals are more controversial and complex in their practical effects than
these opinions acknowledge.
In conclusion, the background to the tender offer freezeout standards endorsed
in Pure and Cox is a mosaic of federal and state statutes and cases that do not form
a consistent picture with the broader framework of corporate fiduciary law or,
especially, the standards the Delaware Supreme Court has endorsed for cash-out
mergers.
II. INCONSISTENT LEGAL APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDERS' DUTY TO PAY A FAIR PRICE IN FREEZEOUTS
At present there are three distinct legal regimes that define minorities' entitle-
ments in freezeouts. First, in tender offer freezeouts, consistent with the Solomon
decision, 64 courts decline to impose a fair price duty on controllers.1 65 Secondly,
the appraisal statutes provide that shareholders eliminated in cash-out mergers
must receive "fair value."'6 6 Thirdly, under Lynch's Entire Fairness standard, as
applied to controllers' cash-out mergers, minorities are entitled to receive a "fair
price" in the transaction. 167 The disparate definitions of fair price in these three
legal regimes affect investors ex post, in defining the financial remedies minorities
may obtain in litigation, as well as ex ante by influencing the prices minorities will
demand and controllers will offer in freezeout negotiations.'68
Consistent with the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the prices that minori-
ties will pay for their securities at the time of their original issuance will reflect
a judgment regarding the securities' relevant risk/retum profile, including the
potential for opportunism by those in control. 69 Of course, there are many fac-
tors that influence the risks relevant to an investment, but the existence of three
non-equivalent legal schemes defining minorities' financial entitlements in freez-
eouts has certainly increased the level of risk attendant to holding a minority
equity stake by creating inconsistent and opaque understandings about the finan-
cial entitlements attaching to a minority stake. 170 Again, these conflicting legal
164. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
165. Pure, 808 A.2d at 438 ("To begin with, the controlling stockholder is said to have no duty to
pay a fair price, irrespective of its power over the subsidiary").
166. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, §§ 11-16 (2007). For
an analysis of the fair value standard relevant to appraisal actions, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh and
Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119 (2005);
Brett A. Margolin and Samuel J. Kursh, The Economics of Delaware Fair Value, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 413
(2005); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value,
47 DUKE L. J. 613 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can
Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359
(1996).
167. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115 (citation omitted).
168. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637 (1976).
169. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 146
(1991). For a discussion of investors' rational expectations regarding the trade-off of risk and return and
their connection to appraisal's standard of fair value, see Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 426-27.
170. Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 426-27.
806 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 62, May 2007
schemes of financial entitlements are relevant to the price that minorities should
pay to purchase the shares and also to the price they should demand in a sale,
including a freezeout.
Achieving unity and clarity in the scheme of financial entitlements applicable
to freezeouts should yield two forms of economic benefits. First, there will be less
room for controllers to exploit these ambiguities relevant to price as a means to
appropriate wealth from minorities in freezeouts-i.e. less room for "structural
arbitrage." Second, a clear legal standard that would effectively limit controllers'
overreaching in freezeouts should reduce companies' and controllers' costs of
raising minority equity stakes.' 7 ' Hence, achieving a unified doctrinal approach
to fair price in freezeouts should benefit investors and companies overall.1
72
A. IN TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUTS FAIR PRICE
IS THE MARKET PRICE
The presumption validated in Solomon is that minority shareholders can decide
for themselves whether to hold or sell their shares in a controller's tender offer.
73
The working assumption is that because minorities are capable of making choices
in their self-interest, heightened equitable protections, including a fair price require-
ment, are unnecessary. On this presumption, Solomon and subsequent courts have
held that no fair price duty attaches to controllers' tender offers for minorities'
shares. Hence, Solomon treats controllers as being on a par with third parties in
tender offers for minorities' shares. (Third parties, have no duty to offer a legally
set minimum price in a tender offer). The problem with the Solomon approach is
that it ignores the substantial advantages that controllers have over third parties
in making a tender offer.
The view that target shareholders can make free choices in their self-interest is
more reasonable in relation to third parties' offers. First, under Delaware fiduciary
doctrine in responding to third party tender offers, the target board has been
empowered to function as an effective bargaining agent for the shareholders' best
interests. 174 The same is not true in controllers' tender offers-the law has not
empowered the target board to seek alternatives to and defend against controllers'
offers.' 75 In a third party's tender offer, if the offered price is perceived as being too
low, the board or special committee will have a variety of defenses it can employ
171. For further explanation, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 787-88.
172. The academic literature has failed to address the increased risks for minorities arising from the
three distinct legal schemes relevant to pricing in freezeouts. On the need for clarity in the appraisal
standard itself-in the interest of protecting minorities' interests, reducing agency costs and hence
reducing firms' cost of raising outside equity capital-see e.g. Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at
415 ("Hence, corporate law's economic function is to reduce the firm's cost of equity capital through
the governance of managerial malfeasance. Appraisal rights serve this purpose by preventing manage-
ment from forcing the minority to tender its shares at less than Fair Value.").
173. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
174. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
175. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 446.
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while it seeks financial or transactional alternatives. 76 In addition, the market for
corporate control ensures that if the third party's bid remains too low, an alterna-
tive bidder will commonly appear on the scene. In the context of a controller's ten-
der offer, however, the market for corporate control is stymied by the controller's
presence because of the controller's potential exercise of its voting power to thwart
a sale to a third party.
17
In addition, an outside third party bidder will not have access to confidential
information at the target which it could use to launch an offer while the target's
board and minority shareholders remain ignorant about a pending increase in
value or profitable alteration of the firm's business plan. In contrast, access to
this kind of information and the timing advantage it affords controllers creates
a serious risk of opportunism in freezeouts.178 Moreover, in an arms' length ten-
der offer, the bidder will lack any ability to coerce the target board or minority
shareholders with threats of diminishing shareholder value ex post if the freeze-
out is thwarted-the inherent coercion phenomenon is irrelevant in third parties'
tender offers. Each of these factors distinguishes third parties' tender offers from
controllers,' and points to reasons for applying a fair price duty in tender offer
freezeouts.
Corporate law's role in reducing agency costs, and hence firms' cost of capital,
is also a reason to enforce a legal minimum fair price in tender offer freezeouts. As
observed in corporate legal scholarship, corporate law establishes a benchmark
level of irremediable agency costs to which minorities are exposed. 179 The market
trading price of the minorities' shares will reflect a discount to going concern
value that registers the presence of the controller and this risk of overreaching
by it. 180 With third parties' tender offers, the market trading price will still reflect
some level of irremediable managerial agency costs, but a third party bidder has no
176. For a discussion of recent innovations in takeover defenses and their legal regulation, see
David A. Katz, Takeover Law and Practice, 2006 (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) (describing develop-
ments through November 8, 2006), available at http://www.ipba.org/calendar/documents/4d-David-
katz_Takeover_Law andPractice_2006-Asis_M&AForum.PDE
177. Id. This assumes a true majority controller. Where there is a defacto controller who owns less
than absolute voting control, as was true in Cysive for example, then the freezeout would involve a
"change in control," and Revlon duties should apply to the target board. For further discussion see
Part V, intra. This issue has not been meaningfully discussed in the cases or the literature.
178. Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 120. See also Coffee, supra note 166, at 416 (pro-
posing rule to protect minorities from controllers' exploitation of confidential information of target).
179. For the general point, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAw (1991). For corporate fiduciary law's role in this regard, see Gilson & Gordon, supra
note 5, at 786-87. For appraisal's role in relation to controlling controller opportunism, see, e.g.,
Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 414-16. For an argument that pending but undisclosed altera-
tions in the target's business model that prove profitable should be included in the fair value calculus
in appraisals see Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 145-48. The contemporary analysis of
agency costs reflects into the seminal work of Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (observing
that agency costs arise once outside equity capital is used).
180. Professors Gilson and Gordon analyze the web of legal safeguards relevant to controllers' deal-
ings affecting minorities as trading off the benefits of reduced managerial agency costs and controller's
siphoning private benefits of control in their own interest. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at
785-87,843.
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power to engage in fiduciary/insider self-dealing to drive down the market price
of the stock in order to compel an unfair acquisition. In contrast, if controllers
are not required to pay pro rata going concern value in their tender offer freeze-
outs, then they will have an opportunity and incentive to undermanage the
firm and drive down the market price of shares in anticipation of a tender offer
freezeout."'5 In the absence of a fair price requirement, the greater the controller's
malfeasance, the deeper the market's apprehension, the steeper the market trad-
ing discount, the lower the price the controller would have to offer to succeed in
the tender offer freezeout. ' 2 The absence of a fair price duty in controllers' tender
offer freezeouts operates in effect as a hole in the fiduciary web of prohibitions on
malfeasance by controllers, and portends a downward cycle of returns to minori-
ties, and consequently an increase in the cost of raising minority equity stakes. In
sum, the absence of a fair price duty in controllers' tender offer freezeouts is a very
serious matter-one that relates to the most fundamental structures of corporate
law and their influence on M&A and capital markets.
B. CASH-OUT MERGER FREEZEOUTS AND THE "FAIR VALUE"
STANDARD APPLIED IN APPRAISAL ACTIONS
Delaware's appraisal statute18 3 provides financial recourse for shareholders
who are eliminated through a cash-out merger at less than "fair value," as defined
therein. 8 ' By its express terms it applies only in a merger or consolidation involv-
ing cash consideration. 85 Depending on the precise attributes of the tender offer
freezeout, appraisal may be available in the back end, short-form merger, but it is
unavailable to shareholders who sell to a controller in the tender offer portion of
a tender offer freezeout.
186
In defining the appropriate remedy for the courts to award in an appraisal, sec-
tion 262(h) of the DGCL provides that shareholders should receive the "fair value"
of their shares.'87 In specific, the statute states that the court of chancery shall:
181. For further discussion of the myriad ways that controllers can obtain private profits from
corporate control-many of them legal or at least not remediable at law, see John C. Coates, "Fair
Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REv.
1251, 1274 (1999).
182. See, e.g., Margolin & Kursh, supra note 166, at 414-15.
183. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws. ch. 145, §§ 11-16 (2007).
184. For an excellent analysis of fair value in Delaware appraisals see, Hamermesh & Wachter,
supra note 166 (exploring the alternative notions of valuation in the case law on fair value in apprais-
als). For discussion of the appraisal statute and its role in corporate law, see Robert B. Thompson, Exit,
Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L. J. 1 (1995); see also Randall
S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L REv. 1, 16-17 (2000) (describing narrow
scope of appraisal and situations where appraisal rights should exist).
185. DEL. CODE. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws. ch. 145, §§ 11-12 (2007).
186- Ordinarily, the consideration in the short form merger would be cash; but this is not necessar-
ily the case. Appraisal is unavailable where the consideration in the merger is shares in the acquire.
Id. It is not uncommon for a tender offer freezeout to offer shares of the acquirer as consideration, as
was true in Pure. Pure, 808 A.2d at 421.
187. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 § 14 (2007). Cf. ABA
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 13.02(a) (2005); Wertheimer, supra note 166, at 626-27 ("The statutory com-
mand in an appraisal proceeding is to find the 'fair value' of the dissenting shares, or sometimes the
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determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value. In deter-
mining such fair value, the court shall take into account all relevant factors.
Valuation in appraisal actions is complicated by the fact that the statute provides
only this very loose definition of fair value. 1 8 Given the open-ended definition of
fair value in the statute ("all relevant factors"), the task of creating a workably clear
standard of "fair value" has fallen to the courts.
There are certain longstanding ambiguities in the definition of fair value
reflected in the Delaware case law.189 The thorniest of these relates to which forms
of post-merger gains should be included in "fair value."' 9° Leaving this significant
problem aside,' 9t the core concept of fair value is clear, and has remained almost
entirely constant through the years. Cashed-out shareholders are entitled to be
paid the value of what has been taken from them in the merger. 192 For purposes of
an appraisal, corporate shares represent a pro rata interest in the company valued
as a going concern. Accordingly, "fair value" is often referred to as "going concern
value" or "intrinsic value."'1
9 3
"Going concern value" as the core concept of "fair value" for appraisal pur-
poses was firmly established in the Delaware case law by the mid 20th cen-
tury, as reflected in the often cited case of Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye. 94 Thirty
years later, the Supreme Court cited Tri-Continental favorably and expansively
in Weinberger's landmark treatment of fair value in appraisals-again, validating
'fair market value' or 'fair cash value.' Fair value is typically defined by statute as 'the value of the shares
immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding
any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action."' (citations omitted)).
188. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 § 14 (2007).
189. These ambiguities reflect the changing nature of the appraisal remedy At first appraisal seems
to have been intended to facilitate the law's abandonment of the universal consent requirement for
fundamental corporate changes, which had allowed minorities the ability to hold up value-enhancing
mergers with third parties. The appraisal remedy eliminated such hold-up potential, while compensat-
ing the dissenting shareholders for what they lost, and providing them liquidity Over time, appraisal
has become more important in preventing oppression by controllers in cash-out mergers. For discus-
sion of the changing nature of the appraisal remedy and its impact on the development of the fair value
concept, see Wertheimer, supra, note 166.
190. This issue was litigated most notoriously in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 684 A.2d 289 (Del.
1996). For discussion, see Jesse A. Finkelstein and Russell C. Silberglied, Technicolor IV: Appraisal Valu-
ation in a Two-Step Merger, 52 Bus. LAw. 801 (1997).
191. For treatment of this issue, see Harmermesh and Wachter, supra note 166, at 138 (presenting
the argument in favor of employing a definition of fair value that encompasses not only "the cur-
rent asset stock and the return on those assets" but also the value arising from "reinvestment in new
assets").
192. See, e.g., Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000) (affirming that apprais-
al's fair value concept presumes that the cashed-out shareholders would have maintained their invest-
ment had the merger not occurred).
193. For analysis and citation to the cases, see Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 137-39.
For citation to extensive Delaware precedent employing going concern value as the benchmark for fair
value, see id. at 132 n.56.
194. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) ("The basic concept of value under
the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from
him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.").
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the definition of fair value as going concern value. (It's remarkable but true that
Weinberger both established the foundation of modern freezeout doctrine for
cash-out mergers and also the foundations of modern appraisal methodology
in relation to the fair value determination.) Weinberger rejected the mechanistic
"Delaware block method" that had governed valuations in appraisal actions.195
In its place, the court endorsed "a more liberal approach... [to] include proof
of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered accept-
able in the financial community.1.,96 Consistent with the forward-looking
notion of going concern value and modern finance theory, discounted cash
flow is the most accepted valuation methodology for appraisal actions. 197 Most
importantly for this discussion Weinberger affirmed that appraisal is intended
to be an expansive remedy for cashed-out shareholders and that courts should
proceed accordingly 9
The expansive, forward looking interpretation of "fair value" established by
Weinberger has held to the present. For example, the supreme court's decision
in Glassman affirmed Weinberger's expansive approach to fair value analysis in
appraisals. As stated in Glassman:
[t]he determination of fair value must be based on all relevant factors, including dam-
ages and elements of future value, where appropriate. So, for example, if the merger
was timed to take advantage of a depressed market, or a low point in the company's
cyclical earnings, or to precede an anticipated positive development, the appraised
value may be adjusted to account for those factors.' 99
Glassman's definition of fair value thus expressly speaks to the problem of oppor-
tunistic timing in cash-out mergers-which is a special concern in controllers'
transactions. And Glassman, and the other contemporary cases interpreting fair
195. Weinberger 457 A.2d at 712-13.
196. Id. at 713.
197. For cases dissecting the components of discounted cash flow ("DCF") see, e.g. In re Emerging
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Cons. Civ. A. No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *43
(Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) ("...the parties focus almost exclusively upon DCF valuation issues... Ac-
cordingly this Opinion addresses only the valuation issues presented by the parties' competing DCF
approaches."); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 917 (Del. Ch. 1999); and Grimes v. Vital-
ink Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12334, 1997 Del Ch. LEXIS 124, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1997)
(observing that the DCF approach is "increasingly the model of choice for valuations in this Court"),
clarified by 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 159 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 1997), aff'd, 1998 Del. LEXIS 127 (Del.
Apr. 1, 1998). The DCF approach to defining going concern value was first endorsed by the court
of chancery in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 19, 1990).
198. The court stated:
In determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts
must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fix-
ing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earnings prospects, the nature of the
enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of
merger and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only per-
tinent to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered
by the agency fixing the value.
Weinberger 457 A.2d at 713 (emphasis in original).
199. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 (emphasis in original).
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value in appraisals, attribute little significance to the public trading price of the
minorities' shares, consistent with the concern over the minority discount.
2 0 0
The logic of the fair value remedy (understood as going concern value) has held
up remarkably well under contemporary financial economics.2 0' In particular,
the fair value requirement would foster value-creating merger freezeouts so long
as the minority shareholders are not left worse off-that is, so long as the merger
is Pareto-superior. 02 This fits with the economics-based logic that Delaware cor-
porate law should encourage transactions that increase wealth overall-so long as
no party to the transaction is rendered worse off.
B03
Unfortunately, there are features of the appraisal statute that radically limit the
utility of appraisal actions for minorities in freezeouts. These limits often make
appraisal's "fair value" an unattainable remedy for minorities in freezeouts. 0 4 By
far the most important limitation affecting appraisal rights is that they are unavail-
able to minorities who sell to a controller in a tender offer. As described previ-
ously, the Delaware statute contemplates that appraisals are not available in tender
offers.10 5 In addition, appraisal is unavailable if the freezeout contemplates that
the consideration in the merger will be securities in the controller, or in any pub-
licly traded corporation, despite the controller's ability unilaterally to determine
the securities the minority will receive in the freezeout.2 11 Minorities who do not
formally dissent from a cash-out merger prior to the shareholder vote thereon
are precluded from pursuing an appraisal.0 7 Also, appraisal rights can be per-
fected only by the record holders of the shares 208-which generates confusion and
200. See Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *83-84 ("... the market price of shares is
not always indicative of fair value. Our appraisal cases so confirm .... Moreover, because Prosser always
owned the majority interest, the market price of ECM stock always reflected a minority discount.");
Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 132 ("If the shares' current market price were used to value
the firm, the controller would be encouraged to under-manage, since the more it did so, the less it
would have to pay for the minority interest in a squeeze out merger.").
201. For a discussion of corporate valuation in which going concern value approximates financial
economists' understanding of "fundamental value," see Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When
Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 798 (2003) ("ITihe corpo-
ration's fundamental value is the sum of the free cash flows generated by the company's assets.").
For further discussion of going concern value and DCF as a basis for valuation, see, e.g., RICHARD A.
BREALEY, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, at 509-511 (8th ed. 2006).
202. For a discussion of Pareto efficiency versus Kaldor Hicks efficiency and their relevance to
corporate fiduciary law, see, e.g. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common Law of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 84 Ky. L. J. 455, 469-71 (1995-96) (proposing that corporate fiduciary law
mandates managers to take all actions that "move corporate shareholders to Pareto superior states").
203. Id. This logic is distinct from that which bars a corporate fiduciary from profiting at a benefi-
ciary's expense, as a mode of encouraging investment in the corporate form.
204. Observing the hurdles attendant to pursuing appraisal actions, commentators have noted the
comparative paucity of appraisal actions since Weinberger affirmed the equitable cause of action arising
under the Entire Fairness standard. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 789-99; Pure, 808 A.2d at
436 n.20 ("Another underpinning of the Lynch line of cases is an implicit perception that the statutory
remedy of appraisal is a less than fully adequate protection for stockholders facing Inherent Coercion
from a proposed squeeze out merger.").
205. See DEt. CODE tit. 8, § 262(b) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, §§ 11, 12 (2007).
206. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(b)(3) (2007). This limitation falls away if the controller compels
a short-form merger under DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (2007), however.
207. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(d) (2007).
208. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(a) (2007).
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administrative complexity that defeats some claims. The time period for initiating
an appraisal action is brief-120 days from the date of the merger.2"9 Hence it is
not uncommon for minority shareholders to miss the window of opportunity to
initiate an appraisal action. In addition, in order to proceed with an appraisal,
the plaintiff shareholders may be required to submit their stock certificates to the
Register in Chancery, and may have their action dismissed if they fail to submit
them.210 During the period of the proceedings-which typically last nearly four
years on average2'-the shareholders will not have received any consideration
for the sale of their shares.2"2 Finally, perhaps most significantly, the absence of
a class-based mechanism for proceeding in an appraisal action limits the efficacy
of the appraisal remedy and consequently minorities' recourse to fair value in
freezeouts.113 The costs of pursuing individual and even consolidated appraisal
actions are often prohibitive for minorities eliminated in freezeouts.
In sum, notwithstanding the clarity of appraisal's promise of going concern
value, the limits and practical hurdles that apply to appraisal actions have sent
negative signals to minorities about their potential to rely on appraisal actions
to obtain fair value in a freezeout. Controllers can significantly discount the cost
of judicial awards of fair value in appraisals as they weigh the relative benefits of
pursuing a freezeout and its optimal form from their perspective. In this regard,
the limitations inherent in appraisal actions have facilitated controllers' ability to
offer minorities less than going concern value even in a cash-out merger. These
limitations mean that the cause of action arising in equity under Lynch's Entire
Fairness standard is of great importance for minorities. Of course, in contemplat-
ing a freezeout offer, controllers will compare the scope of both the fair value and
fair price actions against the absence of a fair price duty in their tender offers for
minority shares.
C. THE "FAIR PRICE" STANDARD APPLIED IN EQUITABLE
ACTIONS IN CASH-OUT MERGERS
Professors Gilson and Gordon have described the cause of action arising under
Lynch's Entire Fairness standard as "the equivalent of a class appraisal proceeding
without the need for shareholders actually to perfect their appraisal rights."" 4
This statement fails to account for significant differences between the causes of
action for fair price and fair value, differences relevant not only to process (i.e. liti-
gation) but also substantive differences in the potential remedies. Importantly, as
these professors suggest, the equitable fair price action is not limited in its efficacy
by the myriad requirements and qualifications that face minorities in appraisal
209. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(e) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, § 13 (2007).
210. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(g) (2007).
211. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 144 n.102 ("... the average appraisal proceed-
ing lasts nearly four years.").
212. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(a), (k) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, § 16 (2007).
213. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(a), (j) (2007).
214. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 831-32.
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actions. Perhaps most importantly, minorities can proceed through a class action
in Entire Fairness claims.21 This is a hugely important procedural difference, one
which makes the cause of action under the Entire Fairness standard, and the fair
price duty thereunder, an extraordinarily meaningful one for minorities.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the professors' suggestion about the equivalence
between fair value and fair price, Weinberger and the cases applying it suggest that
there may be meaningful valuation differences in these standards. In specific,
fair price may provide a more expansive measure of damages for minorities in
freezeouts.21 6 If the controller is found culpable of gross misconduct, as stated
in Weinberger "[the] appraisal remedy... may not be adequate in certain cases,
particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of cor-
porate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved."21 7 This difference
between the more limited scope of the appraisal remedy and the potentially more
expansive scope of the remedy in a fiduciary action against a controller in a cash-
out merger has been affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, for example in
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc.2 ' In appraisal actions, going concern value reflects
the upper limit of a recovery. The dissenting shareholders can anticipate a maxi-
mum benefit from the appraisal proceedings of the "fair value" of what was taken
from them in the cash-out merger. The court in an appraisal has discretion also
to award interest going back to the merger date, to compensate for the value-loss
attributable to the delayed payout,21 9 as well as the award of litigation costs.220
But based on the statute and its interpretation in the case law, the computation
215. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1111 (noting that the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of all share-
holders of the acquired company whose stock had been procured through the merger).
216. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711; Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115 (citing Weinberger).
217. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
218. The Delaware Supreme Court stated:
To summarize, in a section 262 appraisal action [under the DGCL] the only litigable issue is the
determination of the value of the appraisal petitioners' shares on the date of the merger, the only
party defendant is the surviving corporation and the only relief available is a judgment against
the surviving corporation for the fair value of the dissenters' shares. In contrast, a fraud action
asserting fair dealing and fair price claims affords an expansive remedy and is brought against
the alleged wrongdoers to provide whatever relief the facts of a particular case may require. In
evaluating claims involving violations of entire fairness, the trial court may include in its relief
any damages sustained by the shareholders. See Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107; Weinberger, 457 A.2d
at 713. In a fraud claim, the approach to determining relief may be the same as that employed
in determining fair value under 8 Del. C. § 262. However, an appraisal action may not provide
a complete remedy for unfair dealing or fraud because a damage award in a fraud action may
include "rescissory damages if the [trier of fact] considers them susceptible of proof and a remedy
appropriate to all issues of fairness before him." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. Weinberger and Rab-
kin make this clear distinction in terms of the relief available in a section 262 action as opposed
to a fraud in the merger suit.
Cede, 542. A.2d at 1187-88 (citations in the original). Compare Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 70, at *94-95 (noting that in an appraisal the court may compute a prejudgment interest award
to effect disgorgement by the acquirer of any benefit obtained from the use of the funds, as well as the
lost time value of the money; citing Cede & Co. JRC Acquisitions Corp., No. 18648, 2004 WL 286963,
at *12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004)).
219. See DEt. CODE tit. 8, § 262(i) (2007).
220. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(j) (2007).
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of fair value is supposed to be blind to malfeasance by an acquirer-even if it
is a controller, i.e. a fiduciary. In this regard, appraisal under-deters fiduciary
wrongdoing in freezeouts. In contrast, if a controller has been found culpable of
fraud or significant overreaching in an action under the Lynch Doctrine, it may be
forced to pay a larger award to the plaintiffs. This flows from the express language
of Weinberger cited above.22" '
Indeed, the structure of remedies for breach of fiduciary loyalty, consistent with
the expansive fair price remedy established in Weinberger allows disgorgement of
profits obtained as the result of a breach of duty For example, where a corporate
fiduciary is found culpable of taking a corporate opportunity, the Delaware courts
have endorsed the imposition of a constructive trust on the profits arising from the
seizure of the business opportunity222 In addition, where a fiduciary has exploited
its access to confidential information for the purpose of personally profiting from
this information, the shareholders may bring a derivative action to require the
disgorgement of such profits, even absent a showing of harm to the corporation.
22 3
Hence, the remedy available in the cause of action for fiduciary breach against
controllers in cash-out mergers (i.e. fair price) is broader at the upper end, than
the remedy of going concern value applied in appraisals.
Commentators have generally assumed that in nonfraudulent cash-out mergers
by controllers, the fair price remedy is the same as appraisal's "fair value"-i.e.
going concern value. Weinberger suggests that this should often be the case; that
the fair price determination in nonfraudulent transactions will be analogous to
the expanded fair value remedy it affirms for appraisals.22 4 However, if appraisal
affords minorities only the fair value of what is taken in the cash-out merger,
then an analogous fair price standard allows controllers to capture all the antici-
pated synergy gains from the cash-out merger. If "fair value" and "fair price" are
intended to be equivalent then fair price may exist even if the minority receives
no financial benefit from the transaction. The standard of fair price asks only
whether the minority was injured by the cash-out merger, in comparison to its
financial position ex ante. This standard for fair price would be unusual as applied
221. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
222. See e.g. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Del. 1939) ("[hf, in such circumstances, the inter-
ests of the corporation are betrayed, the corporation may elect to claim all of the benefits of the trans-
action for itself, and the law will impress a trust in favor of the corporation upon the property, interests
and profits so acquired;.. a constructive trust is the remedial device through which precedence of self
is compelled to give way to the stem demands of loyalty"); see also Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate Oppor-
tunity Doctrine and Interested Director Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to Restore
Predictability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 524-25 (1999).
223. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 463 (Del. 1991) ("It is an act of disloyalty for a fiduciary
to profit personally from the use of information secured in a confidential relationship, even if such
profit or advantage is not gained at the expense of the fiduciary The result is nonetheless one of unjust
enrichment which will not be countenanced by a Court of Equity"); see also Brophy v. Cities Service
Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7-8 (Del. Ch. 1949).
224. Weinberger 457 A.2d at 714 ("...a plaintiff's monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined
to the more liberalized appraisal proceeding herein established, we do not intend any limitation on the
historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate.").
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to a self-dealing transaction. Entire Fairness analysis (should require) that the
transaction be mutually beneficial to be fair .25
Consistent with this idea, at several points Weinberger suggests that even absent
wrongdoing, the fair price standard for cash-out mergers is broader than the fair
value standard in appraisals.
Perhaps most importantly, Weinberger repeatedly states that fairness in a cash-
out merger must be equated to the outcome that would occur if the parties were
dealing at arms' length where a transaction occurs if mutually benefical. As stated
in Weinberger's famous footnote 7:
... fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly inde-
pendent board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is unfortunate
that this course apparently was neither considered nor pursued.... Particularly in a
parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as though each of the
parties had exerted its bargaining power against the other at arms' length is strong
evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.
22 6
The importance of this approach to fair price analysis under the Entire Fairness
standard is that a wholly independent board would not agree to a transaction that
conferred no monetary benefit on the minority shareholders, but merely left them
no worse off. Hence, this oft-cited passage from Weinberger supports a broader
understanding of "fair price" than the "fair value" determination relevant in an
appraisal, even absent wrongdoing by the controller.
This same logic, that fair price encompasses a broader measure of value than ex
ante going concern value, also explains one of the most puzzling features of the
Weinberger decision. Weinberger admonishes that the determination of fairness
is not a bifurcated one between fair price and fair process.2 2 7 (As stated previ-
ously, in appraisals the court does not consider the relevance of fair dealings to
fair value.) By insisting that the fairness of the price is not independent of the
negotiating process in a cash-out merger, Weinberger affirms a larger metric of
value under the rubric of "fair price" because an independent board negotiating
at arm's length would not agree to a transaction that did not financially benefit
the minority shareholder. Thus, "fair price" affords the minority some measure of
the synergy gains arising from the acquisition and may exceed "fair value's" ex ante
going concern value.22 8
This higher base-line value in the fair price construct also explains another con-
troversial passage in Weinberger-that is, where the court discusses what forms of
post-merger gains are to be incorporated into the new, unitary measure of value
225. See, e.g., Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976) (requiring controller/director to
establish that sale of assets to corporation was beneficial to the minority/corporation, in order to meet
the fair price criteria of the Entire Fairness standard).
226. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
227. Id. at 711.
228. In the terminology employed by Professors Gordon and Gilson, the fair price element of
the Entire Fairness standard ensures the minority a price that reflects the outcome of bargaining
in a bilateral monopoly, where a deal doesn't happen unless the welfare of each party is improved.
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 804.
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for fiduciary actions and appraisals. While the appraisal statute expressly states
that post-merger gains are to be excluded from "fair value, ' 229 Weinberger states
that only "speculative elements of value that may arise from the 'accomplishment
or expectation' of the merger" should be excluded in remedies for breach of fidu-
ciary duties.2 30 That is, reflecting its instinct that minorities will benefit from a uni-
form legal price standard for actions against cash-out mergers, the court expands
the scope of the fair value remedy to equate it with a "fair price" measure based
on arms' length dealings.
231
D. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD REQUIRING CONTROLLERS
TO PAY A FAIR PRICE IN FREEZEOUTS
The above analysis reveals three reasons why the cause of action against con-
trollers under the Entire Fairness standard is not a gratuitous add-on to the cause
of action established by the appraisal statutes-hence, three reasons why it is of
great importance to minorities. The first is that the limits and burdens attendant to
pursuing appraisal actions hinder a significant number of meritorious "fair value"
claims from proceeding. Minority shareholders who have been undercompen-
sated in a freezeout may have no practical remedy at all absent an action in equity
Second, the Lynch Doctrine backs the prohibition on overreaching and fraud by
controllers with added bite by providing for an expansive damages remedy in
cases where wrongdoing by the controller in a cash-out merger has been proven.
The third is that the "fair price" requirement under the Entire Fairness standard
contemplates that the controller (as a fiduciary) must offer a price that leaves the
minority shareholders, at least in some measure, better off from the freezeout-not
merely "no worse off." Consistent with the dictates of fiduciary duty, the Entire
Fairness standard looks not only to efficiency in an economist's sense (as gains
overall) but also to the distribution of gains arising from equity investment and
how that distribution affects the parties' investment costs and incentives.
This discussion yields several insights. First, freezeout doctrine is presently
underserving minorities' interests. The power advantages possessed by controllers
mean that controllers can exploit the disparities in legal price regimes described
above through "structural arbitrage." In effect, minorities' financial entitlements
in freezeouts are a moving target with controllers having the power to "do all the
moving."
Second, given these highly complex and nonequivalent legal constructs rel-
evant to pricing in freezeouts, it is highly unlikely that the securities markets are
229. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262(h) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145, § 14 (2007).
230. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. To emphasize the narrowness of this exclusion the opinion
provides: "We take this to be a very narrow exception to the appraisal [valuation] process, designed
to eliminate the use of proforma data and projections of a speculative variety relating to the com-
pletion of a merger." Id. Again, as Professors Hamermesh and Wachter have illuminated in their
discussion of "fair value" valuation, going concern value in an appraisal should not allocate any
synergy-specific gains from the merger to the minority. Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at
148-50.
231. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
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able accurately to price the risks attaching to minority equity investment. Thus,
the three non equivalent price regimes in corporate law may inadvertently help
controllers profit unfairly by selling minority equity stakes when the minorities'
vulnerability to controllers' financial overreaching is not fully evident. A uniform,
clear fair price standard applicable in equitable actions against freezeouts would
limit controllers' ability to exploit this market failure.
Finally, if Professors Gilson and Gordon are correct that there is an inevita-
ble interrelationship between the fiduciary safeguards that shape the conduct of
controllers in relation to operating decisions, sales of control and freezeout trans-
actions, 232 then the looser standards in tender offer cases represents a vulnerability
that (if accurately perceived) would negatively affect firms' cost of capital. Firms
that have recently been taken private will soon seek to sell minority equity stakes
in the public markets. If the fair price disparities in freezeout doctrine are not
resolved adequately, then minorities should pay relatively less for these securi-
ties than they would otherwise. This would be a bad result for the economy and
investors overall.
At present there is one important limit to controllers' capacity to obtain "the
best of all possible freezeouts" through structural arbitrage. Once the controller
has executed a cash-out merger agreement with the target company, the Entire
Fairness standard "sticks" to the freezeout irrespective of any subsequent struc-
tural modifications. Even if the controller abandons the negotiated merger agree-
ment and consummates the deal through a combined tender offer and short-form
merger, the courts apply the Entire Fairness standard to the entire freezeout. This
feature of freezeout doctrine has never been explicitly recognized in the case law
or academic commentary. Nor has it been tested through litigation. Nevertheless,
the Entire Fairness standard presently operates as a significant backstop protect-
ing minority shareholders' interests in freezeouts. It gives minority shareholders
some meaningful leverage in cash-out merger freezeout negotiations and limits
the benefits controllers can obtain through structural arbitrage in freezeouts. If the
Cox Reforms are affirmed as binding however, and the scope of Entire Fairness
review in freezeouts is significantly curtailed, minorities will lose this important
feature of their negotiating leverage, and controllers' will have greater capacity to
compel unfair freezeouts.
In light of the uncertainty being created by the "two tracks" in freezeout doctrine,
the Delaware courts should adopt a unified standard of fair price for freezeouts.
The laissezfaire approach endorsed in Solomon is inferior to the Lynch Doctrine's
fair price standard. If the courts allow the market price to become the benchmark
for fair price, they will be fostering a cycle of overreaching by controllers that
would be detrimental not only to investors but also to firms seeking to sell minor-
ity equity stakes. These economic arguments underscore this Article's recommen-
dation for applying the Entire Fairness standard to both forms of freezeouts.
232. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 785 (arguing that an equivalent degree of rigor should
apply in the fiduciary standards that shape controllers' receipt of private benefits in operating deci-
sions, sales of control and freezeouts).
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III. THE COURTS' AMBIGUOUS TREATMENT OF CONTROLLERS'
DUTIES IN TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUTS
This section of the Article focuses on the court of chancery's recent reforms
to tender offer freezeout doctrine. 33 In particular, it finds fault with the notion
endorsed by Pure and Cox that allowing business judgment deference in the pres-
ence of Dual Ratification would represent only a minor "easing" of the Entire
Fairness standard in freezeouts.2 34 Pure and Cox endorse several new criteria that
controllers must follow in order for their tender offer freezeouts to qualify as non-
coercive and be eligible for deferential review 235 However, these new standards are
incomplete and easily subject to manipulation by controllers, especially because,
as Pure and Cox present them,2 36 they are divorced from the conceptual moorings
of the duty of fair dealings. In addition, Pure and Cox eschew imposing a duty of
fair price on controllers' tender offer freezeouts, which has profoundly negative
implications for minorities negotiating these deals.2 37 Hence, the new standards
would exacerbate the minority discount and further controllers' capacity to profit
from this discount in freezeout tender offers.
This section provides a critical analysis of the Solomon, Glassman, and Siliconix
decisions, which provide an essential backdrop to understanding the reforms pro-
posed in Pure and Cox. This Part III concludes that the shift to deferential review
endorsed in Pure and Cox would unacceptably jeopardize minorities' interests in
freezeouts and thus have negative spillover effects for firms and markets.
A. BACKGROUND TO THE RECENT TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUT CASES
1. The Solomon Decision
Solomon has been accepted as the landmark decision governing controllers' fidu-
ciary duties in tender offers. 38 This is surprising in several respects. First, the opin-
ion is only an affirmation by the Delaware Supreme Court of the court of chancery's
grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss. 39 Thus, the substantive questions of
fiduciary duty which were at the heart of the plaintiffs' complaint did not receive
the benefit of a trial.
Secondly, Solomon includes only a brief discussion of substantive questions
of fiduciary law-that is, controllers' and directors' duties in tender offers. Most
233. The reforms proposed to cash-out mergers are analyzed in Part IV, infra.
234. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.The accommodation proposed in Pure, as supplemented by Cox, essen-
tially mirrors the approach proposed by Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 8 ("Translat-
ing the arms-length standard to the freezeout arena requires, first, meaningful approval by [a special
committee] of independent directors; and second, approval by a majority of the minority sharehold-
ers. When both of these procedural protections are provided, this Article proposes that courts should
apply deferential business judgment review to assess the transaction."). See also Gilson & Gordon,
supra note 5, at 786, 838-39.
235. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445; Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
236. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445; Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
237. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445; Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
238. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 623.
239. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 36-37.
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of the opinion focuses on the pleading standards applicable to fiduciary class
actions, and the question of when complaints in such actions may be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.24 ° The plaintiffs argued that the lower court had errone-
ously applied a heightened pleading standard, but the supreme court disagreed
and affirmed the dismissal.
41
That the transaction disputed in Solomon was not a genuine freezeout adds
to the incongruity of the opinion's stature in freezeout doctrine. The controller,
Credit Lyonnais Bank, was conducting a tender offer for the small slice of Pathe
Communications' public equity that it did not own, while simultaneously fore-
closing on the 89.5% interest that it held as collateral on a loan. On the day the
tender offer was announced, the controller initiated an auction to sell the 89.5%
stock interest subject to the pledge.
2 42
Although the case is accepted as landmark precedent on the scope of con-
trollers' duties in tender offers, the plaintiffs' amended complaint (as described
by the supreme court) alleged only fiduciary breaches against the target com-
pany's directors.2 43 Reading Solomon closely, it seems as if the court is unclear
about whether it was supposed to rule on the propriety of the controller's or the
directors' conduct, and the opinion is certainly unclear about the connection
between these two issues. The court notes that there were only two counts in the
amended complaint-both against the directors. The first count described in
the opinion alleged breach of care by the target directors for failing to "negoti-
ate a sufficient tender offer price;" the second alleged that the directors failed to
oppose the tender offer.2 44 The supreme court affirmed the court of chancery's
decision that both failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 45
Instead of addressing the matter complained of by the minority (i.e. the direc-
tors' passivity), the supreme court quoted the Chancellor is finding that there
cannot be "a fleeting doubt of the fairness of the... $1.50 tender offer price."
2 46
That is, the court provide no explanation for why the directors' passive conduct
in the face of the controller's offer satisfied their fiduciary duties to the minori-
ties. The court's failure to consider the substance of the plaintiffs' claims is espe-
cially odd because these were essentially breach of care claims, and in breach of
240. Id. at 38-39.
241. Id. at 39.
242. Id. at 37. Given the factual circumstances noted in the opinion, it is likely that the bank's
tender offer was intended to push its ownership over the 90% threshold, so that it would be able to
obtain a higher price in the sale of Pathe's stock by conveying to a third party the right to execute a
short-form merger-but that, like other important features of the case, is not discussed in the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's opinion.
243. Id. at 39.
244. Id. at 39. Earlier in the opinion the complaint is described as alleging a breach of loyalty
against the controller, based on the "coercive" tender offer price. Id. at 37.
245. Id. at 39. For a discussion of the standards relevant to dismissal of a shareholder complaint in
a class action against a controller, see Rabhin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del.
1985) (in order to sustain a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court must
conclude, with reasonable certainty, that the plaintiff cannot prevail and would not be entitled to the
relief sought under any set of facts that could be proven to support the claims).
246. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
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care claims the Delaware courts usually focus on the adequacy of the process fol-
lowed by the directors, rather than the substance of the transaction or the result
of the decision. 247 The Solomon court avoided inquiring about the adequacy of
the target directors' actions or deliberations in responding to the controller's
offer. 48 Solomon's failure to discuss the extent of target directors' defensive duties
and authority in controllers' tender offers is a major shortcoming in the opinion.
It has dampened the development of the Delaware case law on this subject to
this day
49
Returning to Solomon's discussion of controllers' duties in tender offers, it too
is quite problematic. First, again, it is unrelated to the claims brought by the
plaintiffs, which alleged fiduciary breaches by the target directors. Second, it is
logically unmoored from the rest of the discussion of fiduciary duty-that is,
there is no necessary connection between whether controllers have a fair price
duty and whether the directors' have adequately fulfilled their fiduciary duties in
responding to the controller's offer. These two legal issues are not interdependent,
despite the opinion's suggestion that they are. On the issue of the adequacy of
the price offered, in the dictum that has made the case famous, the court stated:
"[i]n the case of totally voluntary tender offers... courts do not impose any right
of the shareholders to receive a particular price."25 0 This assertion is problem-
atic. Solomon declares that controllers have no fair price duty as if this issue was
resolved-which it was not-and then cites precedents which presumably sup-
port this principle, although they do not.
2 51
In specific, Solomon cites the Vickers Energy litigation and the Weinberger deci-
sion 25 2 as support for the absence of a fair price duty on the part of a controller in
a tender offer for minorities' shares. However, as clarified below, neither of these
two decisions come close to supporting the conclusion that no fair price duty
applies to controllers in their offers to purchase minorities' shares. The lower
court opinion cited by the court in the Vickers Energy litigation was overturned
on appeal in a manner that casts doubt on the portion of the opinion cited in
247. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,877 (Del. 1985) ("Here, the issue is whether the
directors informed themselves as to all the information that was reasonably available to them.").
248. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
249. See infra notes 314-32 and accompanying text.
250. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
251. For court of chancery opinions addressing the fair price issue, see In re Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Company S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 11898, 1991 WL 70028, at *3 (Del Ch. Apr. 30,
199 1) (concluding that "as a general principle our law holds that a controlling shareholder extending
an offer for minority-held shares in the controlled corporation is under no obligation, absent evidence
that material information about the offer has been withheld or misrepresented or that the offer is
coercive in some significant way, to offer any particular price for the minority-held stock"); Joseph v.
Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding that in the absence of fraud minorities
are generally allowed to decide for themselves whether to tender to a controller). An earlier Delaware
Supreme Court decision, Lynch v Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 279 (Del. 1978), ruled on the
adequacy of a controller's disclosures in a tender offer but did not address whether a fair price duty
applied in the transaction.
252. 672 A.2d at 39 (citing Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. 351 A.2d 570, 576 (Del. Ch. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del.
1983)).
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Solomon.253 As for the citation to Weinberger (which involved a cash-out merger),
that opinion is wholly silent on the issue of controllers' duties in tender offers.
Nothing expressly stated or even implied in Weinberger suggests that controllers
do not have a fair price duty in a tender offer for minorities' shares. And Wein-
berger unequivocally affirms that controllers do have a fair price duty in a cash-out
merger, so it certainly is not "soft" on the fair price question . 5 4 Hence, Solomon
interprets the decisions in Vickers Energy and Weinberger far too expansively, if not
incorrectly
Nor is Solomon faithful to the spirit of the Vickers' Energy or Weinberger decisions,
both of which place tremendous importance on corporate law's role in support-
ing minority shareholders' capacity for free choice. 55 In sum, although Solomon is
cited as landmark precedent for the principle that controllers do not have a legal
fair price duty in a tender offer to purchase the minorities' shares, the opinion
nowhere provides any satisfying legal rationale for this conclusion.1
56
Even more troublingly, at the same time that Solomon invokes the notion that
minority shareholders can make "voluntary" choices in responding to controllers'
tender offers as the basis for rejecting a fair price duty, the court fails to give serious
consideration to what constitutes a totally noncoercive, "voluntary" tender offer
by a controller.257 Instead of exploring the power dynamics affecting controllers'
tender offers and minorities decision-making therein, Solomon accepts that "total
voluntariness" in relation to minorities' decision-making means only an absence of
coercion or fraud by the controller.25 8 Seven years later, in his opinion in Pure, Vice-
Chancellor Strine explores this gap between controllers affirmatively acting to sup-
port minorities' ability to make free choices and controllers' engaging in prohibited
coercion and fraud.25 9 But there is no hint of controllers having any affirmative
253. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd, 383 A.2d 278 (Del.
1977). The decision to which the Solomon court refers is the earlier Delaware Court of Chancery case.
Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39. The precise language in Vickers Energy which the Solomon court relies upon
is as follows:
There is no provision in the Delaware Corporation Law and it would not be appropriate under
equitable principles, in my opinion, to bind an offeror in a situation such as the one at bar to an
implied commitment to pay an additional consideration for tendered shares in an amount made
up of the difference between the price offered and what might ultimately be found to be the
intrinsic value of the shares in question.
Vickers Energy, 351 A.2d at 576 (cited in Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39). The additional consideration was
precisely the award made by the Delaware Supreme Court in the second appeal once the plaintiffs had
proven lack of candor on the controller's part. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 503
(Del. 1981).
254. Weinberger 457 A.2d at 711.
255. Id.; Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (holding controllers to a
standard of "complete candor" rather than mere adequacy in their tender offer disclosures, in light of
their opportunity to exploit 'special knowledge' they gained as insiders, to the offerees' detriment).
256. See Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1987) (pro-
viding a rare treatment of the features which would constitute coercion in this setting)). For further
discussion of the Delaware case law on inequitable coercion, see, e.g., Dennis J. Block and Jonathan M.
Hoff, The Doctrine of Inequitable Coercion under Delaware Law, 221 N.Y.L.J. 5 (Apr. 22, 1999).
259. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445-46.
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obligations as fiduciaries to facilitate minorities informed decision making in the
supreme court's treatment of controllers' tender offers in Solomon.
260
These are profound shortcomings in Solomon's treatment of minorities' entitle-
ments and directors' and controllers' duties in tender offers. They have been made
more serious by the fact that the supreme court has not had an occasion to recon-
sider these issues in subsequent years.
2. The Glassman Decision
It was only in 2001 that the Delaware Supreme Court resolved that the business
judgment rule rather than the Entire Fairness standard would apply in short-form
mergers. 261 The supreme court's 1971 opinion in Schnell v. Chris Craft Industries, Inc.
expressly validated courts' equitable authority to supplement statutory mandates
in matters of corporate governance.2 62 Schnell provided authority for applying the
Entire Fairness standard to short-form mergers, since the principles endorsed in
Schnell were applied most commonly to situations where the board's or the share-
holders' usual scope of authority had been undermined, or improperly circum-
scribed. 6 13 Short-form mergers are intriguing in this regard, because the statute's
terms contemplate controllers bypassing the target's board and also the minority
shareholders in purchasing the remaining outstanding shares . 4 The Lynch deci-
sion had also contributed to the impression that Entire Fairness was the appropri-
ate standard of review for short-form mergers. Lynch described Entire Fairness as
the "exclusive" standard of review for parent companies' cash-out mergers of their
subsidiaries.
65
Weighing against the application of Entire Fairness, however, was the Delaware
Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.166 In Stauffer
the court held that absent fraud or wrongdoing, appraisal would be the sole remedy
available to dissatisfied minorities contesting a short-form merger.2 7 Controllers
considering going private based on tender offers anxiously awaited the supreme
court's resolution of whether Entire Fairness would apply to the short-form
merger portion of a tender offer freezeout.
260. Solomon, 672 A.2d 39-40.
261. See In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S'holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 338 n.26 (Del. Ch. 2000),
aff'd sub nom., Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
262. Schnell v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) ("Inequitable conduct does
not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.").
263. See, e.g., Blasius v. Atlas Indus. Inc., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (actions by board after
consent solicitation had begun, designed for purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote, held to violate
fiduciary duties despite their conformity with statutory provisions, consistent with Schnell).
264. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (2007)-
265. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1118 ("Once again, this Court holds that the exclusive standard of judicial
review in examining the propriety of an interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or
dominating shareholder is entire fairness."). The Lynch decision nowhere expressly discussed short-
form mergers, however.
266. Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962), overruled in part by Roland Intern.
Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
267. Id. at 80.
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In 2001, the supreme court held in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. that
courts would not apply an equitable, fair dealings requirement to short-form merg-
ers, on grounds that doing so would conflict with the streamlined process envisioned
in the statute itself.2 6 Reviewing the supreme court's decision, it is apparent that
the court did not consider the issue cut and dried. The court discussed five decades
of equitable decision-making in long and short-form mergers before it announced
that deference to the legislature precluded applying equitable fair dealings stan-
dards to short-form mergers.2 69 Glassman held, furthermore, that in light of the
absence of the fiduciary fair dealing requirement, valuation disputes in short-form
mergers would henceforth be reviewable exclusively through the appraisal pro-
cess.2"" Appraisal would provide the exclusive recourse for aggrieved shareholders
in short-form mergers "absent fraud or illegality.27" Hence, after 2001, controllers
were empowered to proceed with short-form mergers unilaterally-that is, without
consultation with the target's directors or minority shareholders (consistent with
the terms of the statute).272 Controllers were also spared being "second-guessed" by
the courts in equitable actions, consistent with Glassman.73
However, subsequent courts have read Glassman too broadly-as support
for a very narrow role for equity in tender offer freezeouts.2 74 In Glassman there
was no "premeditated" combination of a tender offer and short form merger by
a controller-hence no tender offer freezeout as presently understood. 7 5 Fur-
thermore, because prior to Glassman controllers had very rarely relied on tender
offers as vehicles for going private, there is reason to doubt that the supreme court
contemplated the relevance of its holding for tender offer freezeouts.2 76 And in the
six years since Glassman, moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court has not had an
occasion to rule on a tender offer freezeout.
For the reasons described above, Glassman is questionable authority for the
view that controllers have no equitable fair price or fair dealings obligations in
tender offer freezeouts. On the same basis, the decision should not be interpreted
to resolve that there are two distinct tracks in freezeout doctrine. In this regard, the
court of chancery decisions addressing tender offer freezeouts have over read the
combined effect of Solomon and Glassman, and have gone too far in invoking them
as a spring board for deregulating freezeout doctrine.
268. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Del. 2001).
269. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48 ("The equitable claim plainly conflicts with the statute. If a
corporate fiduciary follows the truncated process authorized by § 253, it will not be able to establish
the fair dealing prong of entire fairness. If, instead, the corporate fiduciary sets up negotiating commit-
tees, hired independent financial and legal experts, etc., then it will have lost the very benefit provided
by the statute.").
270. Id. at 248.
271. Id.
272. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (2007).
273. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48.
274. For a discussion of the residual ambiguity in the opinion, see Marc 1. Steinberg, Short-Form
Mergers in Delaware, 27 DEL J. CORP. L. 489 (2002).
275. See In re Unocal, 793 A.2d at 338 n.26.
276. But see In re Life Tech., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 16513, 1998 WL 1812280 (Del Ch.
Nov. 24, 1998). The case is noted and discussed in Letsou & Haas, supra note 113, at 45.
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3. In re Siliconix-Delaware's First True Tender
Offer Freezeout Decision
a. Siliconix's Facts
In Siliconix the court of chancery had an opportunity to review a true tender
offer freezeout-a going private transaction consciously structured by a controller
as a combined tender offer and short-form merger.277 Siliconix provides a provoca-
tive illustration of how far a controller could go in exerting a dominating influence
over the controlled company's board and minority shareholders, while success-
fully avoiding judicial intervention on grounds that it had committed fraud and
coercion.278 The target of the freezeout was Siliconix Inc., a NASDAQ listed tech-
nology company that had suffered through the market correction of early 2000.279
The controller, Vishay Intertechnology Inc, owned 80% of Siliconix's stock and
operated in the same line of business as Siliconix.25 0 As described by the court,
Vishay was attempting to exploit what appeared to be a fleeting opportunity to
acquire Siliconix's publicly traded shares at a favorable price. Indeed, the freeze-
out allowed Vishay to eliminate a potential competitor." 1
In February of 2001, without prior notice, Vishay announced a cash tender
offer for all of Siliconix's shares. 28 2 Its SEC filings and public disclosures declared
Vishay's probable intention to consummate a short-form merger after the ten-
der offer-hence, the minority shareholders could not assume they would have
appraisal rights if they refused to tender to the controller.8 3 Vishay also announced
that Siliconix would probably be delisted from the NASDAQ at the conclusion
of the tender offer.28 4 This announcement, logically, would have deepened the
minority's concerns about the diminished liquidity their shares would suffer after
the tender offer's consummation. In these disclosures Vishay was also equivocal
about its motives for the freezeout.25 And notwithstanding the applicable fed-
eral and fiduciary disclosure requirements, Vishay failed to enunciate a rationale
for the price it was offering to pay for the minorities' shares. 286 In these respects
277. In fact, the controller remained somewhat indecisive about its intention to complete the
short-form merger. The effect of that, however, was to make the target stockholders' decision to
refuse to tender more perilous, because appraisal rights would not be triggered without a short-form
merger. In re Siliconix, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 19,
2001).
278. Id. at *15 ("1 now turn to the instances alleged by Fitzgerald to constitute actionable coer-
cion."). Prior to Siliconix, the most telling case on the question of what "pressure" from controllers
constituted "coercion" in equity was Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del.
Ch. 1987).
279. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *2, *4-5. Siliconix's stock price and product performance were
showing signs of a rebound at the time of the buyout offer; however, the stock's price had advanced
only slightly from its recent historic low.
280. Id. at * 1.
281. Id. at *2.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at * 16 (finding that this declaration, too, was not coercive).
285. Id. at *12.
286. Id.
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Vishay's disclosures skirted the edge of what was legally acceptable under both
federal law and fiduciary disclosure mandates.2 87
Vishay's tactics suggested at best a perfunctory effort to comply with the estab-
lished transactional choreography for freezeouts-perhaps the very least a con-
troller could do to avoid a judicial finding that it had acted coercively. The Siliconix
opinion describes at length many reasons to be concerned that the controller acted
coercively in the transaction. For example, although Vishay declared its willing-
ness to negotiate with a special committee of Siliconix's independent directors,28
the resulting committee was quite obviously dominated by Vishay.2 9 The two
special committee directors each had substantial ties to Vishay One of them had
been Vishay's lawyer until shortly before the transaction. 90 The other "had been
active in providing banking services" to Vishay several years earlier.291 In addition,
both special committee directors "were friends of Vishay management," including
the chief negotiator for Vishay in the freezeout.192 Moreover, the aforementioned
lawyer-director had been appointed to Siliconix's special committee at the sugges-
tion of the person who would become Vishay's principal negotiator.293 There was
evidence, also, that the two special committee directors would receive a "special
fee" contingent on the controller's consummation of the freezeout-which seems
shocking given their role as agents for the minority in the freezeout negotiations.
294
Hence there was no basis for the parties or the court to assume the independence of
the committee directors who ostensibly represented the minority in the "negotia-
tions" with the controller. Indeed, the court noted that the independence of the
special committee members was debatable.
295
As to advice from outside experts, Vishay was allowed to vet the special com-
mittee's selection of its outside financial advisers. 296 And the financial advisers' fee,
too, was contingent on the freezeout's consummation!2 97 Finally, Siliconix's special
committee was cautioned by its legal advisers that "Vishay could not be com-
pelled to sell its stake in Siliconix" and could "commence a unilateral offer at any
time."298 The court's extensive recitation of the facts suggests that the committee's
legal or financial advisers did not work aggressively in the minorities' best interest.
In fact, the court's recital of the facts reads like a "worst case scenario" of corporate
governance in freezeouts. The court describes extensive evidence of domination
and coercion by the controller: the compromised composition of the committee,
287. For the discussion of the fiduciary disclosure requirement, see id. at *9-14.







295. Id. at *2 n.4
296. Id. at *3.
297. Id. at *3 & n.7 (the court called attention to the $1.75 million fee to be paid to Lehman, the
special committee's advisers, upon the closing of the transaction).
298. Id. at *3.
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the ambiguous and incomplete disclosures, the vetting of the committee's advis-
ers, the problematic "special fee" arrangements affecting the committee and its
financial adviser, the unilateral switch to stock consideration, and the surprise
timing of the original offer. And still the court rejected the minorities' requested
injunction and ruled in favor of the controller.
Although Siliconix pays lip service to Solomon's criteria of "total voluntari-
ness,"299 based on the facts described in the opinion, there were many factors
that inhibited the shareholders' free choice in regard to Vishay's tender offer.
As stated above, Vishay's Williams Act and Schedule 13e-3 disclosures were
equivocal about its motive for going private, and silent regarding the basis for
the price it was offering. 300 In addition, Siliconix's directors assumed a posture
of neutrality in the Schedule 14D-9, so the minority investors did not have
guidance from their directors in evaluating the merits of the offer.
30 1 Finally,
the special committee did not attempt to obtain a fairness opinion from its
financial advisors-so this information, too, was unavailable for the minority's
consideration.
30 2
In regard to the financial merits of the freezeout offer, the court stated that in its
original cash offer, Vishay "made no effort to value Siliconix," but instead merely
applied a 10% premium to the prevailing public trading price of the stock.
30 3 It
also observed that Vishay even lowered its final offer as part of its switch to stock
consideration. 30 4 In addition, the switch to stock consideration and finalization
of the offer's other basic terms were resolved and publicized without prior notice
to the special committee. 30 The controller's only bow to concerns over fair pro-
cess was its apparent observance of a "majority of the minority" minimum tender
condition. 0 6 In sum, Vishay's tender offer freezeout for Siliconix's outstanding
publicly-traded shares presents remarkable facts, facts that suggest patent coer-
cion and overreaching on the controller's part.
299. Id. at *6 ("However, this Court will intervene to protect the rights of the shareholders to
make a voluntary choice."). Compare Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39 ("In the case of totally voluntary tender
offers, as here, courts do not impose any right of the shareholders to receive a particular price." (cita-
tions omitted)), with Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *15 ("A tender offer is coercive if the tendering
shareholders are 'wrongfully induced by some act of the defendant to sell their shares for reasons
unrelated to the economic merit of the sale.' The wrongful acts must 'influence in some material way'
the shareholder's decision to tender. I now turn to the instances alleged by Fitzgerald to constitute
actionable coercion." (citations omitted)).
300. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *12.
301. Id. at *5 ("... [The Schedule 14D-91 reported that the Special Committee has determined to
remain neutral and make no recommendation with respect to the tender offer. The special committee
never requested Lehman to prepare a fairness opinion as to the exchange offer.").
302. Id.
303. Id. at *2. The controller set its opening cash bid at a 10% cash premium over the market trad-
ing price of Siliconix stock-a relatively low premium which was, moreover, twenty percent below the
average trading price of the stock in the six months prior to the bid. The court states that Vishay made
"no effort to value Siliconix." Id. For facts relating to the switch to stock, see id. at *4.
304. Id. at *4 ("Unlike the February 22 cash tender announcement, the share exchange carried no
market premium for the Siliconix shareholder.").
305. See id. at *4.
306. Id. at *4.
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b. Coercion and Inadequate Disclosure by Controllers
With respect to the application of fiduciary law, the Siliconix court departed
from the Solomon standards in a way that biased the proceedings against the plain-
tiffs. In addition to having to meet the usual, heightened standard of irreparable
harm in order to obtain an injunction, 30 7 the plaintiffs were required to show
"actual" fraud, "improper" coercion, or conduct that was "coercive in some signifi-
cant way ' '38 In applying these heightened standards for coercion, Siliconix moved
beyond the Solomon standards in accepting that some level of coercion by control-
lers in tender offers is acceptable. In this disparity between the court's recitation of
highly worrisome facts, and application of the law in a fashion biased in favor of
the controller, Siliconix is a strange opinion. The court seems to have gone out of its
way to avoid granting the injunction requested by the plaintiffs, despite its airing
many ways the freezeout appeared problematic. 30 9 Even while the court denied the
injunction, it openly expressed consternation over the "lesser scrutiny" applied to
controllers' tender offers in comparison to cash-out mergers.31 0
Even the court's analysis of the adequacy of the controller's disclosures also
appears biased in favor of the controller. In its Vickers Energy opinion, the Del-
aware Supreme Court mandated that controllers' tender offer disclosures must
meet a standard of "complete candor.""31 In the alternative, in Siliconix the court of
chancery imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs31 2 and asked whether they
had proven there were material misrepresentations by the controller. The Siliconix
court's disclosure analysis is problematic both in terms of the substantive standard
applied (material misrepresentation versus complete candor) and the allocation of
the burden of proof. In Siliconix the court concluded that "Fitzgerald [the plain-
tiff] has not met his burden of a preliminary showing that there was a disclosure
violation,"33 notwithstanding the court's recitation of several forms of disclosure
307. Id. at *17.
308. Id. at *6 ("The issue of voluntariness of the tender depends on the absence of improper coer-
cion and the absence of disclosure violations.... Accordingly, Vishay was under no duty to offer any
particular price, or a 'fair' price to the minority shareholders of Siliconix unless actual coercion or
disclosure violations are shown by Fitzgerald." (emphasis added)).
309. See, e.g., id. at *2 n.4 ("It is not disputed that all Siliconix directors, because of their deep
involvement with Vishay suffered serious conflicts of interest (except for those directors Segall and
Talbert, about whose independence there is debate).").
310. Id. at *7 ("lilt may seem strange that the scrutiny given to tender offer transactions is less than
the scrutiny given to, for example, a merger....").
311. See Vichers Energy, 383 A.2d at 279; Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998). For
an analysis of the evolution of Delaware's fiduciary disclosure doctrine, see Hamermesh, Calling Off
the Lynch Mob, supra note 99. For further commentary, see Kahn, Transparency and Accountability, supra
note 66; Jennifer O'Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty
of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CiN. L. REv. 475 (2002).
312. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *14 ("In conclusion, I have not found that, on this preliminary
record, Fitzgerald had made the necessary showing to establish any disclosure violation."); id. at *9
("In the context of a preliminary injunction proceeding regarding a tender offer, the issue becomes
whether there is a reasonable probability that a material omission or misstatement has been made 'that
would make a reasonable shareholder more likely to tender his shares."' (Citations omitted.)).
313. Id. at *12.
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deficiencies that individually and collectively would have been significant to the
minority shareholders' decision-making in the transaction.
c. Directors' Duties in Tender Offer Freezeouts
The preceding discussion of the Siliconix opinion focused on the court's analy-
sis of the conduct of the controller Vishay However, the Siliconix decision is also
important for its treatment of target directors' duties in tender offer freezeouts. 314
(Both the controller, Vishay, and Siliconix's directors were named as defendants
in the breach of fiduciary duty class action.) 315 Because Solomon avoided this sub-
ject, and Glassman ruled against the application of fiduciary fair dealings criteria
in short-form mergers, the Siliconix court found itself working off of a nearly
clean slate in analyzing the nature and scope of target directors' fiduciary duties
in tender offer freezeouts. Reviewing their actions, the court found the special
committee directors' conduct passive and wholly ineffectual. 316 Nonetheless, it
concluded that the committee's conduct satisfied the fiduciary duties they owed
the minority shareholders. 317 To be more precise, the court reviewed the duty of
care and duty of loyalty breaches alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint against the
directors,318 but then quickly disregarded this inquiry and instead switched to a
discussion of the Entire Fairness standard. The court stated that "unless coercion
or disclosure violations can be shown, no defendant has the duty to demonstrate
the entire fairness of this proposed... transaction. '" 319 The court conflated the rule
applicable to the controller with that applicable to the target's directors, although
they are not the same.
In a different portion of the opinion, the Siliconix court engaged in an inquiry
into the target directors' responsibilities in freezeout tender offers. In its effort
to discern the nature and scope of these directors' duties, the court notes that
the DGCL is silent about directors' roles in responding to tender offers. 32" This
statutory silence provides a major part of Siliconix's rationale for affirming that the
directors' conduct, though shockingly passive, was adequate to meet theirfiduciary
duties32 1-notwithstanding the obvious distinction between statutory duties and
fiduciary duties recognized in Delaware's corporate jurisprudence.3 11 Secondly, the
court rationalized that target company shareholders make individual decisions to
314. Id. at *7 ("Indeed, the board of the tender target is not asking its shareholders to approve any
corporate action by the tender target. That, however, does not mean that the board of the company to
be acquired in a tender has no duties to the shareholders.").
315. Id. at *1.
316. Id. at *2-3, *5.
317. Id. at *8-9.
318. Id. at *6.
319. Id. at *6.
320. Id. at *7-8.
321. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *8 (distinguishing the Delaware Supreme Court's expansive
view of directors' duties in McMullin on the basis that those duties "were statutory duties imposed by
8 Del. C. § 251"). See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000).
322. See, e.g., Pure, 808 A.2d at 434.
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hold or sell in a tender offer-which distinguishes them from transactions involv-
ing a corporate-level event.3 23 However, what the Siliconix court notably failed to
discuss was the accepted, activist role of target directors in responding to inad-
equate third party tender offers as reflected in the Delaware jurisprudence. The
absence of a "corporate level" event has not prevented the courts from recognizing
expansive fiduciary duties for target directors in defending against hostile tender
offers from outsiders.
324
The Siliconix court paused over the issue of the adequacy of the directors' con-
duct long enough to be troubled by a parallel with a recent decision by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, McMullin v Beran.325 The problem was that in McMullin the
supreme court held that the target directors may have breached their fiduciary
duties on account of their passivity in the face of the controller's preferred sale
transaction.3 2 6 The Siliconix court comments at length that in the freezeout before
it and the one contested in McMullin, the minorities' "need for (and ability to
benefit from) the guidance and information to be provided by their boards" was
virtually "indistinguishable.."327 The Siliconix court also observed that the financial
alternatives for the minorities were analogous in the two instances: they could
either take the deal consideration offered by the controller, without meaningful
guidance from their directors, or pursue an appraisal action. 32 8
The supreme court's disapproval of the target directors' passivity in McMullin
clearly caught the court's attention in Siliconix. Based on these observations, it
seemed that the court was close to reaching the same determination as the court
had in McMullin-i.e. that the directors may have failed to fulfill their fiduciary
duties in remaining so passive in the face of the controller's chosen sale transac-
tion. But there were differences also noted by the court in Siliconix. In McMullin,
the controller had forced a sale of the company through a merger with a third
party.329 Siliconix observed that McMullin teaches that directors of a Delaware cor-
poration have an affirmative duty to protect the minority if the controller is forcing
through a disadvantageous corporate sale, and the directors cannot take a "leave
it to the shareholders" 3 0 approach.3 3' However, the Siliconix court concluded that
these duties are more relevant to a controllers' merger, than a freezeout tender
offer. With little else to distinguish the conduct of the two sets of directors in these
transactions, in Siliconix the court relied on the different statutory consent require-
323. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *7 ("...the target company in the tender context does not
confront a comparable corporate decision [to a merger] .").
324. See supra note 158.
325. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *8 (citing McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000)).
326. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim reversed and remanded).
327. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at * 8.
328. Id.
329. McMullin, 765 A2d. at 921.
330. This same principle is enunciated earlier in Smith v. Van Gorkom, in relation to directors' duties
in a sale by merger to a third party See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
331. 2001 WL 716787, at *7 ("Indeed, the board of the tender target is not asking its shareholders
to approve any corporate action by the tender target. That, however, does not mean that the board of
the company to be acquired in a tender has no duties to the shareholders.").
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ments relevant to tender offer freezeouts and cash-out mergers to distinguish the
scope of the directors' duties.
3 32 Most problematically, Siliconix ignores the highly
developed Delaware case law affording target directors extensive defensive author-
ity in responding to hostile tender offers from third parties. In sum, Siliconix is an
unsatisfying and provocative decision on many levels, and its treatment of tar-
get directors' duties in responding to tender offers by controllers is particularly
unsatisfying. These shortcomings were obviously apparent to the Vice Chancellor
writing in Pure.
B. THE PURE DECISION: NEW PRECONDITIONS FOR DEFERENTIAL
REVIEW IN TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUT SUITS
1. The Facts in Pure
The tenor of Pure suggests a generally favorable view of Unocal's freezeout
offer.333 And certainly Unocal, the controllery proceeded in a manner that seemed
less coercive than the freezeouts analyzed by the court of chancery 
in Siliconix 334
and Acquila.33" However, upon closer examination, the recital of facts in the opin-
ion reveals that Unocal unhesitatingly sought to benefit from its superior negotiat-
ing leverage,33 6 from disclosure deficiencies,
337 a committee whose independence
may have been compromised, and consent terms that systematically favored its
interests.331 Perceiving the latter forms of self-interested conduct, certain minority
shareholders of Pure Resources, Inc. sued and obtained a preliminary injunc-
tion against Unocal's proposed tender/exchange offer.
339 Nevertheless, the court
of chancery ruled that the freezeout could go forward so long as Unocal (which
owned 65.4% of Pure's shares
340 ) (I) disclosed valuation data prepared by the
investment bankers hired by the special committee, (ii) provided a fuller descrip-
tion of the communications that had occurred between the special committee
and Unocal's representatives over the scope of the committee's authority,
341 and
(iii) amended the majority-of-minority consent provision to back out shares in
the minority group affected by conflicting financial interests.
342 These were easy
"fixes. '343 They allowed the court of chancery in Pure to advocate law reforms
332. Id. at *8. In Siliconix, the court expressed the view that it would have to endorse "a new
approach to assessing the conduct of directors of a tender target" if it were to rule in plaintiffs' favor.
The court said that it would have to overrule cases such as Solomon to validate an active defensive role
for target directors. Id.
333. Pure, 808 A.2d at 446-332.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 276-332.
335. In re Aquila, Inc. S'holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184, 190-91 (Del. Ch. 2002).
336. See infra notes 350-84 and accompanying text.
337. Pure, 808 A.2d at 450.
338. Id. at 430.
339. Id. at 424-25.
340. Id. at 425.
341. See id. at 449-51.
342. Id. at 446.
343. 808 A.2d at 452 ("... an injunction can be issued that can be lifted in short order if Unocal and
the Pure board respond to the concerns addressed in this opinion.").
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in the minority's interest, grant the requested injunction, and yet compromise
the controller's ability to go forward with the freezeout only in small measure.3 44
Indeed, Unocal promptly consummated its tender offer freezeout after it imple-
mented the changes requested by the court. 345
The chancery court's opinion described the process of the transaction in detail.
Unocal had been involved in Pure's business operations from the latter's incep-
tion. 346 As part of the creation of Pure, Unocal obtained a shareholder voting
agreement that gave it control over five of Pure's eight board seats, 347 and a "Busi-
ness Opportunity Agreement" that allowed it to take commercial opportunities
that otherwise might have been deemed (consistent with the corporate opportu-
nity doctrine) to belong to Pure.348 The competitive operations of the parent and
subsidiary, the prospect of favorable market conditions and financing alternatives
for the subsidiary, and the fact that Pure had genuinely independent and ambi-
tious senior executives 349 created friction that led to Unocal's freezeout offer.
Unocal's interest in acquiring Pure was initially out in the open.350 Then, in the
fall of 2001 Unocal gave notice to Pure's CEO that it had decided not to proceed
with the offer.35 ' However, by the following summer Unocal's interest in acquir-
ing its subsidiary's remaining shares resurfaced in a "surprise" public announce-
ment of its proposed freezeout tender/exchange offer.352 During the summer of
2001, as part of its original investigation into a freezeout, Unocal's representa-
tives on Pure's board had gathered confidential information from Pure.353 That
Unocal had "permission" from Pure's management to do so354 (as described in the
opinion) reveals the extent of the conflicting interests that affected Pure's CEO
and COO,3 55 and their possession of valuable severance agreements that would
be triggered by the freezeout.356 The opinion notes that Pure's management and
Unocal's representatives had discussed the fact that proceeding through a single
step cash-out merger was probably untenable. 357 Although the court does not
discuss why this would have been so, it likely reflects that the Entire Fairness
standard would have applied in the event of a freezeout merger, which would
have been problematic since seven of the eight directors had financial interests
344. Id.
345. On October 30, 2002 (one month after the court of chancery's decision in Pure) Unocal closed
its short-form merger finalizing its acquisition of Pure. The exchange offer had closed the previous night
at midnight. See Unocal Press Release archives, Unocal completes acquisition of Pure Resources (Oct. 30,
2003), available at http://www.chevron.comnews/archive/unocal-press/release.aspx?id=2002-10-30a.
346. Pure, 808 A.2d at 425-26.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 426-27.
349. Id. at 426-28.
350. Id. at 427.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 428-29.
353. Id. at 427.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 426.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 428.
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potentially conflicting with the unaffiliated minority stockholders.
3"8 The trans-
action in Pure thus represents an explicit example of the kind of "structural arbi-





Unocal structured its offer with some attention to the established transactional
choreography for tender offer freezeouts-that is, Unocal seemed to recognize
the advantage of proceeding in a fashion that was not obviously coercive.
360 Yet
it sought to exploit its power advantage as well. For example, while Unocal did
nothing to thwart Pure's establishment of a special committee,
361 it attempted to
keep the committee's negotiating and defensive authority limited.
362 Accordingly,
Pure contains conflicting information regarding the committee's authority to nego-
tiate at arms' length in the freezeout (as would be required if the Lynch Doctrine
applied). For example, the court notes that Keith Covington, one of Pure's two
special committee directors, was "a close personal friend" of Timothy Ling-who
was Unocal's President and COO and a Pure director.
363 Also troubling is the fact
that after the negotiations over the freezeout's terms had commenced, Unocal took
a harder line in enforcing the Business Opportunities Agreement than it had in the
past. It barred, for the first time, Pure's pursuit of an opportunity that implicated
Unocal's commercial interests.36
4 This was of course a negative sign for Pure in
regard to Unocal's willingness to engage in financial retribution if the freezeout was
opposed or defeated (i.e. the operation of inherent coercion). As the negotiations
over the freezeout progressed, Unocal's representatives on Pure's board refused
to recuse themselves from the special committee's deliberations.
365 This would
have inhibited the special committee's candor and freedom in responding to the
controller's offer. Finally, most palpably, when the committee sought clarification
of its power to block Unocal's bid and seek alternatives more consistent with all
the shareholders' interests (including its ability to employ a rights plan to hold
Unocal at bay while it did so) Unocal's representatives at Pure sounded the alarm
and aggressively confronted the special committee.
366 This response squelched
the special committee's "insurgency"
367 The court was definitive that Unocal had
358. See id. at 425-26. On the indeterminate effect of a conflicted board's approval of a merger
agreement, see Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 285 (Del. 2003) (noting the dilemma posed by
statute's prohibition on assent to a merger by a committee where nearly the entire board was affected
by material conflicts of interest in a merger).
359. See supra Part II, D.
360. For the conditions Unocal agreed to abide by in its offer, see Pure, 808 A.2d at 430. By the
time of its opinion in Pure, the court of chancery was able to refer to a "line of cases" under which a
controller's observance of certain terms would demonstrate that the freezeout tender offer was non-
coercive. Id. at 438.
361. Id. at 429,431.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 426.
364. For the denial of the waiver, see id. at 432 n.9; for previous grants of the waiver, see id. at 427
("Unocal granted these waivers in each case.").
365. Id. at 429 (noting that Unocal affiliated directors "Maxwell and Laughbaum did not recuse
themselves generally from the Pure board's process of reacting to the Offer").
366. Id. at 430-31.
367. See id.
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taken aggressive efforts to terminate the special committee's efforts to block the
freezeout, despite the fact that the details of the back and forth between the com-
mittee and Unocal's representatives were unavailable to it.36 Because the directors
at Pure were concerned about their own fate in relation to the suit challenging
Unocal's freezeout, 369 they elected to invoke the attorney client privilege to protect
the confidentiality of their communications about the scope of their defensive
authority 3 0 In any event, what resulted from the conflict between Unocal's repre-
sentatatives and Pure's special committee was a "pared down" version of the board
resolution conferring negotiating authority on the special committee. This ended
the committee's affirmative efforts to stop the freezeout, 37' although the committee
refused to recommend in favor of the freezeout in the Schedule 14D-9 3 72
In some respects, at least at a superficial level, Unocal's offer was attentive to
fair process concerns.3 3 Nevertheless, a close reading of the facts reveals that
there were significant grounds for concern about coercion and overreaching on
Unocal's part. Indeed, Unocal's conduct seems more coercive and overbearing than
the court's legal analysis and holding reflects. For example, consistent with the
minorities' interest, Unocal agreed to a majority-of-the-minority minimum tender
condition.3 4 However, as the court observed, the minority approval condition
was tainted by the fact that shares owned by Unocal representatives and shares
owned by Pure's two most powerful executives were included in the minority
group although these shares were affected by financial incentives different from
rest of the 35.4% shares unaffiliated with Unocal.3 1 5 Unocal also adopted a 90%
minimum tender condition, and agreed to consummate a short-form merger at
the tender offer price if it obtained the required 90% share-level in Pure. However,
Unocal reserved the right to waive the 90% minimum tender condition and close
the tender offer irregardless 7.3 1 The ability to wave the 90% minimum tender
condition meant that at the time the minority shareholders would have to make
a choice about whether or not to tender, they would not know whether the back-
end, short-form merger and attendant appraisal rights would materialize. 37
Furthermore, Unocal did not commit to abandon the offer if the committee
withheld its approval.37 8 Indeed, Unocal did in fact go ahead with the freezeout
368. Id.
369. This becomes evident principally in relation to the court's discussion of the disclosure defi-
ciencies relating to the Schedule 14D-9, id. at 450-51.
370. Id. at 431.
371. Id.
372. Pure, 808 A.2d at 432 ("... on September 17, 2002 the Special Committee voted not to recom-
mend the Offer, based on its analysis and the advice of its financial advisors").
373. Id. at 438-39.
374. Id. at 430.
375. Id. at 446-47.
376. Id. at 430.
377. It is not clear how withdrawal rights would or would not protect minorities in this case. For
the regulation affording minorities withdrawal rights in tender offers, see supra note 147 and accom-
panying text.
378. Pure, 808 A.2d at 430, 432.
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when the committee declined to give its approval of the offer in the Schedule
14D-9. 37 9 (As discussed below, Cox subsequently affirms that special committee
approval should be a prerequisite to deferential judicial review.
38°) In addition,
Unocal had publicly stated its unwillingness to sell its shares to a third 
party,381
which significantly decreased the chance that a third party offer for the company
would materialize. And the court of chancery's grant of the requested injunction
reflected that the tender offer disclosures to the minority included no substantive
information from the valuation studies conducted purportedly in the minorities'
interests, by the committee's financial advisers.
3 82 This information would clearly
have helped the minority shareholders make more informed choices about whether
or not to tender to the controller. Nor were the shareholders told about the com-
mittee's failed efforts to obtain blocking power.
383 In addition, the court notes
that Pure's special committee was unsuccessful in motivating Unocal to improve
the exchange ratio over that originally announced.
384 Because the chancery court
declined to apply Lynch's Entire Fairness standard, and instead endorsed Solomon's
standard as more appropriate to the review of the transaction, Pure does not discuss
the adequacy of the price offered by Unocal. The court notes the exchange 
ratio, 385
and Unocal's statement describing the size of the premium,
3 6 but does not engage
in any analysis of the adequacy of the controller's offered price.
The lengthy description of facts provided herein is directly relevant to this Arti-
cle's normative conclusions about the future of freezeout doctrine and the use of
the Entire Fairness standard. This is because in many respects Unocal's freezeout
of Pure's minority, and the court of chancery's new standards enunciated 
in Pure,3 7
have served as a springboard for a broad initiative to reform the doctrine relevant
to both cash out mergers and tender offer freezeouts.
388 Furthermore, the minority-
protective features in Unocal's offer, as incorporated into a set of "anticoercion" cri-
teria endorsed in Pure (and supplemented by Cox) have been "ratified" by corporate
legal academics studying freezeouts as a sufficient basis for allowing judicial defer-
ence in freezeouts.38 9 For example, as stated by Professors Gilson and Gordon: "We
379. Id. at 432.
380. See infra Part l1, C.
381. Pure, 808 A.2d at 429 ("... we are not interested in selling our shares in Pure").
382. Id. at 450.
383. Id. The court requires amendments to these disclosures, but they may have influenced the
course of the transaction nevertheless.
384. Id. at 432.
385. Id. at 430.
386. Id. at 429.
387. Id. at 445.
388. Id. at 444 ("To the extent that my decision to adhere to Solomon causes some discordance
between the treatment of similar transactions to persist, that lack of harmony is better addressed in
the Lynch line, by affording greater liability-immunizing effect to protective devices such as majority of
the minority approval conditions and special committee negotiation and approval."). For discussion of
Cox's broad based plan to overhaul freezeout doctrine, see infra Part IV
389. See, e.g., Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 8 (concluding that where a special
committee and majority of the minority shares have ratified a freezeout, deferential review rather than
the Entire Fairness standard is warranted); Letsou & Haas, supra note 113, at 29 (adopting analogous
approach though with greater emphasis on the controller's disclosure duties).
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share the Pure court's conclusion that a fully empowered special committee, includ-
ing the Pure anticoercion litany and the right to say "no" affords sufficient process so
that entire fairness review in a freeze out merger can be eliminated."
390
The discussion of the Unocal freezeout is intended to qualify this enthusiasm
for the anti-coercion standards endorsed in Pure (even as supplemented by Cox)
and their endorsement of deferential judicial review, by illuminating reasons why
the court should have been more concerned about coercion and overreaching on
Unocal's part, and less confident about the committee's effective ability to say "no"
to the controller. Instead, in Pure the court chose to emphasize the more favorable
elements of the offer: the absence of express threats of financial retribution, cre-
ation of a special committee and its employment of independent legal and finan-
cial advisers, the majority of the minority consent requirement and the controller's
affirmative promise to execute the back-end, short-form merger (if it obtained the
shares necessary to do so), while it gave less emphasis to the many worrisome
features of Unocal's freezeout offer. In essence, by invoking the Solomon standards
instead of the Entire Fairness standard of the Lynch Doctrine, the court was able
to resolve each of the ambiguities in the freezeout in the controller's favor, while
requiring the controller to make changes only in areas that were consistent with
the freezeout's consummation. Certainly, another court might have emphasized the
more problematic features of the transaction-and the court of chancery would
have been required to do so if it had employed the Entire Fairness standard.
2. Doctrinal Analysis and Pure's Holding
Pure's holding should be stated with clarity at this point. First, the court rules
that the Solomon tradition provides the analysis of Unocal's offer for Pure's minority
shares.3 91 It concludes, furthermore, that Solomon's "more flexible" standards are
preferable to Lynch's Entire Fairness standards as a general matter.392 Second, Pure
holds that, certain of the provisions incorporated into Unocal's tender offer freeze-
out should be deemed essential preconditions to a court's finding that a controller
has avoided acting coercively in a tender offer freezeout, consistent with Solomon's
mandates. As noted by the court in Pure these are: (i) the absence of express
threats by the controller to take retributive action injurious to the minority if the
freezeout fails, (ii) the observance of a majority-of-the-minority minimum tender
condition, (iii) a promise to complete a short-form merger if the controller reaches
more than 90% ownership in the target at the conclusion of the tender offer, and
(iv) the controller allowing the special committee (if one exists) to consult inde-
pendent advisers and formulate an opinion on the merits of the transaction.
393
390. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 838.
391. Pure, 808 A.2d at 444 (".. the preferable policy choice is to continue to adhere to the more
flexible and less constraining Solomon approach...").
392. Id.
393. Id. at 445. Apart from these equitable requirements, controllers have extensive disclosure
obligations, consistent with established fiduciary requirements and federal securities' law mandates, of
course. These are addressed in a separate portion of the Pure opinion. Id. at 447-52.
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Pure presents an ambitious, comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of three
distinct strands of Delaware doctrine potentially relevant to tender offer freezeouts
in general. These are the "Solomon standards," '394 the Lynch Doctrine3 95 and Unocal's
progeny.396 Because the court endorses new, objective standards for adjudging
coercion by controllers in tender offer freezeouts, the Pure opinion is generally
interpreted as a positive step towards protecting minority shareholders' rights.
39 7
In comparison to Siliconix and Aquila (as stated above) this view is correct. 391 After
reviewing the court's doctrinal choices in depth, however, it is apparent that there
were very different avenues of analysis available to the court.
Pure's first bold doctrinal move is its affirmation that the "Solomon standards"
represent a legitimate alternative tradition for adjudicating controllers' conduct in
freezeouts. 3 9 This had been accepted by the court of chancery in Siliconix °° and
Aquila,4 10 but those opinions did not engage in the kind of comprehensive and rig-
orous doctrinal analysis that Pure does. Interestingly, Pure nowhere suggests there
is a doubt about Solomon representing a legitimate alternative doctrinal tradition
for freezeouts-despite the fact that neither Solomon nor Glassman involved a true
tender offer freezeout as presently understood, as discussed above.
40 2
Secondly, Pure observes, at length, that the problem of inherent coercion (i.e.
ex post financial retribution by the controller) is not a cognizable issue in the
Solomon tradition for freezeouts 40 3 (as opposed to the Lynch Doctrine)-despite
the fact that the potential for inherent coercion, Pure affirms, is equally present
in freezeouts based on tender offers. 40 4 In effect, the Pure court implicitly con-
cludes that the supreme court's failure to discuss the issue of inherent coercion
in Solomon represents authority for disregarding the significance of inherent
coercion in modern tender offer freezeout doctrine. That is, while Pure pays
lip service to the operation of inherent coercion in tender offer freezeouts, the
reforms it endorses fail to address the dangers posed by inherent coercion.
405
394. Id. at 437-39.
395. Id. at 435-37.
396. Id. at 439-41.
397. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 826 ("Properly understood, the Pure resolution is
an important, yet still incomplete, step toward restoring a desirable coherence in this area.").
398. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 817 (critique of the improper loosening of stan-
dards effectuated by Siliconix and Aquila for tender offer freezeouts).
399. Pure, 808 A.2d at 437-39.
400. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 19,
2001) (citing as a rationale for its holding the belief that an alternative finding would have required it
to "overrule" Solomon).
401. In re Aquila, Inc., 805 A.2d 184, 190 (Del. Ch. 2002).
402. See supra Part 1II, A. 1 and 2.
403. Pure, 808 A.2d at 438 ("The inherent coercion that Lynch found to exists when controlling
stockholders seek to acquire the minority's stake is not even a cognizable concern for the common law
of corporations if the tender offer method is employed.").
404. Id. at 441 ("The problem is that nothing in the tender offer method of corporate acquisition
makes the 800-pound gorilla's retributive capabilities less daunting to minority stockholders. Indeed,
many commentators would argue that the tender offer form is more coercive than a merger vote.")
405. There reforms address informational, organizational and timing issues, but not inherent coer-
cion. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
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What makes Pure's treatment of inherent coercion even more problematic is that
the conceptual core of the court's analysis is the presumption that minorities can
make informed choices in their own interest. 40 6 This faith that minorities can
protect their own interests so long as the new anticoercion tests are met is the
rationale that underlies Pure's endorsing business judgment deference and no fair
price duty for tender offer freezeouts. In short, Pure relies on Solomon's concept
of "totally voluntary"407 tender offers, while failing to take seriously the threat to
minority free choice posed by inherent coercion. 0 8 In sum, Pure acknowledges
the relevance of inherent coercion in freezeout tender offers but then proposes
anticoercion standards that fall short of the mark in dealing with the inher-
ent coercion problem. However, if minorities' capacity for free choice remains
the lynchpin for deferential rather than intensive judicial review, and also the
rationale for not imposing a fair price duty on controllers in these deals, then
the problem of inherent coercion deserves more consideration than Pure (and
Cox 40 9) affords it.
In the end, Pure's choices do not seem motivated by the conviction that inherent
coercion is irrelevant in tender offer freezeouts (since the court says it is not410),
or the view that minorities have adequate leverage under the Solomon standards
(since the court observes they may not41 1). Rather, the court's doctrinal choices are
motivated by its express policy preferences in M&A transactions.4 12 Pure's policy
preferences resonate in the court's "meta-musings" about the role of judges in
building the common law.413 The court concludes that the policy alternatives favor
Solomon's "flexible" standards, because they may limit litigation and hence fos-
ter strong capital markets by encouraging acquisitions. 14 In contrast, Pure finds
Lynch's Entire Fairness standard as more "constraining," "litigation-intensive," and
apt to inhibit value-enhancing transactions.
41 5
Ironically, throughout much of the first half of the opinion, Pure presents an
extensive "defense" of the minority-protective rationales underlying the Entire
Fairness standard's noting their relevance to controllers' power in freezeout tender
406. Id.
407. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
408. See Pure, 808 A. 2d at 441.
409. See infra Part III, C.
410. Pure, 808 A.2d at 441-42.
411. Id. at 443 ("The [Solomon] approach also minimizes the potential for the minority to get the
best price, by arguably giving them only enough protection to keep them from being structurally
coerced into accepting grossly insufficient bids but not necessarily merely inadequate ones."). See also
id. at 444 ("The preferable policy choice is to continue to adhere to the more flexible and less con-
straining Solomon approach..."); id. at 437 ("The policy balance struck in Lynch continues to govern
negotiated mergers between controlling stockholders and subsidiaries.")
412. Id. at 443. Pure expressly owns this "policy" basis for its reforms at certain points, for example
in its observation that the two lines of freezeout doctrine reflect "a difference in policy emphasis that
is far greater than can be explained by the technical differences between tender offers and negotiated
mergers .... Id.
413. Id. at 434 (stating that judges inevitably make normative choices in conditions of imperfect
information).
414. See id.
415. Id. at 443-44.
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offers. 41 6 The court observed that the Lynch Doctrine rests on the perception of
unequal bargaining power between controllers and minorities in freezeouts.
4t7
And Pure notes that the timing, informational, organizational, market and legal
power advantages that are relevant to cash-out mergers are relevant also to tender
offer freezeouts. 41 1 Indeed, throughout its lengthy discussion of the Lynch Doc-
trine's validity, it seems that the Pure opinion is establishing a logical foundation
for extending Lynch's Entire Fairness to tender offer freezeouts. However, while
Pure affirms controllers' many power advantages over minorities in freezeouts, it
proposes that these power advantages will be sufficiently neutralized if controllers
adhere to the bright line anticoercion rules set forth. 4 9 According to the court in
Pure, so long as controllers observe the four express conditions described above
(and commit no material disclosure violations), the tender offer freezeout should
be judged noncoercive and eligible for deferential review. In this fashion, Pure
substitutes a standard of "relative noncoerciveness" for Solomon's standard of "total
voluntariness."
Leaving aside the conflict between the Solomon and the Lynch standards, there
was a further doctrinal hurdle to Pure's ruling in favor of the controller. This hur-
dle was the conflict acknowledged in Pure between the laissez faire standards
for target directors' duties in tender offer freezeouts and the progeny of Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 42° and Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 2 ' which affirm tar-
get directors' broad defensive duties and authority in responding to tender offers
by third parties.422 The court is cognizant of the relevance of this case law-it
addresses it expressly For this reason its conclusion that a controller can per-
missibly (without exercising coercion) shut down a special committee's defensive
efforts to block a controller's freezeout tender offer when the directors have judged
it to be inadequate or coercive, is startling.423 The legal issue was directly relevant
in Pure, since the special committee requested expansive defensive authority and
was refused it by Unocal's representatives on Pure's board.424
As a matter of statutory law, it is the board of directors that has authority to
define the scope of a committee's power, not the shareholders. 42 5 Furthermore,
since Pure's board owed fiduciary duties to all the shareholders equally,42 6 it would
seemingly have needed some all-shareholder or corporate-regarding explana-
tion for denying the committee's authority to seek alternatives to the controller's
416. Id. at 435-36, 441-44.
417. Id. at 442.
418. Id. at 442-44.
419. Id. at 444-45.
420. 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
421. 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985).
422. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 439. For further discussion of this issue, see Gilson & Gordon, supra
note 5, at 820-22.
423. Pure, 808 A.2d at 446.
424. Id. at 430-31.
425. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2007).
426. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., Civ. A.
No. 9212, 1990 WL 135923, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1990).
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offer.427 Such a rationale is never supplied however, nor does the court demand
one, remarkably428 In defending its conclusion, that controllers need not allow a
committee authority to deploy a poison pill and that a committee need not seek
authority to defend against an unsatisfactory tender offer freezeout, the court
points to the "awkward sociology" of controlled boards and the "burdensome"
implications for the common law of a contrary rule. 429 However, neither one of
these is a satisfactory rationale for the limits the court recognizes for special com-
mittees' authority Just as strangely, the court rationalizes that the statutory under-
pinnings of poison pills are less than solid-notwithstanding that the case law
has resolved this issue absolutely by now.430 In sum, the court does not provide a
satisfactory legal basis for limiting the target director's authority In this way it fails
to reconcile the disparity between directors' duties and authority in controllers'
tender offers compared to third parties.
To recap, in ruling on the role of the board in a controller's tender offer, Pure
holds (merely) that for the freezeout offer to be deemed noncoercive, the control-
ler must only afford committees access to advisers and the time required for them
to reach an informed judgment about the offer. The court states that control-
lers must do "at least" this much; but they need not do more to empower the
special committees in the minorities' interest. 431 In effect, the court provides only
that controllers must not stand in the way of the committee doing its job-since
the federally mandated Schedule 14D-9 requires target director's to make some
public pronouncement of their views on the offer. Furthermore, the court does
not attribute independent significance to the committee's views on the offer, but
requires merely that the controller allow the committee to serve as an adviser to
the minority shareholders. 432 This is the opposite approach from that taken in
Weinberger where the court afforded great significance (in regard to the deter-
mination of fairness) to whether the controller afforded the committee genuine
negotiating authority4 33 Commentators who have concluded that Pure affirms a
robust negotiating role for the special committee have over read its holding.
4 34
3. Closer Analysis of Pure's New Requirements
Pure's new standards for determining whether a freezeout is coercive each merit
consideration.
First, the requirement that the controller cannot have made any express threats
is effectively an historical artifact.435 In the cash-out merger in Lynch, the control-
ler warned the committee that it would commence a tender offer at a lower price
427. See Freedman, 1990 WL 135923, at *6-7.
428. Pure, 808 A.2d at 431.
429. Id. at 446.
430. Id. See, e.g., Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
431. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
432. Id.
433. Weinberger 457 A.2d at 709.
434. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 838.
435. 808 A.2d at 445.
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if the committee failed to approve the cash-out merger.436 In reality, express threats
of retributive action by controllers are gratuitous. It would be truly odd (especially
given the role of counsel in modern transactions) to find a record of a controller
making such a threat. Put simply, there is no need. Minorities, special commit-
tees and the capital markets in general are already aware of controllers' capacity
to take retributive action if it meets sustained opposition in its freezeout. Hence,
the absence of "express" threats by the controller is illusory as an indication of the
voluntariness of a tender offer freezeout.
With regard to Pure's second standard for determining whether the control-
ler has acted coercively, even a majority-of-the-minority tender condition only
mildly mitigates the severity of the prisoner's dilemma; it surely does not eliminate
it. (Nor does Pure claim it does.437) The pressure to tender persists because the
shareholders contemplating the offer are aware that once the controller is intent
on the freezeout, they cannot maintain the status quo. If the tender offer fails, the
controller can switch to a cash-out merger, which it probably can compel. Even
the special committee's express disapproval would not block the controller from
proceeding. In Pure the court afforded no weight to the committee's disapproval of
the controller's offer in its holding.4 38 Furthermore, even after Pure, the sharehold-
ers' "reward" for not selling into the controller's tender offer is that they will either
hold shares that are more illiquid and trading at a deeper discount, or they may
(though not assuredly so) be able to pursue a costly, protracted appraisal action,
as discussed previously. This awareness, logically, influences minorities' choices
ex ante. Hence, the minimum tender condition endorsed in Pure is also a weak
indicia of the voluntariness of a tender offer freezeout. 439
Nor is Pure's proposed minimum tender condition analogous to the minority
voting consent relevant to the Lynch doctrine: 4 0 the dynamics in tender offers
favor tendering, in a way that is not applicable to shareholders' voting decisions.
Justice Jacobs noted this disparity in his opinion in Emerging Communications,44 1
for example. And even in Pure the court noted disparities between mergers and
tender offers that pressure minorities to tender.442 Most importantly, sharehold-
ers who vote "no" in a merger may still take the merger consideration if the
deal closes, whereas nontendering shareholders have no such option. In addi-
tion, the more accelerated timing in tender offers exerts pressure on investors to
436. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113. In Lynch the committee's choices were further constrained by the
controller's power to block third party offers that received approval by less than 80% of the voting
shares. The subsidiary's law firm had proposed and explored adoption of a poison pill or the search
for a "white knight" bidder but found both "unfeasible" in light of the controller's blocking power. See
id. at 1113 n.3.
437. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
438. Id.
439. It is important to note that neither the recent cases nor this Article propose new requirement
for controllers to proceed in freezeouts. What is at stake is the standard of review.
440. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(c) (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 §§ 4-5 (2007).
441. In re Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *114-15 ("Nor should a tender offer be
treated as the equivalent of an informed vote.").
442. Pure, 808 A.2d at 442-43.
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sell, 443 and the looming deadline increases the salience of the premium over the
market price.4 44 The short time frame limits the target board's ability to ascertain
if alternatives more favorable for the minority are feasible, even if the controller
has not expressly blocked the committee's power to do so. 445 These factors have
a cumulative effect and pressure minorities to sell in tender offer freezeouts.
Finally, under the Lynch doctrine, the minority's voting their approval merely
effects a shift in the burden of proof; in contrast, in Pure the court proposes that
the easier-to-obtain minimum tender condition should serve as an important
indicia of a freezeout's voluntariness-and hence a crucial factor weighing in
favor of judicial deference towards the transaction.
Lastly, Pure's "90%-short-form merger" provision is also ineffective to reduce
the prisoner's dilemma affecting minority shareholders' decision making about
whether or not to tender. There are two relevant ways for controllers to exploit
their power advantages in tender offer freezeouts. The first involves the prospect of
the hold-out minority shareholders being "crushed" in a back-end short form
merger (which the controller can effectuate unilaterally) at a radically discounted
price. Appraisal rights are of only tenuous value here, for the reasons discussed
earlier.44 6 Second, after Glassman, minorities have no ability to bring an equitable
class-action for fair price in the short-form merger.4 7 In Pure, the court appears to
shore the likelihood of there being a prompt short-form merger at the tender offer
price, but it falls short of doing so effectively, for two reasons.
First, Pure's short form merger provision fails to provide minorities protection
because it gets the numbers wrong. Section 253 of the DGCL gives controllers
certainty that they can consummate a short-form merger once they own "at least"
90% of the shares.4 48 However, Pure provides that a tender offer freezeout will be
deemed noncoercive if the controller commits to effectuate a short-form merger if
it acquires more than 90% as a result of the tender offer.4 49 This disconnect between
the statute and Pure means that a controller can acquire precisely 90% of the
target's shares (which would give it certainty that it could consummate the short
form merger at its discretion), without having to consummate a prompt short-form
merger at an equivalent price, and without its freezeout being deemed coercive.
4 0
Hence, Pure's short form merger provision does not reduce the controller's ability
to "squeeze" the minority in the front end of the tender offer freezeout-because
it does not ensure the minority a prompt, equivalently priced short-form merger
443. See supra note 146.
444. On the phenomenon of "salience," as it may affect investor psychology, see, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1295 (2003)
(analyzing social influences that make certain forms of risk salient or "cognitively available" and their
relevance to law).
445. In addition, brokers earn commissions on shareholders' decisions to tender (these are stock
sales), but no commissions are earned by brokers if minorities retain their shares.
446. See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
447. 777 A.2d at 248.
448. DEL CODE tit. 8 § 253 (2007).
449. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
450. Id.
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even if the controller acquire the 90% ownership level required by statute. It is
possible that this defect in Pure's short-form merger provision is simply a misread-
ing of the statute. That is, that the court meant "at least 90%" (i.e the statutory
standard) instead of "more than 90%" (as stated in the opinion). 451 Nevertheless,
the short-form merger provision is a core element of Pure's holding, which would
suggest that the court gave it thorough consideration.
That takes us to the second way that a controller can exploit its power advan-
tages in a tender offer freezeout. In addition to the fear of being "crushed" in
an unfair short form merger, the minority shareholders will fear being left hold-
ing "super-minority" shares. That is, they will fear that there will not be any
short-form merger at all, and hence no recourse to appraisal. If a very small seg-
ment of the minority holds because they believe the tender offer price is inad-
equate, they may end up holding stock that effectively has no value because it
is delisted and radically illiquid. Selling to the controller privately at a later date
might be their only viable option. No appraisal rights would be available in rela-
tion to such private sales. On this score, too, Pure's short-form merger provision
falls short. It provides that the controller must commit to effectuate the (prompt,
equivalently priced) short-form merger only if it obtains more than the 90% own-
ership level. Here the danger for the minority is that the controller will close the
offer before the threshold is reached, the short form merger will never materialize,
and the minority will be left owning virtually worthless shares.
Furthermore, there is less room to believe this is a "mistake" in the opinion.
This feature of the court's new standards probably reflects the fact that Unocal
agreed only to a waivable 90% minimum tender condition,45 2 and the court did
not inhibit Unocal's tender offer from proceeding on this account. In other words,
at the time that the minority shareholders had to make a decision about whether
or not to tender to Unocal, they could not be assured that the back-end, equiva-
lently priced short-form merger would ever take place.
Of final importance is the fact that even if the short-form merger does material-
ize promptly, and at an equivalent price as the tender offer, that tender offer will
not have been subject to a fair price requirement This is a further implication of
Pure's rejection of Lynch in favor of Solomon.453 For these reasons, Pure's short-form
merger provision does not protect minorities' interests in controllers' tender offer
freezeouts.
In considering the effect of Pure's new standards for tender offer freezeouts, fur-
thermore, it is important to recall that they must be read outside of a fair dealings
451. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal filed in the case. See Pure, 808
A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002), appeal refused, 2002 Del. LEXIS 630 (Del. Oct. 10, 2002).
452. In Pure itself there were mixed signals sent to the minority shareholders about the 90% mini-
mum tender condition. Unocal initially announced that its offer was "conditioned on the tender of a
sufficient number of shares of Pure common stock such that, after the offer is completed, we will own
at least 90% of the outstanding shares of Pure common stock...." Pure, 808 A.2d at 429. However, in
describing the key terms of the Unocal offer as presented to the special committee, the court noted the
inclusion of "a waivable condition that a sufficient number of tenders be received to enable Unocal to
own 90% .... " Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
453. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 444.
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requirement. The duty of fair dealings is an essential part of the Lynch Doctrine,
which Pure rejects in favor of Solomon's looser prohibition on coercion. Consistent
with this expressed preference on the part of the court, Pure's prohibitions on coer-
cion must be read literally, according to their express terms. Even after Pure, the
"divide and conquer" strategy that is the essence of the prisoner's dilemma is still
available to controllers in tender offer freezeouts.454
The court's analysis of the disclosures to the minority shareholders in Pure is also
troubling. First, Pure places the burden of proving a material disclosure deficiency
on the minority shareholders. This is exceptional because in cases where self-dealing
is present (as in a tender offer freezeout) 455 courts ordinarily require the party relying
on the shareholder vote to demonstrate the adequacy of the disclosures.4"5 Second,
in reviewing the S-4 and the Schedule 14D-9 submitted for the minorities' consider-
ation, the court nowhere endorses the "complete candor" standard affirmed for con-
trollers' tender offers in Lynch v. Vickers Energy.4 57 Instead, in Pure, the question was
whether minority shareholders had demonstrated a misstatement or omission of
a material fact in the controller's disclosures. This is a critical difference which would
certainly allow room for less than "complete candor" in the tender offer freezeout
disclosures.
A considerable portion of the Pure opinion is devoted to describing controllers'
numerable opportunities for acting coercively in tender offer freezeouts. The tests
for coercion endorsed by the court in Pure are insufficient to address the vulner-
abilities of minorities in these deals. This is true even if Pure's new standards
are considered cumulatively The best explanation for the softness in the court's
stance towards coercion in tender offer freezeouts is its stated policy preference
for encouraging freezeout transactions. However, as the court failed to observe,
promoting freezeouts that are less than fair will not strengthen the capital markets;
it will have the opposite effect.
C. Cox ADDS ANOTHER SPECIAL COMMITTEE REQUIREMENT
FOR DEFERENTIAL REVIEW IN TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUTS
The Cox opinion amends Pure's anticoercion standards for tender offer freeze-
outs in one important respect. It recants the part of Pure's holding that attached
454. See, e.g., Rabkin v. Olin Corp., C.A. No. 7547, 1990 WL 47648, at * 12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990),
aff'd, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990) (Where the controller waited until immediately after a price agreement
had expired to eliminate the minority, the court of chancery held, consistent with Lynch's Entire Fairness
standard, that such precise tactical maneuvering was incompatible with the duty of fair dealings.)-
455. See, e.g., Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at * 111 (ruling that tender offer freeze-
out was a self-dealing transaction because the controller was at both sides, so that Entire Fairness was
the proper standard of review). The self-dealing nature of the transaction would be mitigated if there
were truly a majority of independent directors, i.e. if there was only a de facto controller. But then
Revlon duties would apply See infra note 501 and accompanying text.
456. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d. at 703 ("But in all this, the burden clearly remains on those rely-
ing on the vote to show that they completely disclosed all material facts relevant to the transaction.").
457. 383 A.2d at 280 ("The court's duty was to examine what information defendants had and
to measure it against what they gave to the minority stockholders, in a context in which "complete
candor" is required.").
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no significance, in terms of the applicable standard of review to a committee's
disapproval of a controller's offer.
458
To review, Pure's new standards for independent directors in tender offer freeze-
outs are quite limited. In Pure, the court held merely that where a controller is
found to have hindered the target's directors from serving as informed, impar-
tial advisers to the minority shareholders, the freezeout would not be presumed
fair-hence not entitled to deferential review.459 To be clear, the court did not
create an affirmative fiduciary obligation on the part of a controller to create (i.e.
allow the target board's creation of) a special committee. Pure merely assumes that
such a special committee will have been created. Indeed, Pure does not resolve
or even address the equitable effect of the absence of such a committee. (Nor is it
clear that Cox resolves this issue-a committee that does not exist cannot disap-
prove of a controller's offer).4 60 Second, given that Pure allowed "a close personal
friend" of the controller's President and COO to serve as one of the two members
of Pure's special committee (without even noting there was any problem regarding
the committee's independence from the controller),4 6' it is clear that the court did
not establish a rigorous test of independence for special committee members in a
tender offer freezeout. Nor did the court find that the controller had unacceptably
hindered the committee's functioning, notwithstanding that Unocals' representa-
tives participated in meetings where the committee was deliberating. 462 This result
is remarkable since Pure's only express requirement regarding a committee's role
in a tender offer freezeout is that the controller must not hinder the committee's
ability to formulate its opinion about the offer.
463
Even more significantly, Pure expressly rejected the view that committees have
inherent fiduciary authority to oppose a controller's bid that they judge to be inad-
equate or coercive. 464 Finally, Pure declined to give distinct significance to whether a
special committee approved or disapproved of the controller's offer. (In the transaction
in Pure itself the committee determined to recommend against the minority's tender-
ing to the controller,4 6 and the court did not afford this disapproval significance in
its holding.466) On this last point only, Cox recants Pure's special committee provision.
467
458. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 ("That is, in the context of going-private transactions implemented by
tender offers by controlling stockholders-so called Siliconix transactions-the protections of Pure
Resources should be supplemented by subjecting the controlling stockholder to the entire fairness
standard if a special committee recommended that the minority not tender." (citations omitted)); com-
pare id. at 645 ("In the case of a tender offer by a controlling stockholder, the controlling stockholder
could be relieved of the burden of proving entire fairness if: 1) the tender offer was recommended by
an independent special committee; 2) the tender offer was structurally non-coercive in the manner
articulated by Pure Resources; and 3) there was disclosure of all material facts.").
459. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
460. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 607.
461. Pure, 808 A.2d at 426, 429.
462. Id. at 431.
463. Id. at 445.
464. Id. at 446.
465. Id. at 432.
466. Id. at 445.
467. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607, 645.
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In sum, Cox provides that in a tender offer freezeout, in addition to a controller
needing to adhere to Pure's anticoercion standards, a court should apply the Entire
Fairness standard if the special committee disapproved of the controller's offer and
the controller proceeded with the freezeout nevertheless.46
On this point the Cox opinion is absolutely clear: committee disapproval should
mandate the application of the Entire Fairness standard.469
However, two profoundly important caveats are pertinent to evaluating Cox's
treatment of the role of committees in tender offer freezeouts. First, Cox provides
only that the committee's disapproval will preclude deferential review of the tender
offer freezeout.47 ° Cox does not provide that controllers should be precluded from
going forward if the special committee has disapproved of the offer. The cost of the
committee's disapproval is the application of the Entire Fairness standard if claims
are filed in equity Secondly, crucially, Cox does not mandate that committees must
be given real negotiating authority for the freezeout to receive judicial deference.
471
Cox does not address the part of Pure that rejected special committees' fiduciary
authority to employ a defensive strategy while it investigated alternatives to the
controller's offer.4 72 Neither Pure nor Cox resolves the disparity between target
directors' expansive authority in third party hostile tender offers and target direc-
tors' circumscribed authority in responding to controllers' tender offers.
The second important shortcoming in Cox's special committee provision is that
there are two significantly different versions of it in the opinion.47 3 The two ver-
sions, have very different implications for freezeout negotiations. To put the issue
most succinctly: it is unclear what effect Cox would give to a special committee's
decision to remain neutral in a tender offer freezeout. On the first occasion in the
opinion where the court addresses this issue, it provides that deferential review
should apply if (in addition to Pure's anticoercion litany being followed) the spe-
cial committee does not "disapprove" of the tender offer freezeout. 474 In the sec-
ond instance, it provides that the special committee's approval should be required
in order for the transaction to be presumed noncoercive and eligible for deferen-
tial review.475 This second version, of course, raises the bar for deferential review
468. Id.
469. Whether read as an approval requirement or a requirement of nondisapproval, it is clear that
Cox is proposing that a special committee's disapproval would trigger the Entire Fairness standard
for the tender offer freezeout. Id. at 607 (the "nondisapproval" requirement) and 645 (the approval
requirement).
470. Id.
471. At times Cox describes the special committee's role in negotiating the freezeout, in addition to
approving of it, as a condition to deferential review. Id. at 643-44. However, as part of this negotiating
power Cox nowhere proposes that the special committee be allowed defensive authority to block the
bid while it considers alternatives. In the absence of such plenary defensive power and the attendant
capacity to consider alternative proposals, it is difficult to make sense of what genuine negotiating
authority means.
472. Id. at 607, 645 (this is evident from Cox's failure to address a committee's defensive authority
or even negotiating role in a tender offer freezeout).
473. Id. at 607 (the "nondisapproval" requirement) and 645 (the approval requirement).
474. Id. at 607.
475. Id. at 645.
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Thus the court in Cox did not take a definitive stand in favor of the approval or
non-disapproval requirement judicial deference.
The relevance of neutrality (i.e. whether "nondisapproval" will be sufficient for
deferential review) is significant because special committees will remain under
significant pressure not to disapprove of a controller's tender offer.4 76 It will be
extraordinarily tempting for them to elect neutrality "at worst." This is certainly
a viable option as far as Schedule 14D-9 is concerned; the SEC rule so provides
expressly 477 The attraction to the committee of electing neutrality is intensified by
the limited defensive authority afforded special committees in these cases. Indeed,
given the absence of a fair price duty in tender offer freezeouts (as validated by
Pure and Cox 475), the absence of defensive authority on the committee's part,
479
and the fact controllers will foreseeably threaten not to rescind their offer if the
committee disapproves, "neutrality" will be a nearly irresistible option for a com-
mittee that is unpersuaded or uncertain about the value of the controller's offer.
Given the court's historic presumption that minority shareholders can decide for
themselves whether to tender their shares,48 ° the committee will be under tremen-
dous pressure not to "kill the deal" by officially disapproving of it, as the controller
will assert would be the case.
In this regard it is noteworthy that Cox does not present its new special com-
mittee provision for freezeouts as part of a law reform agenda aimed at protecting
minorities' interests. 4 11 The tenor of the Pure opinion is very different from that of
the Cox opinion in this respect. The Pure opinion expressed considerable concern
about controllers' capacity for overreaching in tender offer freezeouts." 2 The Cox
opinion, in contrast, expressed far less concern for minorities' vulnerability in
freezeouts. In Cox, these issues take a back seat to the court's goals of unifying
freezeout doctrine 413 and reducing shareholder litigation in freezeouts." 4
D. THE AMBIGUOUS STATUS OF CONTEMPORARY TENDER
OFFER FREEZEOUT DOCTRINE, IN SUMMARY
The ambiguities present in Cox's different special committee provisions are
one salient example of the shortcomings in the court of chancery's approach to
476. This is illustrated by the conduct of the committees in Siliconix and Aquila. See Siliconix, 2001
WL 716787, at *5; Aquila, 805 A.2d at 191.
477. See 17 C.ER. § 240.14d-101 (2007).
478. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445; Cox, 879 at 607 and 645.
479. Pure, 808 A.2d at 446; Cox, 879 at 607 and 645.
480. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
481. For discussion of Cox's emphasis on reducing litigation in freezeouts and unifying freezeout
doctrine, see infra Part IV, B and D.
482. Pure, 808 A.2d at 445 ("The potential for coercion and unfairness posed by controlling stock-
holders who seek to acquire the balance of the company's shares by acquisition requires some equi-
table reinforcement, in order to give proper effect to the concerns undergirding Lynch.").
483. Cox, 879 A.2d at 646 ("The jarring doctrinal inconsistency between the equitable principles
of fiduciary duty that apply to Lynch and Siliconix deals has been noted by this court before in Pure
Resources and Cysive.').
484. Id. ("It was thought preferable in Pure Resources to keep the strands of the doctrine separate until
there is an alteration of Lynch, lest the less than confidence inspiring pattern of "Lynch litigation" replicate
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reforming tender offer freezeout doctrine. Admittedly, affirming the application of
a fair dealings requirement would not resolve all the ambiguities regarding what
controllers could and could not do in tender offer freezeouts, consistent with
their fiduciary duties. It would, however, alter the background standard of what
is acceptable, and preclude marginally acceptable practices by controllers in this
context. Whether the courts validate a background norm of Entire Fairness or
business judgment deference thus matters tremendously to minorities and con-
trollers contemplating these deals.
Furthermore, the establishment of a fair price requirement in tender offer freez-
eouts would limit controllers' ability to use these transactions to profit from the
market's apprehension of controllers' capacity for self-dealing. Neither Pure nor
Cox make progress in resolving the doctrinal disparity and logical inconsistency
between the largely passive role contemplated for target directors in responding
to controllers' tender offers and the robust authority afforded independent direc-
tors in defending against unsatisfactory third party tender offers under Unocal
and its progeny Neither Pure nor Cox effectively grapples with the "total volun-
tariness" standard affirmed by Solomon for controllers' tender offers. For these
reasons, the Solomon tradition, even as further elaborated by Pure and Cox, does
not create a solid foundation for the future evolution of freezeout doctrine.
IV. THE Cox DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF FREEZEOUT DOCTRINE
This Part IV first analyzes the criticisms of suits and settlements in cash-out
mergers under Lynch's Entire Fairness standard, as they are enumerated in the
court of chancery's opinions in Cysive485 and Cox.4"' These criticisms are the back-
drop to Part IV's later discussion of the contribution to minorities' welfare made
by Lynch's Entire Fairness standard.
A. A PRELUDE: CYsIvE DERIDES ENTIRE FAIRNESS REVIEW
IN FREEZEOUTS
1. The Facts in Cysive
The Cysive opinion reflects the court of chancery's findings after a full trial.
In 2003, Nelson Carbonell, the controller, founder and chief executive officer
of Cysive, Inc. sought to acquire the remaining publicly traded shares of Cysive
through a cash-out merger.487 In 2000, Carbonell sold a minority interest in Cysive
in a public offering (earning more than $62 million in so doing).488 Soon thereaf-
ter, the technology market lost value and a business reorganization failed. 489 Both
itself across-the-board in all going private transactions, thereby deterring the procession of offers that
provide valuable liquidity to minority stockholders and efficiency for the economy in general.").
485. In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).
486. Cox, 879 A.2d 604.
487. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 534.
488. Id. at 535.
489. It had intended to switch from being fundamentally a services provider to a technology prod-
uct developer, but its timing was unfortunate. Id. at 533-36.
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Cysive's independent and management directors, and Carbonell himself, agreed
that fundamental change was necessary for Cysive to avoid liquidation. 49° Accord-
ingly, they hired an investment bank and commenced a search for a buyer.
49'
After months of searching and not receiving any credible offers, Carbonell himself
offered to purchase the company's remaining publicly traded shares.4 92 His good
faith toward the minority was manifest in his permitting the search for a third
party buyer to continue while he negotiated the cash-out merger with Cysive's
independent directors.493 In addition, the price he offered exceeded not only the
market trading price of the minority shares, but also the firm's anticipated liqui-
dation value.4 94 The court held that Carbonell's cash-out merger met the Entire
Fairness standard .
49
2. Litigating Factually-Intensive Questions in Equity
Cysive begins by observing that the parties disagreed about the relevant stan-
dard of review 4 96 The plaintiffs argued that Carbonell was a controller, so that the
Entire Fairness standard was relevant.4 97 The defendant argued that the business
judgment rule applied.4 98 The court observed that the answer was not self-evident
because Carbonell owned just under 40% of Cysive's voting shares, and hence
possessed less than conclusive voting control. 499 However, because he exercised
managerial control, as the founder and CEO of the company,00 the court com-
bined his voting power and his managerial power to conclude he was a control-
ler (in the language of this Article, a de facto controller). On this basis the court
applied the Entire Fairness standard. 50 1 Cysive's decision to treat Carbonell as a
490. Id. at 538.
491. Id. at 533-34.
492. Id. at 540.
493. Id. at 534, 541-44.
494. Id. at 542. Because of the company's problems, the stock price plummeted. As stated therein:
"When the market's infatuation with technology stocks ended, Cysives formerly lofty stock price
dropped precipitously From its NASDAQ trading high of $63 per share in March 2000, Cysive's
stock price dropped drastically, eventually reaching a low of $1.93 per share in August 2001." Id. at
536-37.
495. Id. at 557.
496. Id. at 546-47.
497. Id. at 546.
498. Id. at 547.
499. Id. at 551-52 ("Carbonell holds a large enough block of stock to be the dominant force in any
contested Cysive election."). For another example of a case in which it was questionable whether a
shareholder was a controller, see In re Western Nat'l Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192
(Del. Ch. May 22, 2000) (finding, under the Lynch doctrine, that a 46% shareholder was not a control-
ler based on the factual circumstances).
500. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
501. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 552-53. As defined in the introduction, Carbonell was a defacto control-
ler. For this reason, as the court in Cysive recognized, the sale of the company represented a change of
control and implicated Revlon duties. See id. at 557 n.40 ("Whether Revlon duties pertain in a cash deal
involving a controlling stockholder is an interesting question the answer to which has little practical
effect. Because entire fairness is the most exacting form of review, and because the Snowbird Agree-
ment passes muster under that test, it is difficult to see how the intermediate Revlon standard could
be violated."). Nevertheless, if the Cox Reforms allow Dual Ratification to trigger deferential review,
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controller reflects an expansive application of the Entire Fairness standard, but
not an unorthodox one. Nevertheless, had the court been searching for a prin-
cipled way to streamline the proceedings and to avoid review for Entire Fairness,
it could have ruled against Carbonell's "controller" status, and hence applied the
business judgment rule. Instead, the court's expansive ruling on Carbonell's con-
troller status served as a vehicle for its proposing fundamental reform of the Lynch
Doctrine.5 02
The Cysive court's indictment of the Lynch Doctrine is sweeping. The court
especially condemns the factually intensive nature of the fair dealings inquiry,
noting that fair dealings is relevant to both the question of the burden shift
and the resolution of the merits of the claim.5" 3 The court criticized Lynch's
adherence to the Entire Fairness standard as miring suits against controllers'
cash-out mergers in "time consuming questions that are of little practical con-
sequence."504 According to Cysive, Lynch has "so entangled the determination
over the standard of review with the resolution of the merits that the two inqui-
ries are inseparable. 5 0 5 In sum, the court expresses substantial frustration with
the Lynch Doctrine for preventing the efficient adjudication, and especially the
timely dismissal of claims, in cash-out merger freezeouts10 6 While suggesting
various strategies which courts could employ to simplify the burden-shifting
aspect of the Lynch Doctrine, Cysive goes so far as to question whether the Lynch
Doctrine should be perpetuated at all.
5 0
1
Cysive's claims about the Lynch Doctrine's hypertrophied complexity are
rather odd because all claims of breach of fiduciary duty require courts to adju-
dicate complex facts. This intertwining of flexible, nuanced, context-specific
standards and complex facts is the hallmark of Delaware's corporate legal juris-
prudence, and a reason for its prestige. 08 In this regard, it is notable that just
two years before Cysive was decided, Vice-Chancellor Strine had co-authored an
article published in The Business Lawyer (with two other Delaware judges) pro-
testing that undue complexity had grown up in Delaware's corporate fiduciary
at least where there is a de facto controller, the freezeout will involve a change of control-hence
Revlon duties would apply and the target directors would be required to take action consistent with
obtaining the best price available for the shareholders. Hence, the Cox Reforms, and the commentary
that endorses business judgment deference upon Dual Ratification, have failed to grapple with the
relevance of Revlon duties in freezeouts by defacto controllers. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 606; Allen, Jacobs, &
Strine, supra note 17, at 1317; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 786, 838-39.
502. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 549 ("These realities suggest that the Lynch doctrine if it is to be perpetu-
ated could be usefully simplified.").
503. Id. at 549-50.
504. Id. at 550. The court further contends that even the determination over whether a controller
is present has consumed "disproportionate energy" and generally cannot be resolved on the pleadings.
Id. at 550-51.
505. Id. at 547.
506. Id. at 547-49.
507. Id. at 549.
508. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1009 (1997) (arguing that Delaware fiduciary law operates through normatively sat-
urated, factually intensive narratives that provide guidance to corporate actors about proper and
improper conduct in complex transactions).
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jurisprudence. 509 In particular, the article proposed that going forward, the
courts should allow less intensive judicial scrutiny of many kinds of transac-
tions, consistent with the business judgment rule. 510 Other commentators do
not necessarily agree that the business judgement rule should be the univer-
sal standard.5 Put simply, the Lynch Doctrine is not exceptional for requiring
courts to scrutinize complex facts. What makes Lynch exceptional is its refusal to
allow disinterested director or shareholder consent to supplant judicial scrutiny
of the transaction. In other contexts, such disinterested consent to a self-dealing
transaction will trigger deferential review (i.e. application of the business judg-
ment rule), rather than merely shifting the burden of proof.52 This is why the
recent trilogy of freezeout cases characterize the Lynch Doctrine as being gratu-
itously "rigid"513-that is, in insisting that shareholders are entitled to a hearing
on Entire Fairness because of the controllers' potential for coercion and the high
stakes involved in a cash-out merger. 1 4 Cysive is correct that the Lynch Doctrine
allows minorities more room to have their claims of unfairness heard by the
court, but this is fitting since freezeouts are unusual in the potential for insider
opportunism they present, and the limited play of minority-protective market
forces in this context.
Cysive correctly observes that there is some degree of overlap in the facts perti-
nent to the determination of who possesses the burden of proof and a resolution
of a fair dealings claim under the Lynch Doctrine. 51 5 But the court's conclusion
that Lynch is fatally flawed because it is grossly inefficient in this regard is hyper-
bole.5 16 As long as courts are able to impose limits on attorneys' fees in these suits
(which they are), 517 the phenomenon of duplicative presentations of evidence is
509. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 17, at 1292 ("Moreover, new standards of review prolif-
erated when a smaller number of functionally-thought-out standards would have provided a more
coherent analytical framework.").
510. Id. at 1317 ("In contrast to current practice, however, we would apply the business judgment
review standard to self-interested mergers, in cases where the merger: (1) was expressly conditioned
on an informed and uncoerced majority of the minority vote; or (ii) was approved as fair by an effective
and uncoerced special committee of independent directors."); id. ("We would also rid the corporate
law of the 'waste' exception to the ratification effect currently accorded to informed, uncoerced stock-
holder votes."); id. at 1321 ("These modest incremental changes should better position the Delaware
corporation law to tackle the new doctrinal challenges that will undoubtedly emerge during this new
century.") (emphasis added).
511. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Gugliemo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate
Law and Governance from 1992-2004?, A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REv.
1399, 1486 (2005) ("Having two applicable standards of review available, rather than applying entire
fairness review to all transactions involving controlling stockholders, leaves room for the fact-specific,
contextual inquiries at which the Delaware courts are adept.").
512. See supra note 126. For further analysis and citation to the case law under section DEL. CODE
tit. 8, § 144, see Cox, 879 A.2d at 614-15.
513. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 609 ("...any amended complaint the plaintiffs might file against an
ultimate merger agreement could not be dismissed, per the teachings of Kahn v. Lynch Communication
Systems, Inc., if the plaintiffs could plausibly allege unfairness.").
514. Id.
515. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 547-48.
516. See id. at 549.
517. See infra Part IV, C, 2.
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a manageable one. The procedural devices incorporated into the Lynch Doctrine
facilitate a methodical litigation process that allows the controller's and minority's
representatives to assess the strength of their claims while they resolve whether to
litigate further or to settle them.
Instead, Cysive proposes that the intermingling of facts relevant to threshold
procedural questions (such as the burden of proof) and facts relevant to resolving
the merits of these claims are an "aspect of our corporation law that is passing
strange.."518 The opinion proposes that the case at bar is an example of this, noting
that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant requested that the standard of review
or burden of proof be resolved prior to trial. 19 However, as the court fails to note,
it was the defendant who requested an expedited full trial on the merits, in order
to facilitate his ability to obtain the financing required to consummate the transac-
tion. 520 Hence, contrary to what the court suggests, the proceedings in Cysive do
not support the conclusion that the Lynch Doctrine prevents dismissals when they
are warranted, or that it forces full trials in conditions of absurd uncertainty
2'
The controller's interest in resolving all the open issues through an expedited trial
made Cysive exceptional in this respect.522
3. The Importance of the Burden of Proof in Freezeout Suits
The Cysive opinion adds force to its criticism that the Lynch Doctrine unfruit-
fully prolongs litigation by proposing that the court's consideration and assign-
ment of the burden of proof in the proceedings is of little practical importance
to the litigants. 23 As stated therein: "The practical effect of the Lynch doctrine's
burden shift is slight. "524 Accordingly, as a logical next step, the Cysive opinion rec-
ommends that the Lynch Doctrine should be streamlined to eliminate the potential
for burden-shifting upon disinterested consent to the freezeout.
5 25 By eliminating
hearings contesting the validity of the consents (that are the predicate to burden
shifting under the Lynch Doctrine), Cysive intends to accelerate the resolution of
shareholder claims against cash-out mergers and increase controllers' chances of
obtaining dismissals.526
518. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 547. The court suggests that controllers are so intent on avoiding the
costly, duplicative presentation of evidence as part of the proceedings that they prefer to endure full
trials in situations where the allocation of the burdens of proof and the relevant standard of review are
not resolved prior to trial-that is, in a state of nearly intolerable uncertainty Id. at 549-
519. Id. at 547 ("Although the trial in this matter has already been held, a major aspect of the par-
ties' post-trial briefs focuses on the standard of review I am to apply to decide the case.").
520. Id. at 534 ("Because the pendency of this suit was hampering Carbonell's financing efforts, the
defendants sought an expedited trial. That request was granted...").
521. Id. at 547-49.
522. Id. at 534.
523. Id. at 549 ("Thus, because of the factually intensive nature of the burden-shifting inquiry and
the modest benefit obtained by the defendants from the shift, it is unsurprising that few defendants
have sought a pre-trial hearing to determine who bears the burden of persuasion on fairness.").
524. Id. at 548.
525. Id. at 549-50.
526. Id. at 549 ("These realities suggest that the Lynch doctrine, if it is to be perpetuated, could
be usefully simplified. When the Lynch doctrine governs, it would be simpler to take one of two
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The heart of Cysive's assertion that the assignment of the burden of proof is "time
consuming" and "of little practical consequence"527 in freezeouts is its conclusion
that the burden of proof operates essentially as a tiebreaker-that it assumes func-
tional importance only in the rare case when the evidence is "in equipoise. '528 As
stated therein: "[Sihifting the burden of persuasion under a preponderance stan-
dard is not a major move, if one assumes, as I do, that the outcome of very few cases
hinges on what happens if the evidence is in equipoise." '529 Because dead ties are
highly unlikely in litigation, if the burden of proof operated merely as a tiebreaker,
then the court would be correct in finding it of little practical significance. However,
this is an oddly limited view of the function of burdens of proof in litigation.
It is more plausible that the allocation of the burden of proof between plaintiffs
and defendants exerts a comprehensive framing effect on the proceedings, and
that this would be true in respect to both the court's interpretation of the facts
and the law.53' First, the law's allocation of the burden of proof reflects a base-line
policy judgment about which party should bear the risk of ambiguity 531 Under
the Lynch Doctrine, and the duty of loyalty in general, once conflict of interest has
been established, the fiduciary-as-defendant bears the burden of proof.532 Accord-
ingly, the assignment of the burden of proof would influence the resolution of
ambiguity in regard to the review of all the facts and legal issues in the case. The
assignment of the burden of proof (like the standard of review) operates compre-
hensively in the litigation as a heuristic, not merely as an ex post tiebreaker.
As analyzed above the Lynch Doctrine's allowance of burden-shifting takes into
account the superior bargaining power of controllers in freezeouts. 533 Hence, it
assigns the burden of proof and attendant risks arising from ambiguity to the con-
troller, absent evidence of the minorities' informed ratification of the transaction,
or that of their directors, on their behalf. 3 4 Furthermore, by allowing disinterested,
approaches. If it is thought that giving the plaintiff the opportunity to litigate a case under a favorable
fairness standard is sufficient.., then the burden of proving unfairness could be placed on, and remain
with, the plaintiff from the beginning.").
527. Id. at 550.
528. Id. at 548.
529. Id.
530. For a discussion of "framing effects," see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981) (explaining framing effects and their signifi-
cance to rational choice theory).
531. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Toolsfor Legal Stability and Change,
17 -ARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 759, 765 (1994) ("If plaintiff-shareholders fail to prove that the board's
decision was flawed by lack of care or tainted with conflicts of interest, their actions will be unsuccess-
ful. If plaintiffs prove either flaw, the burden of proof then shifts to the defendants. At this point the
gate opens up, allowing judicial scrutiny of the merits of the decision.").
532. Id.
533. For a discussion in the academic literature, see, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 211 (2003) ("As is often the case, the party bearing the burden of proof on a given dispute
lost."); Frankel, supra note 531.
534. For the court's treatment of the burden of proof issue in a tender offer freezeout, see Emerg-
ing Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at * 111 ("Both sides agree that because the Privatization is a
self-dealing transaction of which the majority stockholder stands on both sides, entire fairness is the
standard of review ab initio. The only question is whether the burden of proof, which normally falls on
the defendants, has shifted to the plaintiffs in this particular case." (citations omitted)).
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informed consent to shift the burden of proof back to the plaintiffs, the Lynch Doc-
trine (in the manner of transactional choreography) provides controllers a positive
incentive to expose their deals to this salutary constraint.535 In these respects the
allocation of the burden of proof has genuine practical significance to minority
shareholders in cash-out mergers.
In contrast to Cysive's suggestion that the assignment of the burden of proof is
of little consequence, Delaware's broader case law on corporate fiduciary loyalty
supports the conclusion that the assignment of the burden of proof is significant to
the litigants and the proceedings. This is reflected in the fact that the courts over-
see something like a "pas de troix" in considering the allocation of the burden of
proof in a case alleging a fiduciary breach.5 36 Once the burden-possessing plaintiff
demonstrates the apparent presence of self-dealing, it is the defendant/proponent
of the self-dealing transaction who must prove its "entire" or "inherent" fairness to
avoid paying damages-unless it obtains the burden-shifting consent described
above.5 37 If there was a broad consensus that the allocation of the burden of proof
was of little importance, then there would be widespread judicial resistance to
this feature of fiduciary doctrine. This basic feature of Delaware's duty of loyalty
jurisprudence would not exist if the burden of proof were as insignificant as Cysive
contends.
53
Further evidence of the practical importance of the allocation of the burden of
proof is demonstrated by the fact that controllers go to considerable lengths to
obtain disinterested consent-that is, by supporting the establishment of special
committees in cash-out mergers, and inviting their consideration of the freezeout
proposal . 39 Controllers do so, moreover, despite the fact that under the Lynch Doc-
trine, the maximum legal benefit consent will afford them is a shift in the burden of
proof (rather than a return to the business judgment rule), as discussed above. 40
Controllers would not go to the trouble of facilitating the formation of such com-
mittees, and seeking their consent to freezeout, if they did not anticipate substan-
tial benefit from their efforts-and, again, under the Lynch Doctrine, the maximum
benefit controllers can obtain is a shift in the burden of proving fairness.
535. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 618 ("Initially it cannot be ignored that Lynch created a strong in-
centive for the use of special negotiating committees in addressing mergers with controlling stock-
holders. This is a very useful incentive.").
536. For a recent application of the principle that informed ratification by disinterested directors or
stockholders shifts the burden of proof to plaintiffs and makes the business judgment rule applicable,
see, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, No. Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (finding
that stockholder ratification of the merger, notwithstanding the presence of conflicted directors, shifts
the burden to plaintiffs, resolving claims in controller's favor). in Orman, because the court did not
interpret the sale as a freezeout, it allowed the business judgment rule to apply
537. See, e.g., Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224 (Del. Ch. 1921), aff'd, 118 A. 224 (Del. 1922) (discern-
ing circumstances in which courts should give effect to a burden shift); Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d
218 (Del. 1976).
538. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. 1952). There is no basis to believe
that the allocation of the burden of proof is of less importance in self-dealing transactions involving
controllers, as opposed to other cases involving self-dealing by corporate fiduciaries.
539. For data indicating prevalent employment of special committees in cash-out mergers, see
Subramanian, Theory & Evidence, supra note 23, at 18-19.
540. See supra notes, 70-72.
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Authoritative legal commentators also affirm the importance of the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. Most persuasively, in a retrospective of Delaware
Supreme Court decisions, published in 2005, former Delaware Chief Justice E.
Norman Veasey stated that "...burdens [of proof] and standards of review are
often outcome determinative.""54 In line with the above insights and conclusions
about the importance of the assignment of the burden of proof, Part V of this
Article proposes that in future freezeout doctrine, for both forms of freezeout,
the burden should continue to lie initially with the controller, consistent with the
"interested" nature of transaction, as it presently does under the Lynch Doctrine.
In contrast to the present rule, however, the better approach is to require Dual
Ratification as a prerequisite to shifting the burden of proving unfairness to the
plaintiffs. 42
4. Does the Lynch Doctrine Prohibit
the Granting of Motions to Dismiss?
Even if one accepts Cysive's policy conclusion that claims should be dismissed
on the pleadings whenever possible, is it correct that Lynch's adherence to the
Entire Fairness standard precludes courts from dismissing claims against cash-out
mergers on the pleadings? 43 Cysive seems to propose that the factual underlay of
cash-out merger cases is too complex to be resolved without a full trial. However,
it should be remembered that in cash-out mergers and tender offers, the control-
ler would have presented extensive, detailed information about the substance and
process of the freezeout in its SEC mandated proxy statement or tender offer
statement. The SEC's going private rule also adds to the detailed disclosures about
541. Veasey & DiGugliemo, supra note 511, at 1435.
542. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 606 (arguing that the directors' and minorities' consents are prop-
erly understood as complements, not substitutes).
543. To bolster its argument that the disinterested, informed nature of the consent of the directors
(as a condition to burden shifting) is too complex to be resolved absent a full trial, Cysive cites to the
Delaware Supreme Court's nearly contemporaneous decision in Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277 (Del.
2003) as authority Cysive, 836 A.2d at 549. However, there were matters of first impression at issue
in Krasner One was the effect to be given to special committee approval of a merger where a majority
of the board had material conflicts of interest in the outcome, because a committee cannot give valid
consent to a merger in Delaware. Krasner, 826 A.2d at 286. Krasner does not support a broad reading
that the supreme court has determined that the allocation of the burden of proof is too complex to
be determined on the pleadings, i.e. without or prior to a trial. In Krasner, furthermore, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed that defendants have a high burden to win dismissal of a conflicted transac-
tion. As stated therein, it is the defendants "not the plaintiffs [who] bear the burden of proving that
the [challenged, interested] merger was approved by a committee of disinterested directors, acting
independently, with real bargaining power to negotiate the terms of the merger." Id. at 284-85. Thus
Krasner provides another example of a court allocating importance to the burden of proof in a situation
involving a controller, and construing ambiguity in favor of the minority shareholder plaintiffs. On this
point, see Kahn v. Tremont Corp., Civ. A. No. 12339, 1992 WL 205637, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997) (finding that the independence of the committee is
a question of fact that must turn on the particular realities of the situation). But see Veasey & DiGug-
lielmo, supra note 511, at 1471 (suggesting that process determination regarding efficacy of special
committees in conflicted transactions is a challenge to legitimate dismissals on the pleadings).
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the that the controller must publish.544 Information from the parties' federally-
mandated disclosures is often presented to the court as part of motion practice
in proceedings under the Lynch Doctrine, either as part of the complaint or in
motions for summary judgment. 45 If controllers observe the minority protective
conditions affirmed in the case law and in Part V of this Article, and provide the
comprehensive, candid disclosure required by law, courts should be capable of
legitimately resolving plaintiff's unfairness based claims prior to trial.
In Cysive there were no such extensive disclosures because the defendant's
request for an expedited trial preceded the solicitation of the shareholder vote,
and hence the filing of a proxy statement. However, based on the facts presented
in the opinion, it seems that most of the evidence was not disputed by the parties,
so that many of the questions critical to the burden of proof and resolution of
the standard of review could have been resolved even without a trial.546 There
was evidence that a genuinely independent special committee had actively and
effectively negotiated with the controller,547 while at the same time Carbonell
allowed the committee freedom to continue searching for a third party buyer.54
The record showed that the special committee had twenty-one meetings, con-
tacted thirty-seven potential buyers, and obtained valuation analyses from two
different well-known, independent financial advisers.5 49 The committee had
negotiated a decrease in Carbonell's requested termination fee, had refused his
preliminary bids, and had denied his request to cut off third party offers.55 0 There
was little if any dispute over these facts. Had the procedural posture of the case
not been extraordinary-that is, had the controller not sought an expedited trial
prior to consummating the transaction-these facts would have been set forth in
a proxy statement.55 ' Furthermore, the objective independence criteria for direc-
tors recently endorsed by the NYSE and the NASD will influence determinations
about whether an independent committee ratified the freezeout and thus facilitate
prompt resolution of claims.552 In sum, in many freezeouts, the information in
544. See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.ER. § 240.13e-3 (2007). There are many self dealing cases where
the Entire Fairness standard applied where the court resolves issues pertaining to the adequacy of
disclosures (as they are relevant to the efficacy of minority shareholders' approvals) on motions to
dismiss. See, e.g., Orman v Cullman, No. Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
Furthermore, if the court was not satisfied that the complaint and the disclosures appended thereto
were sufficient, it could order limited discovery and then hear the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
point is, the court can control litigation agency costs.
545. This is evident from perusing these SEC filings, but also from the judicial analysis of control-
lers' disclosure in the freezeout cases. See, e.g., Pure, 808 A.2d at 447-52.
546. Cysive, 836 A.2d at 536, 542.
547. The committee's composition and hiring of its financial advisor are described in Cysive, 836
A.2d at 541-42.
548. Id. at 546 ("After the Snowbird Agreement was signed, the special committee continued to
entertain inquiries from interested buyers and to seek diligently a higher price.").
549. Id. at 545 and 546.
550. Id. at 543.
551. See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.ER. § 240.13e-3 (2007); Schedule 13e-3, 17 C.ER. § 240.13e-100
(2007).
552. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (defining "independent director" for NYSE
listing purposes), available at http://www.nyse.comc/lcm/cm-section.html; NASD MANUAL, Marketplace
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mandated filings with the SEC contain evidence sufficient for courts to resolve,
whether to shift the burden of proof and the merits of the unfairness claim prior to
a full trial. It is reasonable to believe that if Carbonell had not sought an expedited
trial, the objective evidence in that case would have been sufficient for the court




Furthermore, Cysive's contention that the Lynch Doctrine is an outlier in regard
to the complexity it imports to the litigation of shareholder claims is suspect. It
seems highly implausible that the Lynch Doctrine is meaningfully more complex
than are other corporate legal doctrines, and other features of modern litigation
practice.554 The more reasonable conclusion is that neither freezeout transac-
tions nor the doctrines governing them are more complex on average than other
forms of M&A transactions and the fiduciary standards applicable to them.
555
Because the Delaware courts commonly resolve highly complex, fact-intensive
disputes in corporate transactions on motions to dismiss and motions for sum-
mary judgment, it is reasonable to believe that they can do so efficaciously while
adhering to the Lynch Doctrine. 556 If claims under Lynch's Entire Fairness standard
commonly go forward, this is more likely indicative of the courts' perception of
widespread overreaching by controllers than their helplessness in the face of the
demands of the Lynch Doctrine.
557
Rule 4200(a)(15) (defining "independent director" for NASDAQ listing purposes), available at http://
nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html.
553. Cysive is nearly a textbook example of when the courts should allow the controller business
judgment deference in litigation.
554. The article by Allen, Jacobs and Strine comes to mind. If one accepts that the role of law is to
increase economic efficiency defined as growth overall (a contestable assumption), and if one accepts
that shareholder litigation inhibits some number of profitable transactions (also contestable-
depending on the definition of "profitable"), then the function of Delaware doctrine is to err on the
side of facilitating more deals-hence looser standards are preferable. This is the working analytical
framework of that law review article, and its relevance to Cysive and Cox (opinions written by one of
the article's co-authors) is obvious. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 17, at 1287-88 (describing
corporate law's role in relation to economic efficiency).
555. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). For further discussion of the height-
ened fiduciary standards that apply in other acquisition transactions, see infra Part V, D.
556. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001) (affirming Delaware Court of
Chancery's granting of motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged breach of due care, loyalty, and
disclosure); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999) (affirming application
of business judgment rule and dismissal of disclosure claims in a shareholder challenge to a merger
involving conflicted directors); Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 9212, 1990
WL 135923 (Del Ch. Sept. 21, 1990) (granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to
dismiss as part of complex management lead buyout). For a notable summary judgment decision (in
favor of defendants) resolving issues relating to the definition of who is a controller, disclosure claims,
and the potential presence of deal-stopping lock-ups, see Orman v. Cullman, No. Civ. A. 18039, 2004
WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
557. One would think that at this point in the evolution of the transactional choreography for
freezeouts and other M&A transactions that most buyers, and especially controllers, would avoid
patent overreaching, however this does not seem to be the true. For a case demonstrating remark-
able facts in this regard, see Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at * 119-33 (individual
director defendants on special committee were conflicted and exhibited shockingly bad judgment in
representing minorities' interests, so that certain of them were found individually to have breached
their fiduciary duties).
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B. THE Cox DECISION AS AN "ADVISORY OPINION"
The next sections of this Part IV provide an analysis of the Cox opinion's criti-
cisms of litigation under the Lynch Doctrine. 5 8 In many respects, these criticisms
expand on those in Cysive analyzed above.
1. The Cash-Out Merger in Cox
The cash-out merger in Cox exemplifies many features of modern freezeout trans-
actions. The Cox family proposed a buyout of the public shares in Cox Communica-
tions, Inc, a company in the broadband communications industry that had listed
minority shares on the New York Stock Exchange. The controlling family had previ-
ously taken the company public, and then private, and then public again, consistent
with its private preferences and the company's need for capital.159 When the family
announced its freezeout bid in the fall of 2004, it held 74% of the company's voting
stock and control over the chairmanship of Cox's board.5 60 The Cox family was thus
unequivocally a controlling shareholder as defined under the Lynch Doctrine.
The Cox family's initial $32 bid represented only a 14% premium over the
average trading price of the listed shares. The final price, which was agreed to
both by the special committee and counsel for the minority shareholders, was
$34.75. 5 1 Consistent with the minority shareholders' best interests, the family
agreed to go forward only if it reached an agreement with the special commit-
tee. 56 2 The family also agreed to abandon the freezeout if the special committee
was unable to obtain a fairness opinion from its financial adviser.5 63 Less favor-
ably for the minority, the family announced its unwillingness to allow a market
check or sale of the company to a third party 564 This limited the committee's and
its financial adviser's ability to evaluate the company's true going concern value,
and hence the actual merits of the controller's offer.
Consistent with the established transactional choreography for cash-out merg-
ers, the special committee hired independent legal advisers (Fried, Frank, Harris,




Once the controller and the special committee arrived at final terms, the merger
agreement was ratified by the company's full board.5 66 The Cox family then made a
tender offer for the minority's shares to accelerate the closing of the freezeout and
558. Cox's changes to tender offer freezeout doctrine were analyzed in Part III, supra. In many
respects, the Cox decision deepens and expands on the Cysive's criticisms of the effects of applying
Entire Fairness standard to Freezeouts under the Lynch Doctrine.
559. Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 ("At various times, the Family has found it convenient to take Cox
public, in order to raise money from the public capital markets. At other times, the Family has found
it preferable to run Cox as a private company").
560. Id.
561. Id. at 605.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 608. The family was quoted as saying that "it would not sell its Cox shares or support a
sale of Cox to a third party" Id.
565. Id. at 609.
566. Id. at 612.
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minimize their exposure to appraisal proceedings. After acquiring over 90% of
Cox Communications' shares in the tender offer, the family consummated the
freezeout through a short-form merger.567 The Stipulation of Settlement reflecting
the resolution of legal claims against the freezeout was presented to the Delaware
Court of Chancery a month prior to the transaction's closing.
5 68
2. A Plan for Comprehensive Doctrinal Reform for Freezeouts
Neither the reasonableness of the price paid for the minority shares nor the
family's adherence to fair dealings in the freezeout were before the court in Cox.15 9
The sole issue being contested was an objection to the plaintiffs' lawyers' requested
fee. 5 70 However, in Cox the fee issue serves as a platform for the court to survey
contemporary freezeout doctrine and recommend comprehensive reform.
From the outset of the Cox opinion, the court's negative view of the conduct
of the plaintiffs' lawyers in the transaction is explicit. In one of its blander criti-
cisms, the court describes the lawyers as having filed "premature, hastily-drafted
makeweight complaints. "571 Moreover, the opinion expresses a palpable aversion
to the conduct of plaintiffs' lawyers in claims filed under the Lynch doctrine as a
general matter. 72 It objects to what it describes as a nearly comprehensive pattern
of abusive suits and settlements in cash-out mergers governed by the Lynch Doc-
trine.573 The opinion describes the settlement negotiations in the Cox transaction,
and in claims against cash-out mergers governed by the Lynch Doctrine in general,
as unfolding in a triangulated interchange between controllers, special commit-
tees and lawyers for minority shareholder plaintiffs.5 74 Cox contends that these
problematic settlement negotiations are paradigmatic in suits filed using the Lynch
Doctrine,' 75 and that they represent an easy, unfair way for plaintiffs' lawyers to
earn fees. 576 The specter of "free riding" plaintiffs' lawyers 77 clogging Delaware's
567. Id. at 612-13 ("The Stipulation of Settlement was presented to the Court on November 10,
2004. Notice was promptly issued to the public stockholders on November 24, 2004. By that time,
the Family had already commenced their tender offer at $34.75 per share.... On December 2, 2004
the tender offer expired... giving the family over 90% of the Cox shares. On December 8, 2004 a back
end, short-form merger was executed taking Cox private.").
568. Id.
569. This issue was resolved in the earlier Stipulation of Settlement presented to the Delaware
Court of Chancery on November 10, 2004. See id. at 612-13.
570. Id. at 605.
571. Id.
572. For example, describing the firm that obtained lead counsel status, the Cox court states, "that
firm is no ingenue to the lead counsel sweepstakes." Id. at 608. The court describes the plaintiffs' law-
yers as engaging in a "food fight" over who would be lead counsel. Id. at 609.
573. Id. at 620 ("... plaintiffs sue as soon as there is a public announcement of the controller's in-
tention to propose a merger.... In this regard, this case is paradigmatic.").
574. The interaction of the special committee representing the minority shareholders in negotia-
tions with the Cox family's lawyers and the lawyers for the minority shareholder plaintiffs is described
in Cox, 879 A.2d at 608-13. For a discussion of triangulation as a general problem, see id. at 620-21.
575. Id. at 645.
576. Id. at 605-06 ("For their part, plaintiffs' awyers can get sizable fees by 'contributing to the success-
ful work of a special committee and by settling at the same level that the special committee achieved.")
577. Id. at 607.
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dockets with meritless claims 578 fuels the court's sweeping invective against Lynch
is adherence to the Entire Fairness standard. Accordingly, Cox calls for compre-
hensive reform; indeed, for reforming not only the doctrine applicable to cash-out
mergers, but all Delaware freezeout doctrine. 5 9 In specific, Cox proposes that the
business judgment rule should apply as the presumptive standard of review in
all freezeouts, so long as the controller obtained Dual Ratification, 580 or at least so
long as neither the independent directors or minority shareholders disapproved of
the transaction.5 1 This law reform proposal is the culmination of Vice Chancellor
Strines opinions in Pure, Cysive, and Cox. As applied, it would largely repeal the




Notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of the reforms proposed in Cox, the
"emergency" that purportedly compels their adoption relates to only one category
of freezeouts (cash-out mergers), and one category of cash-out mergers-those
announced as negotiable transactions.5 3 At a few different points in the Cox opin-
ion the court acknowledges the limited empirical basis of its critique-observing
that different pattern of claims and settlements exist in cash-out mergers announced
after final terms have been reached between the controller and the minority share-
holders' representatives, as well as in a tender offer freezeouts 4 In these other
contexts, Cox notes in passing, the allegedly abusive pattern of hastily filed com-
plaints and collusive settlements does not manifest itself.58 5 This is a significant
578. Id. at 605 ("...each Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits, but
because it cannot be dismissed.").
579. There is some confusion with respect to the precise nature of the consent/nondisapproval
required, as previously noted, supra at notes 473-80 and accompanying text. Although the court is
motivated to unify freezeout doctrine, an interesting disconnect appears. In cash-out mergers, Dual
Ratification is proposed as the prerequisite to the business judgment rule. Cox, 879 A.2d at 606,
643-44. Hence, neutrality would not be sufficient, which is consistent with DGCL § 251. In the first
statement of the proposal for tender offer freezeouts, the absence of disapproval seems to be sufficient.
In a later treatment of this question, however, Cox proposes Dual Ratification for tender offer freeze-
outs to obtain business judgment deference as well. Cox 879 A.2d at 645.
580. Id. at 643-44 ("Put simply, if a controller proposed a merger, subject from inception to nego-
tiation and approval of the merger by an independent special committee and a Minority Approval
Condition, the business judgment rule should presumptively apply" (emphasis in original)).
581. See id. at 606-07, 643, 647.
582. The Cox court affirmatively avoids proposing the repeal of Lynch, as Cysive had delicately sug-
gested. Cysive 836 A.2d at 549. Cox contends that the Delaware Supreme Court has never precluded
the application of the business judgment rule upon Dual Ratification. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 617.
Furthermore, Cox deemphasizes the radicalness of its proposal to apply the business judgment rule
to freezeouts upon Dual Ratification as merely "a relatively modest alteration of Lynch." Id. at 643. In
this way the court of chancery is endeavoring to avoid a direct conflict with respected supreme court
precedent.
583. Cox, 879 A.2d at 620. ("lPjlaintiffs sue as soon as there is a public announcement of the
controller's intention to propose a merger.").
584. Id. at 628 ("When a controller has already had to complete negotiations with a special com-
mittee or launched a tender offer, it cannot provide more consideration without implicitly criticizing
the special committee (or itself) and without incurring more out of pocket acquisition costs.").
585. Id. at 627. Interestingly, in Cox's lexicon there are only "premature" claims and "tardy" claims.
The former are filed against cash-out mergers which are still advertised as negotiable, so that the
receipt of a fee by plaintiffs' lawyers is presumed. The latter "tardy" claims are filed against cash-out
mergers after terms have been agreed to by controllers and committees-controllers generally refuse
to settle those claims according to Cox. See id. at 627.
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caveat to Cox's sweeping call to limit the application of Lynch's Entire Fairness stan-
dard. And yet it is not one the court takes much notice of. Instead, Cox engages in
a tirade against the "perverse incentives" generated by review for Entire Fairness
under the Lynch Doctrine, and presents a wide array of arguments why review for
Entire Fairness in freezeouts should be limited. The court proposes this sweeping
law reform initiative notwithstanding that its principal criticisms of the Lynch Doc-
trine are inapplicable to cash-out mergers announced after key terms have been
agreed to and inapplicable to tender offer freezeouts58 6 The overbreadth in Cox's
criticisms of review for Entire Fairness reveals that the opinion is fueled by the
broader, policy-based agenda noted in the Introduction." 7 Indeed, the Cox court is
quite adamant in expressing its policy preference for significantly limiting share-
holder litigation in freezeouts and encouraging more freezeout transactions."'
However, if Cox was correct that controllers routinely face "injurious" circum-
stances in going ahead with publically announced negotiable cash-out mergers
through forced settlements and the payment of excessive fees to plaintiffs' law-
yers, then controllers would eschew negotiable cash-out mergers. They could pro-
ceed with a going private deal through a tender offer freezeout or by delaying the
announcement of their cash-out merger until after the principal terms had been
agreed with the board or special committee. That this is not the case suggests
that controllers are not stuck in an untenable situation on account of the Lynch
Doctrine, but rather that they commonly enjoy some benefit from obtaining an
early, comprehensive settlements in shareholder suits under the Lynch Doctrine.
This likely benefit is discussed below in relation to the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein.5" 9 Although Cox
acknowledges in passing that controllers may obtain some benefits from early
settlements, 590 this is a minor footnote to the discussion of opportunistic plaintiffs'
lawyers,59 1 meritless "Lynch litigation"592 and Lynch's deleterious effects on firms
and the economy 593 That is, controllers are portrayed as unwitting "victims" in
Cox's account of freezeout litigation under the Lynch doctrine.
Cox's review of the fee dispute provided the court an opportunity to present its
vision for reforming freezeout doctrine.5 94 Reviews of settlements have spurred
586. Id. at 628.
587. Id. at 605 ("Because [the Lynch] standard makes it impossible for a controlling stockholder
ever to structure a transaction in a manner that will enable it to obtain a dismissal of a complaint in a
challenged transaction, each Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits but
because it cannot be dismissed.").
588. See id. at 607, 646.
589. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
590. In general, the opinion proposes that controllers settle in order to avoid having to pay the
inevitable costs associated with discovery because, the court claims suits under Lynch cannot ever be
dismissed, and to avoid the waste of executive time. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 606.
591. See, e.g., id. at 619 ("The incentive system that Lynch created for plaintiffs' lawyers is its most
problematic feature.").
592. Id. at 646.
593. Id.
594. This is a hallmark of Vice Chancellor Strines decisions, about which he is not shy To his credit,
his opinions are extraordinarily comprehensive he allows no sacred cows in corporate governance; and
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such far-ranging and influential opinions from the Delaware Court of Chancery
in other instances. 595 Merely applying the established fee doctrine to the dispute
in question would not have yielded a survey of the entire body of Delaware
freezeout doctrine, or an opportunity to propose a sweeping reform of freezeout
doctrine.
C. Cox's CRITICISMS OF THE OPERATION OF
THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD IN FREEZEOUTS
1. Motions to Dismiss under the Lynch Doctrine
Cox claims of the Lynch Doctrine prevents even specious shareholder claims
against cash-out mergers from being dismissed. 596 This view is stated and restated
throughout the opinion.5 97 For example, Cox states that the Lynch Doctrine "makes
it impossible for a controller ever to structure a transaction in a manner that will
enable it to obtain dismissal of a complaint challenging the transaction."598 In
another passage Cox claims that it is "an undeniable reality that Lynch stated that
any merger with a controlling stockholder, however structured, was subject to a
fairness review.' 599 To further emphasize this point, the opinion describes a hypo-
thetical freezeout in which a controller offered a 25% premium above the market
price to the minority shareholders, negotiated with a special committee composed
of independent directors ("Bill Gates and Warren Buffett") and otherwise adhered
to the established transactional choreography for cash-out mergers meticulously
and in good faith-only to have its motion to dismiss denied. 00 This story is
offered up as "proof' of the Lynch Doctrine's dysfunctionality and the damage it is
causing to investors and the legal system. In this respect, the Cox opinion claims,
the Lynch Doctrine is different from all other corporate legal doctrines, including
ones that impose heightened fiduciary requirements on M&A and self-dealing
does not hide his agenda. For commentary on Vice Chancellor Strine's style of deciding cases, see
Gapper, supra note 31.
595. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
596. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 605. Cox's assertion of nondismissability is an updated version of the
Cysive court's entanglement critique of Lynch. That is, the view that the doctrine is simply so dysfunc-
tional in its complexity that it precludes meaningful determinations without prolonged litigation.
Thus, this Article's objections to the Cysives "entanglement" critique are relevant here as well. See supra
notes 503-22 and accompanying text.
597. For example, the opinion states that "unlike any other transaction one can imagine ... it [is]
impossible after Lynch to structure a merger with a controlling shareholder in a way that permitted the
defendants to obtain a dismissal of the case on the pleadings." Cox, 879 A.2d at 619.
598. Id. at 605.
599. Id. at 617. What appears to be an equally undeniable reality is that the Delaware Court of
Chancery is frustrated by the substantial demands imposed on the court valuation-based litigation
under the Lynch Doctrine and other types of corporate fiduciary cases. But the burdens imposed on
courts by valuation litigation would not radically be reduced if the Cox Reforms are adopted because,
for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery also hears appraisal actions. Furthermore, valuation
analyses are also relevant in claims of breach of fiduciary duty against directors in going private trans-
actions. Getting rid of Entire Fairness in freezeouts is not a solution to the court's methodological
problems with valuation therefore.
600. Id. at 620.
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transactions.6 0 According to the court, in all these other doctrines, the court can
dismiss nonmeritorious claims, but not under the Lynch Doctrine.
a. Entire Fairness and the Courts' Ability to Dismiss Claims in Freezeouts
As represented in the Cox opinion, the nondismissability of even the most spe-
cious of shareholder claims under the Lynch Doctrine is the root of much evil.
Because even "premature, hastily-drafted, makeweight"6°2 complaints cannot be
dismissed under the Lynch Doctrine, Cox contends, plaintiffs' lawyers know that
they can make a "sizable" fee by free riding on the negotiation efforts of special
committees in cash-out merger freezeouts. °3 According to the court, controllers
have a rational preference for settling even nonmeritorious claims because only
in this way can they avoid the otherwise unavoidable and exorbitant costs of
discovery and lost executive time. 60 4 According to Cox, when the settlements are
presented to the court for approval, the plaintiffs' lawyers claim that they have
benefitted the minority shareholders by pointing to the improved price earned by
the special committee. That is, Cox insists that the litigation itself contributes little
or no value to improved prices where a committee has been negotiating with the
controller, 0 5 but that committees would win such price improvements without
the filing of claims. As evidence for this conclusion the court points to the fact that
it has not been presented with a case in which the plaintiffs' lawyers elected to liti-
gate further after a special committee had settled with a controller (the "Simulta-
neous Settlement" phenomenon). 6 6 According to the court, the plaintiffs' lawyers
justify their decision to terminate the litigation on the rationalization that some
improvement in the price offered to the minority is better than none which could
be the result if there were further litigation.
60 7
601. Id. at 620-22.
602. Id. at 605.
603. Id.
604. See id. at 606. See also id. at 643 ("The judicial process should be invoked when a party has
a genuine claim of injury. Particularly in the representative litigation context, where there are deep
concerns about the agency costs imposed by plaintiffs' attorneys, our judiciary must be vigilant to
make sure that the incentives we create promote integrity and that we do not, by judicial doctrine,
generate the need for defendants to settle simply because they have no viable alternative, even when
they have done nothing wrong.").
605. Id. at 606 ("Moreover, I cannot give credence to the notion that the litigation had a substan-
tially important impact on the pricing of the transaction because the plaintiffs' claims were not meri-
torious when filed and it is most probable that the defendants settled simply because they had, under
Lynch, no other economically efficient option for disposal of the lawsuit.").
606. The Cox court attributes virtually all the increases obtained by special committees in negotia-
tions with controllers to their savvy and organizational stature (in comparison to disaggregated minority
shareholders), with only the slightest advantage being conferred by the added leverage of claims filed
by plaintiffs under the Entire Fairness standard. As a basis for the conclusion that committees are the
driving engines of minorities' receipt of meaningfully high premiums, the Cox court cites the absence of
a situation in which "the controller's lawyer told the plaintiffs' lawyer this is my best and final offer and
received the answer, 'sign up your deal with the special committee, and we'll meet you in the Chancel-
lor's office for the scheduling conference on our motion to expedite."' Id. at 621. The Cox court proposes
that "in every instance, the plaintiffs' lawyers have concluded that the price obtained by the special com-
mittee was sufficiently attractive, that the acceptance of the settlement at that price was warranted." Id.
607. Id. at 622, 633.
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Finally, the Cox opinion ups the ante by asserting that the Lynch Doctrine is
not only disadvantageous to controllers, but also harming the system of repre-
sentative litigation under Delaware law and impairing economic efficiency in
general by deterring some profitable freezeouts. 65 As stated in Cox, the filing
of meritless suits under the Lynch doctrine is deterring "the procession of offers
that provide valuable liquidity to minority shareholders and efficiency for the
economy in general. ' 60 9 These assertions form the basis of Cox's proposal for
allowing deferential review in freezeouts upon Dual Ratification.
b. The Entire Fairness Standard and "Mere" Allegations
of Financial Unfairness
The claim that the Lynch Doctrine prevents the timely dismissal of claims was
made previously by the court in Cysive, as described earlier.6 0 The claim seemed
largely to rest on the court's view that suits under Lynch present mixed questions
of law and fact that cannot legitimately be resolved absent a trial. 61 In Cox the
nondismissability thesis rests on a different conclusion. The strongest explanation
the Cox court provides for its assertions that Lynch claims "cannot ever" be dis-
missed is that a plaintiff can go forward under the Lynch Doctrine simply by dis-
puting the price offered in the cash-out merger. In the words of the court, because
"financial fairness is a debatable issue," 61 2 plaintiffs can always go forward, and
so defendants are forced to settle even nonmeritorious claims to avoid further
nonmeritorious litigation. As presented in Cox, Lynch litigation is unstoppable
because the fair price aspect of the Entire Fairness standard is an open door to the
courthouse.
613
But the court in Cox has misread the scope and implications of the Lynch Doc-
trine. Put simply, as provided in Weinberger6 4 and affirmed subsequently by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.,615 without
a credible claim of unfair dealing, a plaintiff cannot go forward with an Entire
Fairness claim against a cash-out merger. The cause of action would properly be
dismissed. The Weinberger opinion held so expressly-that in the absence of a
genuine claim of unfair dealing, minority shareholders would be relegated to the
608. Id. at 645.
609. Id. at 646.
610. See supra Part IV, A.2.
611. See id.
612. Cox, 879 A.2d at 620.
613. Id. at 617 ("Although it is an undeniable reality that Lynch stated that any merger with control-
ling stockholder, however structured, was subject to a fairness review...").
614. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715 (citing Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962)
and David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971)). The Weinberger
court continued to explain that "... the provisions of 8 Del. C. § 262, as herein construed, respecting
the scope of an appraisal and the means for perfecting the same, shall govern the financial remedy avail-
able to minority shareholders in a cash-out merger" Id. (emphasis added).
615. 498 A.2d 1099, 1107-08 (Del. 1985) (finding that plaintiffs had made out a credible claim that
the controller had manipulated the timing of the freezeout in a way that constituted unfair dealing-a
cognizable issue under the entire fairness standard-rather than merely disputing the price of the
cash-out merger, so that the claim should not have been dismissed).
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appraisal remedy 616 As envisioned by Weinberger, the fiduciary Entire Fairness
claim survives only if the plaintiff has made out a viable claim of unfair dealing in
the cash-out merger.
Rabkin affirms this same rule. 61 7 Rabkin is widely and correctly cited for affirm-
ing Weinberger's admonition that a plaintiff can go forward in equity (is not rel-
egated to an appraisal) where its complaint presents a genuine claim of unfair
dealing in the cash-out merger.618 However, there was also a negative implication to
Rabkin's holding. Rabkin affirmed that the lawsuit could go forward because it was
not merely a valuation dispute. The controller had been "charged with bad faith
that goes beyond issues of 'mere inadequacy of price.'" 6'9 The import of Rabkin
is that a mere valuation dispute in a freezeout, without a genuine claim of unfair
dealing, should not survive as an Entire Fairness action. 620 Hence, Cox mistakenly
interprets the fair price aspect of the Entire Fairness standard as an opportunity
for minorities to litigate mere valuation differences as equitable actions. And Rab-
kin also addressed the potential for plaintiffs to add a "mere allegation" of unfair
dealing in order to survive a dismissal. To this objection the court stated: "... our
courts are not without a degree of sophistication in such matters."621
c. The Matsushita Effect
Again, Cox's core objection to the Lynch Doctrine is that even specious claims
cannot be stopped and plaintiffs' lawyers are allowed to extort unearned fees and
unfair settlements from controllers. 6 2 But Cox fails to acknowledge the benefits
for controllers of achieving comprehensive settlements of claims against freezeouts
in state class actions.
623
In 1996, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Epstein,624 the Supreme Court
held that federal courts must extend full faith and credit to state court settlements,
including the settlement of federal securities law claims therein. 625 Resolution of this
issue was complicated by the fact that Congress provided for exclusive jurisdiction
in the federal courts of claims arising under the Exchange Act.626 This would include
616. Weinberger 457 A.2d at 714-15.
617. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107.
618. Id. at 1104-05 ("Weinberger's mandate of fair dealing does not turn solely on issues of decep-
tion."); id. at 1105 ("In Weinberger we observed that the timing, structure, negotiation and disclosure of
a cash-out merger all had a bearing on the issue of procedural fairness."). In Rabkin, the supreme court
reversed the chancery court conclusion that fair dealing was limited to allegations of misrepresenta-
tion. See Rabkin, 480 A.2d 655, 660 (Del. Ch. 1984), rev'd, 498 A.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Del. 1985).
619. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107.
620. Id. at 1107-08.
621. Id. at 1107.
622. Cox, 879 A.2d at 605-06 ("For their part, plaintiffs' lawyers can get sizable fees by 'contribut-
ing' to the successful work of a special committee and by settling at the same level that the special
committee achieved.").
623. In fairness, Cox does make brief mention of the fact that controllers may enjoy a benefit as the
result of a "broad release" of claims relating to the freezeout, but without fleshing out the significance
of the reference. See id. at 631.
624. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
625. Id. at 387. For commentary, see Richard W Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Pre-
emption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 95-98 (1998).
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federal securities fraud claims against controllers' merger proxy statements62 7 and
tender offer statements. 6 s But in Matsushita the Court allowed that the settlement
of claims in state court (which would include claims for fiduciary breach in freeze-
outs) may also preclude further litigation of federal securities law claims arising
from the same transaction. 62 9 Matsushita's holding is significant for controllers' deci
sionmaking regarding whether to settle claims in freezeouts. As Professor Richard
Painter observed, "Matsushita... makes state court class actions advantageous for
defendants who can settle state fiduciary duty and federal securities claims together
in state court.
630
The benefits for controllers of avoiding duplicative litigation under federal and
state law is obvious. But there are particular advantages for controllers of preclud-
ing federal securities litigation by achieving state court settlement of Entire Fair-
ness claims in freezeouts.63" ' On average, the size of settlements and attorneys' fees
paid by defendants in federal securities class actions is greater than those paid by
defendants in state law class actions. 632 In addition, the Lynch Doctrine affords
defendants a meaningful procedural benefit from obtaining disinterested consent
to the freezeout (i.e. the plaintiff would bear the burden of proving unfairness in
the freezeout), which may make settling (or if necessary litigating) state claims
more favorable for defendants than responding to federal claims.633 There are also
benefits for individual defendants of achieving state court settlements in fiduciary
claims against freezeouts; in particular, the availability of charter exculpation
634
and corporate indemnification rights.635 These would shield the defendant direc-
tors even if they were found to be grossly negligent in the face of the controller's
freezeout. However, they would afford directors no protection from liability in
federal securities fraud suits.
636
626. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 27, 48 Stat. 881, 902 (codified as amended
in 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000)).
627. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 17 C.ER. § 240.14a-9 (2007).
628. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (prohibiting fraud, deceit, and material mis-
representation or omissions "in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders").
629. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 369; see also William T. Allen, Finality ofJudgments in Class Actions:
A Comment on Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1149 (1998).
630. Painter, supra note 625, at 95.
631. State fiduciary claims may be heard in federal court as part of federal securities law actions by
way of supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
632. Thompson & Thomas 11, supra note 51, at 189-94.
633. The plaintiffs would have the burden of proof in the federal securities law claims as well,
but the presence of ratification in state case law, as suggested by Weinbergei; is "strong evidence"
of fairness. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7. For further discussion of incentives that favor settling
in state court, see Thompson and Thomas I1, supra note 51, at 191.
634. For the relevance of charter exculpation clauses to claims of fiduciary breach against individ-
ual director defendants in freezeouts, see, e.g., Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at * 138.
635. These arise by contract but are provided for by Delaware statutory law. See DEt. CODE tit. 8,
§ 145(a) (2007).
636. By the express terms of the statute, Delaware charter exculpatory clauses are relevant only to
breach of fiduciary duty claims. DEt. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007). As a general matter, the federal
courts support the SEC's position that corporations may not indemnify their executives against liability
for securities fraud. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
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Cox fails to cite to the well-known Matsushita decision, and does not address the
advantages it offers controllers in achieving global settlements of claims against
a freezeout in state court. Cox contends that defendants settle nonmeritorious
Entire Fairness claims because they have no rational economic alternative. Once
the substantial benefits for controllers of achieving prompt settlements in Entire
Fairness cases are apparent, Cox's account of the deleterious effects of suits under
the Lynch Doctrine must be reconsidered. Certainly further research is required to
reach definitive conclusions but it is possible that the settlement of Entire Fairness
suits affords controllers a "cheap" way to resolve legitimate claims of both fiduciary
breach and securities fraud in freezeouts. If this is the case, then these settlements
may be affording controllers more room to compel freezeouts that are disadvanta-
geous to investors and the economy overall.
d. Comparing Dismissals of Claims Governed by Revlon versus Lynch
As outlined above, a principal argument that Cox makes against the legitimacy
of Entire Fairness review under Lynch is that it has prevented the dismissal of
nonmeritorious claims to a degree that is unparalleled in corporate law.63 7 Most
dramatically the Cox opinion states that courts routinely dismiss nonmeritorious
Revlon claims,638 but cannot ever dismiss nonmeritorious Entire Fairness claims
filed under Lynch.639 As stated therein: "Unlike any other transaction one can
imagine-even a Revlon deal, it was impossible after Lynch to structure a merger
with a controlling stockholder in a way that permitted the defendants to obtain a
dismissal of the case on the pleadings. 640 The comparison with Revlon is intended
to illuminate that the Lynch Doctrine is dysfunctional and harmful to shareholders
but of real value only to plaintiffs' attorneys. 64 1 However, there are other expla-
nations for the disparity in dismissal rates which are consistent with the central
tenets of corporate law.
Cox is correct that viewing the disparity in dismissal rates at a generalized doc-
trinal level, it is difficult to explain it. Claims filed under Revlon (which involve
sales of control) and Lynch (which involve cash-out mergers) reflect similarly com-
plex facts, context-specific and nuanced fiduciary mandates and high stakes for
the parties. Revlon claims involve a similar admixture of substantive economic
issues ("best price reasonably available") and process-based safeguards ("best
efforts" and "good faith")642 as do Lynch claims.
However, if courts are less willing to dismiss Lynch claims, this would be con-
sistent with two fundamental differences in these types of claims and transactions.
637. See supra notes 596-601 and accompanying text.
638. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
639. Cox, 879 A.2d at 619.
640. Id.
641. This is clearly the suggestion made by the objectors to the fee in Cox. Id. at 605. See also El-
liott J. Weiss and Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)shapes Share-
holder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1820 (2004). Professor Weiss was among the objectors to
the fee in Cox. Cox, 879 A.2d at 604.
642. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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First, Revlon claims only rarely present problems of self-dealing corporate fiducia-
ries,643 whereas claims against controllers in freezeouts always do, by definition. In
essence, Revlon duties are analogous to heightened duties of care (imposed on the
target directors). 644 In contrast, Lynch claims involve self-dealing transactions and
the duty of loyalty--central to the concerns of corporate law.645
Second, Revlon is applicable to a range of situations where market forces are
more likely to operate and provide some meaningful protection to shareholders,
646
as is not the case in freezeouts. In Revlon cases, the courts scrutinize the change of
control transaction to ensure that the target board has indeed allowed market forces
to operate for the benefit of the shareholders-or, otherwise, that it has a compel-
ling reason for not having done so. 647 The Entire Fairness standard imposed on
controllers in contrast, reflects the fact that market forces generally do not operate
meaningfully in freezeouts; hence greater legal oversight is warranted.
Finally, the fact that individual directors on special takeover committees are
commonly the target of Revlon claims, whereas controllers are frequently corpo-
rate entities, would also suggest a principled reason for the disparity in dismissal
rates. Delaware corporate law is extremely reluctant to hold individual directors
liable for breaches of fiduciary duty, especially where they have not acted out of
personal self interest (which is rarely an issue in a Revlon case). 646 This limitation
on director personal liability is intended to encourage talented people to serve on
public companies' boards. This policy concern would commonly favor dismissals
in Revlon cases but not cases filed under Lynch.
Hence there are good reasons-reasons consistent with fundamental corporate
law policies and principles-why the courts would be more inclined to dismiss
claims under Revlon than claims under Lynch. Nothing about the disparity sug-
gests that the Lynch Doctrine is broken, unreasonable, or misshaping Delaware
corporate law.
643. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (holding that board could not play favorites among bidders once
company had been put up for sale and directors' choice of bid that presented certain liability immuniz-
ing benefits for themselves was unlawful).
644. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A. 2d 34, 46 n.17 (Del.
1994); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Del. 1989); City Capital Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc. 551 A.2d 787, 802 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070
(Del. 1988) (holding that a disinterested board maintains the right and continues to have the duty to
exercise its business judgment in seeking to maximize shareholder value).
645. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that duty of care breaches may be exculpated but
breach of loyalty claims or other claims involving bad faith or express wrongdoing by fiduciaries can-
not be. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007).
646. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989) (where sale of con-
trol is implicated, a deal that does not involve a realistic market check may be difficult to sustain).
647. See, e.g., In re The MONY Group Inc. S'holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (directors
did not breach duty, having put the company up for sale, and entered into a merger agreement, which
nevertheless allowed for a post signing market check-notwithstanding that they had eschewed an
auction).
648. The most famous exception in the acquisitions area is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985). As relevant to freezeouts, however, see Justice Jacobs decision in In re Emerging
Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
Nevertheless, the independent directors in that transaction used extraordinarily bad judgment.
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2. Attorneys' Fees in Settlements under the Lynch Doctrine
The issue of controllers paying (being compelled to pay) excessive, unearned
fees to plaintiffs' lawyers in freezeout suits on account of the Lynch Doctrine is at
the heart of the Cox opinion.649 This is true in the literal sense that the court had
to rule on an objection to the plaintiffs' attorneys' request for fees. But it is true in
the broader sense that Cox claims that this is a serious, harmful byproduct of the
Lynch Doctrine. As stated in the opinion, the "incentive system that Lynch created
for plaintiffs' lawyers is its most problematic feature.
'
"650
However, it is unclear why freezeout doctrine, as opposed to the fee doctrine
pertinent thereto, would have created this problem. Indeed, it is difficult to com-
prehend how the problem of excessive plaintiff attorney's fees could have become
such a major problem in Delaware class actions, as Cox suggests it is. The pay-
ment of coerced or excessive fees to plaintiffs lawyers should be controllable in
corporate law because the court of chancery has sweeping authority and ready
practical means to moderate the size of plaintiffs' attorneys' fee awards. The Cox
opinion itself acknowledges this in its statement that "this court had been modest
in awarding fees in [the class action] context. '65 1 The court of chancery is required
to review all settlements in class actions, which includes the award of fees as part
of these settlements.652 The Cox decision itself illustrates the expansive discretion-
ary authority possessed by the court in the review of fees. The court determined
to reduce the fee awarded to the minority shareholders' lawyers.
65 3
In reviewing the doctrine relevant to the disputed fee, Cox notes that the
courts have discretion to apply either the Chrysler Corp. v. Dann standards 654 or
the more traditional Sugarland standards.65 5 Unabashedly exercising its broad dis-
649. This is the core complaint presented by Professors Weiss and White in their Vanderbilt Law
Review article. See supra note 641.
650. Cox, 879 A.2d at 619. The court employs colorful metaphors to ridicule the conduct of the
plaintiffs' lawyers in the Cox transaction-for example it describes the process of their selecting lead
counsel as resembling a "food fight." Id. at 609. As an aside, it is difficult to believe that controllers'
lawyers are less concerned about their fees and status among their peers than are plaintiffs' lawyers,
but their battles over status and fees are less visible.
651. See id. at 622. See also id. at 639 ("As the objectors point out, this court has never yielded to
plaintiffs and defendants the right to set the level of fees that are awarded in representative actions.
Even when defendants agree to pay the requested fee fully, the settlement benefits to the class are
concededly adequate, and there has been no objection, this court has often reduced the requested fee
to a smaller number.").
652. Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1(c) provides that "the [derivative] action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the Court." DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(c).
653. Cox, 879 A.2d at 606 ("For reasons I detail, I therefore award a substantially smaller fee than
the plaintiffs have requested."); id. at 642 (awarding fees and expenses totaling $1.275 million).
654. Id. at 638 (finding that the Chrysler standard governs the payment of fees where plaintiffs' suit
has become moot on account of voluntary action by the defendant (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223
A.2d 384, 386-87 (Del. 1966)).
655. Cox, 879 A.2d at 640 (considering under Sugarland: "1) the benefits achieved in the action; 2)
the efforts of counsel and the time spent in connection with the case; 3) the contingent nature of the
case; 4) the difficulty of the litigation; and 5) the standing and ability of counsel." (citing Sugarland
Industries, Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 147-50 (Del. 1980)). In Cox, the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery validates the more "traditional" and conservative Sugarland standards as being appropriate for
freezeouts. Cox, 879 A.2d at 640-42.
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cretionary authority to update the Delaware doctrine governing fees in freeze-
outs, the opinion states that "complaints challenging fully negotiable, all cash, all
shares merger proposals by controlling shareholders are not meritorious when
filed under the Chrysler Corp. v. Dann standard. '6 6 The opinion further limits
the ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to obtain fees in freezeouts by providing that "no
risk premium should be awarded in fee applications in cases.., when a plaintiff
suing on a proposal settles at the same level as the special committee."6 7 Finally,
Cox holds that if a controller and a special committee ignore a "prematurely filed"
suit and conclude the final terms of the freezeout without including the plain-
tiffs' lawyers in their negotiations, there should be "no presumed entitlement to
a fee by the plaintiffs' lawyers. '65 In these respects, the Cox opinion extends the
transactional choreography for cash-out mergers to encompass plaintiffs' lawyers
therein and substantially limits these lawyers' incentives to file specious claims in
these freezeouts.
With respect to the magnitude of the fee, the Cox decision substantially reduced
the fee the controller had agreed to pay the plaintiffs' lawyers. It approved a fee
award of only $1.275 million, instead of the $4.95 million fee the controller had
agreed to pay.659 Moreover, the court elected to reduce the fee despite the fact
that the fee award did not reduce the funds allocated to the minority sharehold-
ers, as provided by the settlement's terms.660 In this sense, the court could not
claim that it was compelled to reduce the fee in the minorities' interests. Rather
the court was acting as a "gatekeeper" of the litigation system in reducing the
fee.
66 1
In the end, Cox's attack on unearned fees in freezeout claims is nearly entirely
severable from its complaints about the Lynch Doctrine. The portion of the Cox
decision that discusses and amends the fee doctrine pertinent to freezeouts (that
is, the significance of Chrysler v. Dann662 and the application of the Sugarland fac-
tors663 to the requested fee) is analytically and doctrinally separate from the opin-
ion's discussion of Lynch and Solomon.664 Based on the discussion and holding in
Cox, it is apparent that the court of chancery can amend the doctrine relevant to
the approval of fees in class actions, and grant only a reduced fee to the plaintiffs'
lawyers without overhauling freezeout doctrine.
In addition, recent empirical data on fees in acquisition-oriented class actions,
presented by Professors Thompson and Thomas in a Vanderbilt Law Review article
published in 2004, conflicts with Cox's assertions about the gravity of the fee problem
656. Cox, 879 A.2d at 605.
657. Id. at 606.
658. Id.
659. Id. at 642.
660. Id. at 612.
661. See Hilary Sale, Judges as Gatekeepers in Settlements (forthcoming article, on file with The Busi-
ness Lawyer). The court's unilateral decision to reduce the agreed fee is more interesting in light of its
tremendous emphasis on the legitimacy of outcomes reached through private bargaining.
662. Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386-87 (Del. 1966).
663. Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 147-50 (Del. 1980).
664. Cox, 879 A.2d at 634-43.
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in Entire Fairness claims against cash-out mergers.6 5 Although they acknowledge
the need for further research, 661 these professors conclude that plaintiffs' lawyers'
fees in Entire Fairness claims under Lynch are relatively modest in amount. 667 The
relatively modest nature of these fees becomes evident, for example, in comparison
to the fees awarded in the settlement of federal securities class actions.668 This mod-
est nature of the fees paid to plaintiffs' counsel in these cases holds true whether they
are considered on a percentage of recovery basis,6 69 or on an hourly basis. 670 Just as
significantly, Thompson and Thomas illuminate the genuinely contingent nature of
plaintiffs' lawyers' receipt of any fees in freezeouts and other acquisition-oriented
class actions.671 With respect to claims in freezeouts, Thompson and Thomas' data
suggests that plaintiffs' lawyers receive fees in less than forty percent of all the cases
filed. 672 This conclusion contrasts starkly with Cox's assertion that plaintiffs' lawyers
can earn "sizable fees '673 by filing a claim under Lynch. 674 Even Cox itself, after exco-
riating the conduct of plaintiffs' lawyers in cash-out merger freezeouts, observes that
the lawyers have "moderated" the size of their fee requests in these suits in recogni-
tion of the court of chancery's supervisory role.
675
Consistent with the view of the objectors, the Cox opinion concludes that Entire
Fairness review under the Lynch Doctrine has proven a "green light" for attorneys
665. See Thompson & Thomas I1, supra note 51, at 192-93 (citing data demonstrating that the
median attorneys' fee award in federal securities cases from 1991 to 1996 was about 32 percent of
the settlement value). In comparison, the median percentage of attorneys' fees in control shareholder
acquisition cases was five percent of the additional consideration. Id. at 192. For a discussion of fees
computed on an hourly basis, see id. at 193.
666. Professors Thompson and Thomas were able to study the figures presented by the plaintiffs'
law firms in the briefs they are required to file with the Delaware court of chancery to accompany their
fee petitions. As they note, calculating hourly fees on this basis does not take account of the work done
by plaintiffs' lawyers in claims that are dismissed without settlement-where no fees are recovered and
no figures are extant. Thompson and Thomas II, supra note 51, at 193-94.
667. Id. at 193.
668. Id. at 192-93.
669. Id. at 192
670. See id. at 193.
671. Id. at 193 n.222.
672. See id. at 200 ("We find that in 20 of 65 of the controlling shareholder cases, additional con-
sideration was paid to the minority shareholders, and in another five cases there were attorneys' fees
paid in a settlement."). The authors note "the contingent nature of these cases." Id. at 193. More par-
ticularly, in cases dismissed without settlement (40 out of 65), no fees were paid to plaintiffs' counsel.
Id. at 193.
673. Cox, 879 A.2d at 605-06.
674. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 51, at 199, Table 17; id. at 192 ("If we look at attor-
neys' fee awards, we see some evidence supporting the claim that Delaware class action litigation has
lower litigation agency costs.... In the 20 control shareholder transactions settled in the Delaware
courts [in the two year sample studied], the median amount of additional consideration paid to share-
holders was about $15 million. The median percentage of attorney's fees for these cases was 5 percent
of the additional consideration (with a range extending up to 37 percent). In dollar terms, the median
attorneys' fees awarded by the court were $875,000 (with a range extending up to $4.4 million).").
675. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 622 ("In seeking fees in these cases, the plaintiffs' lawyers have been
pragmatic. Recognizing that they, at best, can claim "shared credit" with the special committee, the
plaintiffs' lawyers have tempered their fee requests and have asked for relatively small percentage
of the "benefit-i.e., the difference between the price of the controller's opening bid and the final
merger price agreed to by the special committee. But, at the same time, the rewards they reap are
substantial .... ).
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to extort sizable, unearned fees from controllers in freezeouts. But the available
evidence, does not demonstrate that the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees problem in these
class action suits is substantial. Most significantly, as illustrated in Cox itself, the
Delaware Court of Chancery has discretionary authority and ample authority to
block the payment of excessive fees in its review of settlements in these cases.
3. The Simultaneous-Settlement Phenomenon
At the heart of the Cox opinion is the question of what role a suit under the
Entire Fairness standard plays when it is filed during the freezeout negotiations.
The objectors were adamant that the lawsuit against the Cox transaction did not
add value to the bettered price obtained by the minority shareholders in the
cash-out merger negotiations-that the special committee would have obtained
the price increase without the lawsuit.6 76 The expert for the plaintiffs' lawyers,
Guhan Subramanian, testified that the pendency of the lawsuit was a positive
factor influencing the price increase, so that the plaintiffs' lawyers had earned
their fee.6 77 The court had to reach some resolution to the question of whether
the lawsuit had created value for the minority shareholders in order to rule
on the fee issue, of course. But in Cox the court addressed a broader question:
whether Entire Fairness lawsuits during freezeouts should generally be discour-
aged. ' 676 The court finds that during the pendency of a freezeout negotiation
committees and minority shareholders can fend for themselves, without legal
proceedings.679 According to Cox, if the committee and a majority of the minor-
ity shares approve the freezeout offer that is "good enough.166 0 In the alternative,
if either the committee or the majority of the minority disapprove, only then
should a cause of action arise in the freezeout.
65 '
The issues discussed in the Cox opinion need to be teased apart to be analyzed
adequately First, the court had to evaluate whether the lawsuit filed in the Cox
transaction helped increase the price obtained for the minority shareholders in
the freezeout. This is an empirical question-one that the court bravely endeav-
ors to answer in considering the conflicting empirical data presented by the par-
ties' experts. 6 2 Although much of the opinion is spent excoriating the plaintiffs'
lawyers, the court arrives at the most intelligent answer possible to this question.
The court concludes that the experts had both failed to prove their case; that it
is impossible conclusively to isolate the effect of the special committee from the
676. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 621-23.
677. See id. at 625-29.
678. See id. at 605-06.
679. See id. at 607 ("At the same time, by giving defendants the real option to get rid of cases on the
pleadings, the integrity of the representative litigation process would be improved, as those cases that
would be filed would involve plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers who knew they could succeed only by fil-
ing and actually prosecuting meritorious cases, and not by free riding on a special committee's work.").
680. For statements of Cox's Dual Ratification proposal for reforming freezeout doctrine, see id. at
606, 607, 643-44, 645,647.
681. Id.
682. See supra notes 676-77 and accompanying text.
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effect of the lawsuit on bettering the price received in the negotiations based on
the empirical evidence.6"3 The ambiguous nature of the empirical evidence left
the court with a dilemma however, because it has to reach a decision about the
fee. Cox altered the fee doctrine to reflect the court's fervently expressed view that
committees can bargain effectively without a pending lawsuit.684 But the court
also allows a fee of $1.275 million to the plaintiffs' lawyers-thus validating their
contribution to the positive outcome achieved for the minority
68 5
On the general issue of the validity of Entire Fairness suits during the pendency
of negotiations, the court rules that they will be regarded as "nonmeritorious."
686
The principal evidence the court points to for this conclusion is a phenomenon
of "simultaneous settlements." According to the court, the plaintiffs' lawyers
routinely settle on the same terms as the special committee representing the
minority, and at the same time.6 7 However, despite the court's conclusion, it is
not obvious that the simultaneous settlement phenomenon proves that these
lawsuits are specious. There are many different conclusions that are possible
from this evidence. 688 Just because plaintiffs' lawyers elect not to continue in
their claims does not prove that the pendency of the lawsuit had no effect on the
committee's bargaining leverage with the controller.689 Indeed, Cox grudgingly
admits that the application of the Entire Fairness standard and even, perhaps,
the pendency of the litigation, gives special committees increased leverage in
bargaining with controllers in freezeouts.6 9° This is a remarkable admission on
the part of the court.
683. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 629 n.57 ("... the relative contributions of the Special Committee and
the plaintiffs' counsel have not been, and perhaps cannot be, empirically isolated"); id. at 631 ("One
cannot tell, of course, how important each of them is as a factor...").
684. See id. at 647 ("By now, experience has proven that special committees.., are willing to say
no to controllers.").
685. See id. at 641-42.
686. See id. at 638-40.
687. See id. at 621-22 ("... one awkward fact strongly suggests that the threat of bare knuckles litiga-
tion over fairness is not as important as the special committee's role as an negotiating force. That awkward
fact is the absence of evidence that "traditional" plaintiffs' lawyers, who attacked going private proposals
by controllers, have ever refused to settle once they have received the signal that the defendants have put
on the table their best and final offer, i.e. an offer that is acceptable to the special committee.").
688. For example, it might be possible to argue that the plaintiffs' lawyers' resolution to follow the
lead of special committees in this regard is evidence of the operation of salutary checks and balances
in this litigation context, since, after all, the committee has a fiduciary duty to the minority and there is
some chance that continued litigation would "kill the deal." It is also possible that the suit added value,
by operationalizing the fair duty and fair dealings' promises in the negotiations, but that the plaintiffs'
lawyers are giving up too soon because the costs and risks of the lawsuit will radically increase for
them once the committee settles. This might suggest that the courts should not routinely approve the
settlements but instead encourage the plaintiffs' lawyers to litigate further. It does not provide evidence
suggesting that the litigation had no effect to date.
689. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 631 ("The plaintiffs' bar would say, of course, this is because they did
such a good job in each case that the price concessions they helped the special committee extract was
of such inarguable fairness that it would be silly to fight on.").
690. See id ("Perhaps what can be most charitably said is that the pendency of litigation and the
theoretical threat that the plaintiffs will press on provides special committees members with additional
clout that they wield to get good results...").
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Cox states that the lawsuits do not add value because committees, have the
legal power to say "no" to controllers in cash-out mergers.691 As noted previ-
ously, however, the committee's disapproval will not ordinarily bar the controller
from proceeding with a freezeout.6 92 Given the terms of the merger statute and
the option of pursuing a tender offer freezeout, the controller will ordinarily
be able to go around a disapproving committee and effectuate the freezeout if
it so chooses. As previously stated, the consequence of disapproval under the
Lynch Doctrine is that the controller will have the burden of proof in respect
to the cash-out merger's fairness. 693 The committee's disapproval may alter the
controller's tactics or even its willingness to go forward with a cash-out merger,
but the committee has nothing akin to veto power."694
Finally, Cox concludes that Entire Fairness suits filed during the pendency of
cash-out merger negotiations do not add value because "there is no litigation con-
flict." 695 This is not an obvious conclusion. To apply an imperfect analogy, no one
disputes that poison pills are effective anti-takeover devices despite the fact that
one has never been triggered. Their importance is that they signal the availability
of an immediate, detrimental response to an unfair acquisition. In a similar fash-
ion, Entire Fairness lawsuits filed during the pendency of freezeout negotiations
are a "direct line" into the courthouse, so that if the controller engages in coer-
cive conduct there can be an immediate response. Given that the Lynch Doctrine
rests on the view that some degree of coercion is omnipresent in freezeouts, the
immediate access to the courthouse created by the pendency of the lawsuit is
not unreasonable. Furthermore, if Cox is correct that there is "no actual litigation
conflict" in these transactions, 696 then the pending claims cannot be exhausting
a significant amount of judicial resources or taxing controllers substantially in
practical terms.
Finally, the prompt filing of claims upon the commencement of the cash-out
merger which the court finds so objectionable allows time for the minorities' law-
yers to resolve who will serve as lead counsel and lead plaintiff.69 Given that
Delaware has adopted these mechanisms to promote efficiency and fairness in
shareholder class actions, it makes sense to allow the lawyers time to do what
is required. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' lawyers may need to organize especially
early in freezeouts because controllers have the potential to accelerate the timing
of the transaction by electing to proceed unilaterally without negotiating with
representatives for the minority
691. See id. at 647.
692. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (2007), amended by 76 Del. Laws ch. 145 §§ 4-7 (2007).
693. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
694. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 625.
695. See id. at 631 ("Third, litigation under Lynch never seems to involve actual litigation conflict if
the lawsuit begins with a suit attacking a negotiable proposal.").
696. Id.
697. See id. at 608 ("That complaint was even less meaty than the first filed complaint. It is exem-
plary of hastily-filed, first-day complaints that serve no purpose other than for a particular law firm
and its client to get into the medal round of the filing speed (also formerly known as the lead counsel
selection) Olympics.").
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For these reasons, neither the simultaneous settlement phenomenon nor the
filing of claims during the pendency of negotiations is evidence of abuse under
the Lynch Doctrine, or evidence that these suits fail to confer value on minority
shareholders.
4. The Utility of Discovery
The Cox opinion portrays discovery requests in claims filed under Lynch as a
tool used to extort settlements from controllers.69 Surely the court is correct that
discovery requests could be abused, as was recognized by the PSLRAs stay of dis-
covery provision. 699 However, as in review of fee requests, the court of chancery
has ample discretion to limit the scope of discovery in freezeout litigation in order
to prevent "fishing expeditions.""7 °
Even more fundamentally, however, discovery may serve special committees'
and minority shareholders' legitimate needs for information about the freezeout
offer. The Lynch Doctrine reflects judicial cognizance of the systemic informa-
tional asymmetry confronting minorities in freezeouts. Controllers are the ulti-
mate "insiders" in this situation. Minorities and the outside directors representing
them will not have anything close to informational parity with respect to the
company's prospects and opportunities. In this regard, the discovery process
with proper judicial oversight should properly be regarded as an extension of the
"arms' length" dealing mandated by Weinberger"7 ° that is, an altered form of the
due diligence process conducted on behalf of minorities in freezeouts. 702 Given
the court of chancery's ability to limit discovery requests, the Cox opinion's grossly
disparaging view of discovery is unwarranted.
Minorities' ability to obtain discovery in a freezeout suit is especially crucial
in light of the informationally disadvantaged status of outside directors-who
are specifically chosen to serve on special committees on account of their greater
impartiality 7°3 Nonmanagement directors are less likely to be beholden to a con-
troller, but they are also more likely to have a less detailed understanding of the
business, in comparison to the controller. The information obtainable through
discovery may be necessary in some instances to compensate for this information
balance.
698. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 620 and 622; id. at 622 ("... the plaintiffs' claims always have settle-
ment value because of the costs of discovery and time to defendants.").
699. The stay of discovery provisions are codified as amended in 15 U.S.C §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-
4(b)(3) (2000).
700. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736
(calling discovery in securities class actions "fishing expeditions," and noting that some testimony
estimated that discovery costs accounted for 80% of total litigation costs in securities fraud cases).
701. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
702. Not only the buyer but also the seller in a merger transaction will need to do a due diligence
analysis of the inherent value of the company This was another point illustrated in the sale-through-
merger in Smith v. Van Gorkom. In that case the "independent" directors were cowed by the company's
chief executive officer; as a consequence they failed to undertake the kind of intensive analysis of their
firm that would have furnished an appropriate valuation basis for approving its sale. Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876-77 (Del. 1985).
703. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 618.
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Furthermore, consistent with Lynch's concern about inherent coercion, the spe-
cial committee directors may be reluctant to engage-or may be inhibited from
engaging-in a full scale due diligence process to ascertain the company's value
and prospects. The directors on the committee might reasonably fear that con-
ducting substantial due diligence to evaluate the financial value of the company
and the merits of the freezeout offer might unsettle the controller's plans, provoke
its ire, and encourage it to engage in more self-seeking conduct to the minori-
ties' detriment. Furthermore, Cox itself acknowledges that despite their good faith
efforts, outside directors may be constrained by time, expertise or other practical
limitations that might make them less than effective "information gatherers" or
vigorous negotiators for minorities."0 4 Hence the discovery process may make a
crucial contribution to overcoming the special committee's and minorities' relative
informational disadvantages. Cox's conclusion that discovery requests under the
Lynch Doctrine are essentially a tool of extortion misses the mark. (And yet the
claim may pass as being noncontroversial, on account of the negative publicity
surrounding discovery abuses in federal securities class actions.)
5. The Utility of Claims Against Target Directors
During Negotiations
Individual target company directors are commonly included as defendants in
freezeout litigation, as the Cox opinion observes.10 5 Because the Lynch Doctrine
addresses the fiduciary duties of controllers, and the duties of individual directors
only indirectly,70 6 claims against individual director defendants would be brought
as "regular" breach of care (or more rarely breach of loyalty) claims pendant to
the Entire Fairness claims against the controller. If the individual directors are
not named as defendants, they may still be asked to give testimony in the liti-
gation against the controller which may either be at trial, through affidavits or
in depositions. In most instances, because of the business judgment rule and
the limits affecting director liability for breach of care, these claims against the
704. See id. at 619 ("...history shows that [independent directors] are sometimes timid, inept,
or... well, let's just say worse").
705. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 620 (".. directors involved in the transactions all .. become defendants
in lawsuits attacking those transactions").
706. The Lynch doctrine itself only addresses controllers' duties in freezeouts, and not the fiduciary
obligations of the target directors themselves. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874 (finding
that directors breached their duty in approving a sale of the company through a merger by failing to
inform themselves of all information reasonably available); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del.
2000) (finding that directors breached their duty to the minority shareholders by turning merger
process over to controller, consistent with controller's best interests). In 1995, in the now notorious
Technicolor litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that the rushed approach of the selling
company directors to the approval process, and their failure to conduct a market check of the value
of the company prior to approving the deal, constituted a breach of the directors' duty of care. That
breach mandated the application of the Entire Fairness standard-the court ultimately concluded that
the acquisition of Technicolor met that standard. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156,
1175 (Del. 1995) ("The Court of Chancery properly considered that the Technicolor board's now
undisputed lack of care in [failing to make] a market check was a flaw in its approval process.').
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target directors would not go forward if it were not for the claims against the
controller.70 7 The point is that the directors' awareness of the pending litigation
will make them especially keen to fulfill their fiduciary duties and exert their best
efforts in negotiating with the controller on the minority's behalf. Although target
company directors are very rarely held liable for breach of duty in freezeouts or
other M&A transactions, the threat of personal financial liability is not the only
stimulus influencing their conduct. By virtue of their having to give testimony in
affidavits, depositions or trials, the target directors' acts or failures to act in the
minorities' interest in the freezeout will be publicly aired, scrutinized and judged.
The outside directors' professional stature will be on the line, even if their expo-
sure to financial damages is only a remote possibility This potential exposure
to embarrassment among their peer group of elite corporate actors (which their
lawyers would alert them to ex ante) would encourage the directors to work dili-
gently in representing the minorities' interests in the freezeout negotiations. This
"extra-liability" mode of stimulating best efforts from corporate decision makers is
well known to the courts and commentators. Indeed, Delaware's judicial opinions
sometimes take clear advantage of this kind of "shaming" opportunity (or threat
of shaming) to stimulate better conduct from directors.708 Hence, the existence of
pendant claims against individual target directors in freezeouts, or the taking of
their testimony in claims filed against controllers under the Lynch Doctrine, is a
further positive feature of freezeout claims filed during the pendency of negotia-
tions.
D. ON Cox's OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING LITIGATION IN FREEZEOUTS
1. The Purported Problem and a Plan
This section of the Article analyzes the feasibility and likely intended effects
for the litigation system of the adoption of the Cox Reforms. The Cox opin-
ion's most fundamental criticism of the Lynch Doctrine is that it invites strike
suits because claims thereunder cannot be dismissed in a timely fashion.70 9 The
basis of this claim was reviewed above.7"' As it encourages strike suits, current
707. Directors' fiduciary care liability will often be abridged by charter exculpation, indemnification
agreements and insurance. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (distinguishing nominal director liability from actual direc-
tor liability, noting that directors have virtually never been required to pay damages from personal
resources given insurance, indemnification, and exculpation).
708. For commentary and citations illustrating the Delaware courts' use of shaming sanctions, see
Edward B. Rock, Saints & Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work', 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009
(1997). The court's "morality tales" also provide instruction for future directors about what is and is
not acceptable, consistent with the transactional choreography of freezeouts.
709. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 647 (proposing that allowing deferential review so long as there
is Dual Ratification will "encourage the consistent use of the transaction structure that best protects
minority stockholders while simultaneously discouraging the filing of premature lawsuits of dubious
integrity and social utility").
710. See supra notes 603-2 1 and accompanying text. The Cox court claims that Rule 11 sanctions
are ineffective in this context because "financial fairness is a debatable issue." Cox, 879 A.2d at 620.
As discussed supra notes 612-21 and accompanying text, however, financial fairness alone is not a
basis to go forward with an Entire Fairness complaint.
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freezeout doctrine has many negative byproducts, according to the court. Viewing
their effect on the economy overall, Cox states that the threat of Entire Fairness
strike suits has deterred "the procession of offers that provide valuable liquidity
to minority stockholders and efficiency for the economy in general.171 Reviewing
the Lynch Doctrine's effect on Delaware's corporate legal system, Cox claims that
it has "cast doubt on the integrity of the representative litigation process. '712 The
court's prescription is that Lynch should be "eased" so that business judgment def-
erence would apply in freezeouts that have received Dual Ratification.7 1 3 In Cox
the court contends that this "modest"7 14 and "sensible 7 15 law reform will bring
freezeout doctrine into "harmony with the rest of Delaware corporate law,"716 and
thus increase investors' faith in the "integrity" of the Delaware corporate legal
system. 717 Hence, as proposed by the court, there are no significant costs or dis-
advantages to the Cox Reforms; everyone benefits. In fact, the Dual Ratification
proposal is described as increasing the protections afforded investors in freeze-
outs718 without "diminish[ing] the integrity-enforcing potential of litigation in any
material way "719
Scrutinizing the substance underlying these claims, it is obvious that the court
anticipates that most freezeouts would receive Dual Ratification. If this were not
their foreseeable effect, the proposed reforms would be ineffectual in achieving
their intended result of reducing litigation in freezeouts. And the court is likely
correct to anticipate that most freezeouts would receive Dual Ratification. Con-
sistent with the concept of transactional choreography, controllers will seek Dual
Ratification for their freezeouts because obtaining it will allow them to obtain a
dismissal on the pleadings. 20 And controllers' ability to obtain Dual Ratification
is suggested by the operation of inherent coercion-the cornerstone principle of
the Lynch Doctrine-which Cox does not "disprove, "21 and which Pure affirmed
operates in both freezeout formats. 72  The likelihood of controllers receiving Dual
Ratification is suggested by the effect the Cox Reforms would have on the fair price
duty As described below, the Cox reforms would marginalize the operation of the
711. Cox, 879 A.2d at 646. Transactions that appear unfair, even if profitable for one party, may
decrease investment and growth over the longer term.
712. Id. at 607, 643. The basis of the integrity of a legal system is a complex matter, of course. For
further discussion of the social freight carried by the system of shareholder litigation under Delaware
corporate law, see James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 3 (1999).
713. See supra note 680.
714. Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 643.
715. Id. at 607.
716. Id. at 646; see also id. at 607 (the Cox Reforms would "provide even greater coherence to our
law...").
717. For Coxs express appeal to increasing the "integrity" of Delaware corporate law and investors'
faith in it via adoption of its proposed reforms, see Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 607, 613, 643.
718. Id. at 606.
719. Id. at 644.
720. Again, this is an express objective of the proposed reforms. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 607,
643,644.
721. For analysis of Cox's disparagement of the legitimacy and continued relevance of the inherent
coercion concept, see infra notes 852-75 and accompanying text.
722. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 441.
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fair price duty in negotiations, which would reduce committees' and minorities'
leverage to say "no" to controllers .723
As future courts consider endorsing Cox's Dual Ratification proposal, it is
important for them to be wary of these claims and their cumulative rhetorical
appeal. Perhaps most glaringly, the Dual Ratification proposal is not "modest"
724
and cannot truly be considered an "extension" of the Lynch Doctrine.7 12 Cox avoids
proposing repeal of the Lynch Doctrine and indeed suggests that its proposed
reforms can be reconcited with Weinberger and Lynch.72 6 But those decisions vali-
date that both forms of consent are tainted by inherent coercion, so that even
dual ratification would be tainted and an unacceptable route to deferential review.
The Lynch Doctrine is grounded on suspicion over the legitimacy of consents in
freezeouts, and the concern over shortcomings of the bargaining process that pits
controllers against committees and minorities. In the alternative, the reforms pro-
posed by the court in Cox accept that committees' and minorities' consents can be
freely given. Furthermore, the pressure pushing special committees and minorities
to consent to freezeouts would be accentuated by the Cox Reforms because they
will attenuate the fair price duty that has afforded directors and minorities leverage
in negotiating with controllers.
2. Will the Quality of Consents Be Reviewable?
As proposed by the court in Cox, so long as a controller's freezeout was
approved by both the special committee and a majority of the minority shares,
the business judgment rule would preclude judicial inquiry into the merits of
the transaction. The aforesaid consents thus become pivotal to determining the
relevant standard of review: Entire Fairness or business judgment deference. But
this presents a paradox, as Cysive intuited. If the quality of the consents (whether
they are uncoerced, based on accurate and complete disclosure, and in confor-
mity with the applicable numerical minimums) is reviewable in future freezeouts,
then there will still need to be significant judicial inquiry into "fair dealings.
727
In the alternative, if the courts are not open to scrutinizing the circumstances and
legitimacy of the consents, while allowing them nevertheless to afford controllers
a route to business judgment protection and hence dismissals upon the plead-
ings, then equity will effectively have resigned its role in freezeouts. This conflict
723. See discussion infra at notes 722-76 and accompanying text.
724. For "modest," see Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 643.
725. For the claim that the Cox Reforms would "extend" rather than repeal the Lynch Doctrine, see
Cox, 879 A.2d at 606 and 607- See also Pure, 808 A.2d at 444 n. 43.
726. For this claim, see Cox, 879 A.2d at 617 ("For this reason, it is important not to assume that
the Supreme Court has already rejected this more precisely focused contention."). The court contra-
dicts this assertion earlier in the opinion however. Id. at 616 ("Even if the transaction was 1) negoti-
ated and approved by a special committee of independent directors, and 2) subject to approval by a
majority of the disinterested shares..., the best that could be achieved [under Lynch] was a shift of the
burden of persuasion on the issue of fairness from the defendants to the plaintiffs.").
727. In administering these claims, courts could delay the fair price inquiry until after they
addressed fair dealings, but the "burden" of the fair dealings inquiry would remain if the Cox Reforms
are to be interpreted as anything other than a total abdication of equity's role in freezeouts.
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illustrates that the easy accommodation suggested by the court in Cox is illusory.
As a matter of policy, the courts may decide to apply the business judgment rule
to freezeouts; but they cannot legitimately do so while claiming that they have
not radically diminished the role of equity in protecting minority shareholders
interests therein.
728
3. The Likelihood of Increased Appraisals
If the Cox Reforms are followed by future courts, will there be an overall reduc-
tion in shareholder suits in freezeouts-as the court in Cox proposes? This is
an unlikely result. Most obviously, there would be a foreseeable increase in the
number of appraisal actions filed in Delaware. This migration to appraisal would
not even reduce the valuation litigation before the Delaware Court of Chancery,
because it hears both kinds of actions. (At present appraisal actions and claims of
fiduciary breach against cash-out mergers are often consolidated. 729) After Wein-
berger the equitable cause of action became a preferable way for aggrieved minor-
ity shareholders to proceed against cash-out mergers.73 However, this would
likely change if the Cox Reforms are followed-because they would drastically
circumscribe the scope of the equitable cause of action in freezeouts. Even if the
appraisal statute remained in its present form, many minority shareholders could
recast their claims to be appraisal actions. Because both types of legal proceedings
require the court of chancery to rule on corporate valuation disputes, there would
not be an overall reduction in the court's responsibilities in this regard. Hence, the
court of chancery's expressed frustration with valuation litigation would not radi-
cally be diminished by following the Cox Reforms.7 1'
Furthermore, there is a strong likelihood that the appraisal statute would be
amended to increase its accessibility to aggrieved shareholders eliminated in freeze-
outs. The decision in Glassman certainly increases the pressure on the legislature
to act-since it has prohibited minorities eliminated in short-form mergers from
728. For this suggestion in the Cox opinion, see 879 A.2d at 644.
729. At present these actions are commonly combined. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc.
S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
730. As the data collected by Professors Thompson and Thomas indicate, appraisals are presently
used infrequently by aggrieved minorities in cash-out merger, in comparison to class action Entire
Fairness suits. See Thompson & Thomas 11, supra note 51, at 170 ("Appraisal proceedings make up
a very small portion of the Chancery Court docket..."); see also Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5, at
799 ("... the economics of the litigation process mean that, if a fight about price is limited to appraisal,
the controlling shareholder is exposed as to price only with respect to the number of shares for which
appraisal rights are perfected, typically a quite small number."). For further statistical information
about the incidence of appraisal actions see Thomas, Delaware Appraisal, supra note 184, at 22 (finding
fewer than 14 cases per year since 1977 and analyzing ways that appraisal falls short of meeting the
needs of investors and the express goals of the statute); compare Wertheimer, supra note 166, at 626
(noting that "the number of reported appraisal decisions has expanded greatly" despite the notable
shortcomings in the appraisal statute).
731. For discussion of the Pure court's expressed frustration and dissatisfaction with assessing value
in freezeouts and its relative preference for a "process based" solution, see Gilson & Gordon, supra
note 5, at 834 ("We are sympathetic to the Pure court's preference for a resolution to the treatment of
freeze-outs that focuses on the court's assessing process, rather than determining value.").
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proceeding in equity 732 In addition, there has been an increase in the scholarly com-
mentary calling for liberalizing the appraisal statute in recent years.
733 And although
corporate legal scholarship has endorsed the kind of Dual Ratification proposal put
forward in Cox,734 this Article will not be the sole voice objecting to limiting the
application of the Entire Fairness standard in freezeouts. As in the 1970s, share-
holder advocates are likely to take their concerns public. Hence, if the Cox Reforms
are followed, these pressures will likely combine to produce reforms in Delaware's
appraisal statute which will increase the number of appraisal actions.
4. More Claims Against Target Directors?
In Cox the court professes that its Dual Ratification proposal for freezeouts would
not "diminish the integrity-enforcing potential of litigation in any material way"
73 5
As described above, this is a dubious assertion. Nevertheless, the court emphasized
that shareholders will be adequately protected notwithstanding the Cox Reforms
because "potent litigation weapons" would "remain in their arsenal."
736
In furtherance of the notion that shareholders' "arsenal" would remain suffi-
cient to respond to the threat posed by unfair freezeouts, the court states that:
[p]laintiffs who believed that a special committee breached its fiduciary duties in
agreeing to a merger would continue to have the practical ability to press a claim;
they would just have to allege particularized facts demonstrating a breach of fidu-
ciary duty737
This is a remarkable suggestion.738 The court proposes that although Dual Rati-
fication would preclude an Entire Fairness attack on a controller's conduct in a
freezeout, minorities would still be adequately protected because they could sue
the special committee directors for breach of fiduciary duty
There are several reasons why this statement is difficult to take seriously First,
merely "swapping" shareholder claims against controllers for claims against special
732. See supra notes 261-71 and accompanying text. For decades there have been calls to reform
the appraisal process. See infra note 733. Those reform proposals have never succeeded-but that lack
of success may be attributable to the fact that the equitable cause of action for Entire Fairness under
the Lynch Doctrine has remained an attractive option for minority investors to challenge cash-out
mergers. If the Cox Reforms are adopted, however, the legal landscape will have changed substantially,
and the Delaware Legislature will be under greater pressure to defend minorities' interests in freezeouts
through modifications to the appraisal remedy.
733. See, e.g., Thomas, Delaware Appraisal, supra note 184, at 1 ("Modem appraisal statutes are
a mess."); Wertheimer, supra note 166; Thompson, Exit, supra note 184.
734. See, e.g., Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 8; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at
839-40; Letsou & Haas, supra note 113, at 94.
735. Cox, 879 A.2d at 644.
736. Id. at 647. It is noteworthy that in adopting this metaphor the court implicitly affirms that
shareholder litigation is viewed as a form of warfare. Id.
737. Id. at 644.
738. This issue of director personal liability in freezeouts relates back to Weinberger. It is striking
in that case that while the court expresses horror at the conduct of Signal's directors on UOP's board it
never even implies that they might be held personally liable for fiduciary breach. See Weinberger 457
A.2d at 708 ("A primary issue mandating reversal is the preparation by two UOP directors, Arledge
and Chitea, of their feasibility study for the exclusive use and benefit of Signal.").
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committee directors would accomplish nothing in terms of reducing shareholder
suits in freezeouts-which is an express objective espoused by the court in Cox.
Second, encouraging shareholders' pursuit of litigation against outside directors
conflicts with one of the most fundamental principles in Delaware corporate
law-that is, that outside directors should not be held liable absent inattentive-
ness that amounts to bad faith or secret profit taking that injures the company in
a material fashion.
739
Furthermore, as stated previously, most suits against special committee direc-
tors would proceed as claims for breach of care-in essence the gravamen of the
complaint would be that the directors were too passive in defending against the
freezeout. This was the essence of the shareholders' complaint in Solomon, for
example. 74" Even if the directors are found to be "beholden" to the controller, this
would not give rise to a loyalty breach per se, but rather would affect the posture
of claims against the controller. 4 ' Returning to the issue of directors' potential
liability for fiduciary care breach, as stated previously, a variety of devices have
evolved which expressly limit or eliminate directors' financial exposure to dam-
ages for breach of care in most cases.742 For the above reasons it is impossible
to take seriously the claim that suits for fiduciary breach brought by minorities
against committees (or the individual directors thereon) will operate as effective
surrogates for reduced accountability on the part of controllers in freezeouts.
5. Will Minorities' Approvals Be Used to Exculpate Directors?
There is a further troubling aspect to the Dual Ratification proposal that is at
the heart of the Cox Reforms. As the court observes, consistent with the Lynch
Doctrine, controllers most commonly have sought approvals from special com-
mittees rather than minority shareholders in order to obtain the favorable burden
shift.743 This makes sense, since no proxy solicitation is required to obtain special
committee approval-hence there is less cost and delay associated with this ratifi-
cation strategy. In Cox the court observes that the Lynch Doctrine has underserved
minorities' interests in this regard 744 -i.e. that it has failed to encourage minority
739. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); but see In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004
WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 282 (Del. 1977)
(finding liability against controller and holding individual directors harmless).
740. See supra notes 243-49.
741. Cf. In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745
(Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
742. See supra notes 707.
743. Controllers' preference for obtaining directors' consents is noted in Cox, 879 A.2d at 618 (" the
absence of any additional standard of review-affecting benefit for a Minority [Shareholder] Approval Con-
dition, has made the use of that independent, and functionally distinct, mechanism less prevalent").
744. Cox, 879 A.2d at 618 ("But Lynch also created other unintended and unanticipated
effects .... For starters, the absence of any additional standard of review-affecting benefit for a Minority
Approval Condition, has made the use of that independent and functionally distinct, mechanism less
prevalent .... As a result, Lynch did not tend to make prevalent the transactional structure that most
clearly mirrors an arms' length merger.").
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shareholder ratification of freezeouts, because Dual Ratification would not pro-
vide controllers any additional "litigation" benefit.
745
If the effect of Cox's Dual Ratification proposal is to stimulate more instances
where controllers seek and obtain minority shareholders' consents in freezeouts,
a question will arise over what effect the courts should give to these shareholders'
consents. In the Cox opinion, they are discussed in relation to whether a controller
would face the Entire Fairness or business judgment rule standard in litigation over
a freezeout. However, the possibility arises that courts would allow the minority
shareholders' consents to exculpate the target's directors from personal liability for
fiduciary breach in the freezeout. Surely target directors will urge that the share-
holders' consents should operate as a "waiver," in this fashion, as was argued in
the recent litigation challenging the freezeout in In re Emerging Communications.
746
In the Delaware case law that has developed as an outgrowth of Section 144 of the
DGCL,747 valid shareholder ratification has been allowed to exonerate directors
from financial liability for certain breaches of fiduciary duty
748 This result is illus-
trated by the holdings in Smith v. Van Gorkom,7
49 Orman v. Cullman,750 and Harbor
Financial Partners v. Huizenga,75 1 for example. Furthermore, shareholder ratifica-
tion may insulate directors not only from liability for breach of care, but even
liability for breach of loyalty, hence its potential utility for defendants is broader
than charter exculpation and indemnification.
752
To be clear, there is no express suggestion in the Cox opinion that minority
shareholder consents to freezeouts should be given this broader effect of reducing
the directors' potential liability for fiduciary breach. However, in Cox the court was
mindful of the liability immunizing effect of disinterested shareholder ratification.
745. For further discussion, see supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
746. In the Emerging Communications litigation the defendants made the novel argument that the
majority of the minority's tendering their shares operated as consent to the transaction which waived
their right to bring suit for fiduciary breach. justice Jacobs (sitting by designation) did not have to
resolve what legal effect could be given to such a waiver, because he had ruled that the disclosure to
the shareholders was deficient. He did observe, however, that no Delaware court has approved that
shareholders' sales in tender offers should be considered the equivalent of an affirmative shareholder
vote. This admonition aside, there will be considerable pressure on the Delaware Supreme Court to
move in this direction. See Emerging Commc'n, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at * 110.
747. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2007).
748. This jurisprudence is described in Cox, 879 A.2d at 614-15, so there is no doubt that Vice-
Chancellor Strine was mindful of the issue.
749. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (finding shareholder ratification void and hence insufficient to
protect the directors from financial liability on account of their demonstrated breach of fiduciary care
because the disclosures in the proxy statement were deficient).
750. No. Civ. A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (ruling that the disclosure to
the shareholders was acceptable so that their vote triggered the waste standard and nullified the duty
of loyalty claims against the board).
751. 751 A.2d 879, 900-01 (Del. Ch. 1999).
752. See Orman, 2004 WL 2348395, at *5 (finding that the fully informed vote of a majority of
company's disinterested shareholders would be effective to trigger business judgment rule so that the
special committee directors would not be liable in approving the sale of the company). See also, e.g.,
J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete Candor: Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of the
Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGs L. J. 641 (2003); Victor Brudney, Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent
for Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty Obligations, 25J. CORP. L. 209 (2000).
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The opinion specifically discusses this body of case law approvingly75 3 Further-
more, the overall approval Cox shows towards negotiated, "bargained-for" out-
comes in freezeouts opens the door to allowing minority shareholder ratification
to limit directors' liability therein. Hence, if the controller obtains the approval of
a majority-of-the-minority shares as part of the Dual Ratification process, such a
vote (or, even, tenders of shares by a majority of the minority) might be deemed
sufficient to insulate the target directors from financial liability for fiduciary
breach in relation to the freezeout. 714 In sum, although in Cox the court describes
the proposed increase in majority-of-the-minority shareholder ratifications in
freezeouts as a further safeguard of minority shareholders' interests 755 that consent
might easily be interpreted to limit the minorities' recourse in equity against target
directors.
6. Limiting the Development of the Transactional
Choreography for Freezeouts
Throughout the Cox opinion, the court represents Lynch's Entire Fairness stan-
dard as giving rise to meritless lawsuits that discourage profitable transactions,
reduce economic efficiency, and impair the integrity of the system of representative
litigation under Delaware law 756 In other words, the court has virtually nothing
good to say about these lawsuits. The discussion above was intended to illustrate
the ways in which Cox's criticisms of Entire Fairness litigation in freezeouts are
exaggerated or unwarranted.
But the Cox opinion also fails to address the favorable contributions to investor
welfare that arise from Delaware's transactional choreography for freezeouts. If
the Cox Reforms are followed, so that business judgment deference would block
judicial review of freezeouts in many or most instances, the court of chancery will
have fewer occasions and less discretion to refine the best practices for freezeouts
it has prescribed. Much would depend on the court's interpretation of its role in
753. Cox, 879 A.2d at 614-15.
754. For a decision where the court found that informed, uncoerced minority shareholder ratifi-
cation precluded a finding of liability against defendant directors, and granted summary judgment
on that basis, see Orman, 2004 WL 2348395; see also Harbor Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d at 900-01
(discussing the exculpatory effect of disinterested shareholder ratification on a duty of loyalty claim,
outside of a freezeout). There is controversy regarding whether shareholder ratification can expunge a
duty of loyalty claim against controllers in a freezeout. Shareholder ratification of directors' fiduciary
breaches is frequently invalidated on the basis of shareholders being inadequately informed. See, e.g.,
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858 (invalidating shareholder ratification of directors' breach of their duty
of care because shareholders were inadequately informed). For a discussion of this issue, see In reJCC
Holdings Co., Inc., 843 A.2d 713, 722-23 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that the voting of plaintiff minority
shareholders in favor of accepting consideration in a merger effectuated by a controlling stockholder
does not bar them, on the basis of acquiescence, or any other related doctrine of waiver, from challeng-
ing the fairness of the merger in an equitable action).
755. Cox, 879 A.2d at 618-19.
756. See id. at 646 ("It was thought preferable in Pure Resources to keep the strands lof freezeout
doctrine] separate until there is an alteration in Lynch, lest the less than confidence inspiring pattern
of 'Lynch litigation' replicate itself across the board in all going private transactions, thereby deterring
the procession of offers that provide valuable liquidity to minority stockholders and efficiency for the
economy in general.").
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reviewing motions to dismiss. If the court was careful about overseeing the integ-
rity of the consents, as a prerequisite to deferential review, then it would still have
the opportunity to safeguard against the kind of defects found by the court in Pure
(i.e. the defect in the structure of the minority approval condition, and the disclo-
sure omissions relevant to the tender offer). The Pure opinion makes a valuable
contribution to the transactional choreography for the minority approval struc-
ture and disclosure issues. However, if in a post-Cox Reform world the court of
chancery is less than fully engaged in scrutinizing the context in which the direc-
tors' and minorities' consents are obtained, then the kind of defects uncovered by
the court in Pure will go unobserved. Controllers will be under less pressure, will
have less incentive to observe standards of fair dealings in freezeouts.
E. BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF A LIMITED FAIR PRICE DUTY
Both controllers' duties of fair price and fair dealing are crucially important
to minorities' welfare, but the fair price duty is the more controversial of the
two."'7 This is apparent from the difference between the Lynch Doctrine and the
Solomon standards on the fair price question: the former says "yes;"7 8 the latter
says "no.''75" Achieving a resolution to whether there should be a fair price duty
represents the greatest stumbling block to unifying freezeout doctrine. Perhaps
because Lynch and Solomon seem irreconcilable on the issue of fair price, the Cox
opinion engages in some obfuscation on this issue. In brief, it nowhere expressly
discusses what place a fair price duty would have in its proposed unified freeze-
out doctrine.7 60 The court expresses a clear preference for Solomon (where no fair
price duty applies) over the Lynch Doctrine (where a fair price duty applies) as the
superior basis for unifying freezeout doctrine.16 ' The court's only treatment of the
fair price duty is implicit in its Dual Ratification proposal, as clarified below.
1. The Fair Price Duty and Negotiations
As a preface to analyzing what the Cox opinion says about the fair price duty, it
is important to consider in what way a legal fair price duty (or its absence) would
shape freezeout negotiations. In specific, is there much difference between a fair
757- Lynch and Solomon are less radically far apart in their treatment of fair process in freeze-
outs. They both prohibit coercion and fraud by controllers. However, while the Lynch Doctrine takes
an "affirmative" approach, making controllers accountable for "fair dealings," the Solomon standards
merely prohibit misconduct by controllers. But this is essentially a difference in degree or approach.
Both doctrines affirm that there are legally enforceable limits on the process through which controllers
can effectuate a freezeout.
758. See supra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
759. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
760. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 642-48 ("A Coda on the Jurisprudential Elephant in the Comer").
761. See id. at 646. In this respect, the Cox Reforms should not be seen as a middle ground between
the two. Rather, the Lynch Doctrine is being folded into Solomon's more lenient framework-with a
consequent "yielding" of the fair price duty as it would apply to negotiations.
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price duty (as applies under Lynch) and a fair price remedy as applies under Solo-
mon in deals where coercion or fraud by the controller has been proven?
Part II of this Article addressed the different legal price regimes relevant to freeze-
outs. The discussion of the problems arising from Solomon's failure to apply a fair
price duty to controllers' offers are relevant once again here.162 In the absence of a
fair price duty, controllers have an incentive to exploit their power advantages to
the maximum degree, to minorities' detriment. They can gain from pushing the
limits of the doctrine governing controllers' receipt of private benefits in ongoing
operations to their maximum advantage in the period before they launch a freeze-
out.7 63 They can gain from pushing the limit of the corporate opportunities doctrine
and delaying the development of lucrative business ventures in the period before
a freezeout. 764 They will gain from manipulating dividend policy in their interest
in the period before a freezeout 65 There are a variety of ways that controllers can
advertise to the market that they are willing to exploit their control over the firm
to their maximum advantage and the minority's disadvantage. With respect to
corporate actions requiring board assent, even in a post-SOX world, so long as the
controller is a true majority controller, there only needs to be three independent
directors on the board-not a majority of them.7 66 In all likelihood, the controller
has a variety of mechanisms that would succeed in forcing down the trading price
of the minority's stock. In a world without a fair price duty, the controller can then
take advantage of this depressed stock price to compel a freezeout.
What do negotiations at a hypothetical bargaining table look like in the absence
of a fair price duty? Given the limits on appraisal, the minority's pro rata stake in
the company's going concern value is only very marginally relevant to the negotia-
tions if the freezeout is based on a tender offer. The same limits on appraisal's effi-
cacy mean that even if the freezeout is based on a cash-out merger, the controller
has no incentive to offer more than the lowest credible estimate of going concern
762. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
763. For excellent discussion of the not easily enforceable and sometimes loose limits applicable to
controllers' obtaining private benefits from the corporation during its ongoing operations, see Gilson
& Gordon, supra note 5, at 789-93. See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971)
(applying very different equitable standards to (i) the parent's preferred dividend policy, (ii) the par-
ent's general oversight of the subsidiary's management consistent with its overall interests, (iii) whether
the company had taken a particular business opportunity that belonged to the subsidiary and (iv) the
enforcement of another wholly owned subsidiary's contract with the first subsidiary).
764. See Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 722-23.
765. See id. at 721-22.
766. As noted by Professors Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5, at 835-36, controlled companies are
exempt from the NYSE and NASD listing standards requiring an absolute majority of directors on the
board, but must still have a minimum of three independent directors to compose an audit committee
that complies with SOX's requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); Self-
Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto
by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 19051, 19052
(Apr. 17, 2003). The NYSE proposal and the comparable NASD proposal were approved. Self-Regula-
tory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes and Amendments No. 1 Thereto and Notice of Filing
and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendments Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64154 (Nov. 12, 2003).
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value discounting this price to reflect the foreseeably large number of sharehold-
ers who will give up on pursuing fair value through an appraisal. A well advised
controller would ordinarily offer no more. The controller will counter the special
committee's request for a higher price with the truism that it would be irrational
for it to pay more than it is legally required, and that it is up to the committee to
take it (ratify the freezeout price offered) or leave it (leaving the minority with no
alternative to the probably now more deeply discounted market price).
Without a fair price duty, any premium to the market price begins to look
appealing. (Indeed, consistent with this departure from financial valuation theory,
and earlier Delaware case law, in Cox the court observes that minorities are doing
"more than tolerably" well because they are selling to controllers in freezeouts
at premiums to the public trading price of their shares.167) The savvy controller
describes its offer as a great deal for the minority shareholders. ("Puffery" is not
the basis for a complaint under the federal securities laws.7 68 ). The announcement
of the offer generates significant publicity that likely attracts arbitrageurs, stimu-
lates increased trading, and leads to an increase in the stock's trading price (which
would dissipate quickly upon the committee's disapproval of the offer, since it
would be seen as a harbinger of the deal falling apart). There is a herding effect in
the market: minority shareholders become excited by the prospect of the transac-
tion.769 Unless the offer is grossly underpriced, the absence of a clear legal metric
for fair price invites enough speculation and hype to result in the transaction's
consummation.
In the absence of a definitive fair price duty in the negotiations, the spe-
cial committee is under tremendous pressure not to "kill the deal" by refusing
the controller's offer. Absent a fair price duty, the committee has only a very atten-
uated conceptual framework-appraisal's fair value, discounted by its impracti-
cal nature-against which to evaluate the adequacy of the price the controller is
offering. If the committee concludes that the controller's price is inadequate, it will
have to scramble to provide a compelling account of why it reached this conclu-
sion. Without a fair price duty, the committee cannot fall back on the gap between
the fair price and the controller's price as the basis for its decision.
767. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 632 ("Fourth, minority stockholders seem to be doing more than
tolerably well under both the Lynch and Siliconix regimes. Even if premiums to market are lower in
Siliconix transactions, the premiums paid are large in comparison to the routine day-to-day trading
prices in which minority and liquidity discounts will be suffered."). On the limited significance of the
market trading price, and hence a premium to the market price, as an indicia of a companys value
see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875-76 (concluding where no controller was present that "[ulsing
market price as a basis for concluding that the premium adequately reflected the true value of the
Company was a clearly faulty, indeed fallacious premise..."); Emerging Commc'n, 2004 WL 1305745,
at *23; Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 166, at 132 (noting that market price is inherently unreli-
able as an indicia of the value of minority shares, if they are assumed to represent a pro rata share of
the residual value).
768. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IowA L. REV. 1395 (2006); Jen-
nifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-Emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private
Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 1697 (1998).
769. See, e.g., HERSH SHEFREN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 184-89 (2000).
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If the minority's representatives are well advised, the negotiations look very dif-
ferent in the presence of a fair price duty The fair price duty creates a clear heuristic
and should give the committee the high ground to commence the negotiations. The
committee should open by asserting the minority's legal entitlement to a "fair price."
This positive claim yields a normative one: the controller should meet its fiduciary
duty and pay the minority the amount it is entitled to by law 770 The fair price
duty allows the committee to argue that it cannot consent (consistent with its own
fiduciary duties) 771 to a price that is less than what the controller has a legal duty to
pay If the fair price duty applies and the committee believes the controller's price
remains inadequate, it has a clear explanation to give to the (disappointed) minor-
ity shareholders: "the controller refused to pay the price you were entitled to by
law!" Given that the committee directors have no incentive to derail the deal, there
is little reason to be concerned that they will err on the side of disapproving the
transaction. Furthermore, the fair price duty frees the committee from the virtually
untenable predicament of having to go back to the minority and say "we just didn't
feel that the price was high enough." In a world where the fair price duty applies,
the committee can provide the minority with a coherent account of what their legal
entitlement was and why the controller's offer did or did not conform to it.1
72
2. Cox on the Fair Price Question
Would a fair price duty apply under the Cox Reforms. First, Cox's clear prefer-
ence for Solomon over Lynch suggests that it would not. Second, reading the express
language of Cox's Dual Ratification provision, the best answer is that it would not
clearly apply-i.e., a definitive fair price duty would not apply in the negotiations
to give the committee leverage with the controller. The ambiguity (i.e., that the
answer is neither clearly yes, nor clearly no) stems from two different features of the
Cox opinion. The first is that the shift from an absolute duty to a counter part duty
(depending on the committee's approval or nondisapproval) places untenable pres-
sure on committees not to reject the controller's offer. The committee is not "in the
hot seat" in the same way under the Lynch Doctrine. Under Lynch, the Entire Fair-
ness standard applies irregardless of whether the committee says "yes" or "no." If
there is ambiguity surrounding the value being offered by the controller's proposal,
770. The law serves an "expressive function," indicating to people what is right and wrong which is
distinct from what is legally sanctionable. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law,
86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650-51 (2000); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 64-72 (1995).
771. In effect this Article's proposals assert that the controller is inhibiting the board from fulfilling
its duty of care if it blocks the committee's investigation of alternatives, e.g. prevents it from conduct-
ing an auction or market check. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 ("The determination of whether a
business judgment is an informed one turns on whether the directors have informed themselves 'prior
to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them."' (citations
omitted)).
772. In addition, if the Entire Fairness standard and its fair price duty apply to all freezeouts, then
as these deals are litigated, there will be a record of the valuation methodologies which are acceptable
for the committee to consider in analyzing the merits of a controller's offer, as was the case in Emerging
Commc'n, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *43-101.
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it rests on the shoulders of the controller Under the Lynch Doctrine, because the
fair price duty applies irregardless of whether the committee consents or not, the
committee's participation can only benefit minority shareholders. It cannot be used
by the controller as a Sword of Damocles to hang over the committee-which is
what it would become if it were dispositive of the standard of review.
7 73
Under Lynch, the fair price duty is absolute. It is not waiting to spring to life
if the committee says "no." As long as the negotiations over the cash-out merger
are ongoing, whether the controller is pushing forward, backpedaling or feigning
disinterest, the fair price duty is appliable. The controller cannot use the Entire
Fairness standard against the committee; the power play works only in one direc-
tion-to correct the power asymmetry between the controller and the minority In
this fashion, the fair price aspect of the Entire Fairness standard is a heuristic that
informs the entire shape of the negotiations.
The second problem with Cox's Dual Ratification provision is that it is too
ambiguous and unstable. The different versions of the Dual Ratification provision
presented in the Cox opinion illustrate this. Does the fair price standard apply
unless (i.e. until) either the independent directors or the minority shareholders
reject the offer? This is one plausible reading of Cox's Dual Ratification provi-
sion.7 74 Would the fair price duty apply only once (i.e. after) the committee or
the minority had rejected the offer? This is the result suggested by one version
of Cox's Dual Ratification proposal.77 In this case, fair price is at best a remedy,
in effect, not a standard of conduct or fair price duty-since the negotiations are
over. In other places in the Cox opinion, Dual Ratification is proposed as a unitary
standard for determining the standard of review in freezeouts. The timing and
application of the fair price duty is even more ambiguous .776
The shift away from Lynch, towards a "Dual Ratification" standard raises fur-
ther questions. As envisioned in Cox, should the business judgment rule standard
apply if the committee elects not to take a position on the freezeout (or remains
neutral), and the majority of the minority approves? (This standard would create
problems in cash-out mergers, but not tender offer freezeouts, presumably 777)
Should the participation of a majority of the minority shares in a tender offer
be given the same effect as an affirmative vote in affording the transaction the
773. Controllers will surely threaten to pull the offer if the committee does not approve. That many
would do so is attested to in the Cox opinion. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 625. Once this happens in enough
freezeouts, committees will anticipate being blamed in the media for killing the deal if they disapprove
of it. Given the court of chancery's fervently expressed preferences for freezeouts going forward, at
least as evidenced in Siliconix, Pure and Cox, it will be very hard for committees to risk terminating the
transaction by disapproving it.
774. Cox, 879 A.2d at 643-44.
775. Id. at 607.
776. Id. at 606.
777. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 ("A director may not abdicate his duty by leaving to the
shareholder alone the decision to approve or disapprove the agreement [of merger]."); McMullin
765 A.2d at 919 ("...when the proposal to merge with a third party is negotiated by the majority
shareholder, the board cannot abdicate that duty [to make an informed judgment on the merger] by
leaving it to the shareholders alone to approve or disapprove the merger agreement because the major-
ity shareholder's voting power makes the outcome a preordained conclusion.").
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protection of the business judgment rule, given that the pressure to tender is
greater than that affecting shareholder voting in mergers? Certainly there is reason
for caution on this point.
Finally, given the importance of committee assent under Cox's Dual Ratification
provision-i.e. that it would largely obviate the fair price duty in negotiations and
trigger deferential review in a suit over the freezeout-what numerical minimums
should attach to committee assent? Pure had a committee of two: what if there was
a split vote, or one abstained? Can it be reasonable to allow deferential review, and
an attenuated fair price duty based on the assent of only two outside directors? The
supreme court's recent decision in Krasner v. Moffett suggests that there is reason for
caution.177 In a committee of three (which may foreseeably become the norm)
7 9 if
two outside directors consent, is that sufficient or should unanimity be required?
Until recently New York required unanimity for disinterested director ratification if
the committee directors numbered less than a quorum.7 10 Placing so much weight
on the committee's assent, makes each of these issues highly important and, given
Cox's Dual Ratification proposal, relevant during the negotiations.
Indeed, the fact that Dual Ratification would raise so many unresolved issues
means that the parties would not be able to predict with certainty whether the
Entire Fairness standard or the business judgment rule was applicable and whether
the fair price duty was not. Compared to this very unstable state of affairs, Lynch's
clear affirmation of a fair price duty is more beneficial to investors. Compared to an
indistinct, "hybrid" approach, 71 it would allow equity investors more accurately to
appraise the risks attendant to their investment. Finally, the Dual Ratification reso-
lution is acceptable only if one accepts the illegitimacy of inherent coercion. But
nothing in the recent trilogy of freezeout cases comes close to proving that inherent
coercion is less of a problem than it was when Lynch was decided.
3. Empirical Evidence
There is a growing body of scholarship analyzing the premiums paid in freeze-
outs. These studies-reviewed by the court in Cox-focus on different features of
freezeout transactions, and especially the role of law and lawsuits in influencing
parties' conduct in freezeout transactions.7"2 Because these studies are relevant to
the future of the Entire Fairness standard in freezeouts (as well as the resolution
of the fee issue before the court in Cox), they are analyzed in considerable depth
by the court-and presented in summary form herein.
7 83
778. 826 A.2d 277, 286 (Del. 2003).
779. As stated above, controlled companies will need to have a minimum of three directors to
conform to the exchanges' listing standards for audit committees. See supra note 766 and accompany-
ing text.
780. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713 (McKinney 2003).
781. See Cox at 879 A.2d at 646 (describing its Dual Ratification proposal for freezeouts as a "prin-
cipled reconciliation of the two lines" of freezeout doctrine, and citing Gilson and Gordon's work as a
model solution in this regard).
782. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 621-31.
783. Id.
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Professors Thompson and Thomas have concluded that suits in cash-out merg-
ers under the Lynch Doctrine raise the premiums offered in the "worst" trans-
actions. 714 Professor Subramanian's data led him to a similar conclusion about
freezeout suits under the Entire Fairness standard. (He served as an expert on
behalf of the plaintiffs' lawyers claiming the fee as part of the settlement.)78 Pro-
fessors Weiss and White's data led them to conclude, in contrast, that Lynch's
Entire Fairness standard has led primarily to an increase in plaintiffs' lawyers
filing nonmeritorious claims in freezeouts-hence an increase in plaintiffs' law-
yers' welfare with little attendant benefit for minorities.78 6 In sum, Thompson
and Thomas' and Subramanian's conclusions point in the direction of extending
the Lynch Doctrine to all forms of freezeouts,7 87 consistent with minorities' best
interests, as is suggested in this Article. In contrast, Professors' Weiss and White's
analysis supports limiting the Entire Fairness standard's application, consistent
with the Dual Ratification proposal endorsed in Cox.7"' Cox's discussion of the
Lynch Doctrine and its effects on the litigation system78 9 reveals that the court was
partial to the arguments made by Weiss and White.7 90 (Their work also informed
the case directly since Professor Weiss was one of the attorneys for the objectors to
the fee and submitted his scholarship in an affidavit filed with the court. 9 )
784. See Thompson & Thomas 1I, supra note 51, at 202; Cox, 879 A.2d at 626.
785. Subramanian, Theory & Evidence, supra note 23; see Cox, 879 A.2d at 625-31; id. at 625 ("Sub-
ramanian makes two major arguments. First Subramanian cites to his own recent scholarly studies to
support his view that the Lynch form of transaction results, on average, in going private transactions
that pay the minority a higher premium in comparison to the preannouncement market price than do
Siliconix deals. Second, Subramanian attempts to show that the filing of lawsuits under Lynch challeng-
ing going private merger proposals by controlling stockholders are a material factor in producing these
more favorable results. I will now explain in summary form Subramanian's arguments and explain why
I conclude that the first of his arguments is his strongest, and that his other point is less convincing. ").
786. See Weiss & White, supra note 641, at 1804 ("Thus, in most mergers involving conflicts
of interest and especially in mergers involving sales of control, the combination of corporate prac-
tice and Delaware law appears to have provided plaintiffs' attorneys with substantial incentives
to file class actions, regardless of whether it appeared that fiduciary duties had been or would be
breached .").
787. A significant caveat is required: Notwithstanding his conclusions about the beneficial effects of
claims filed under the Entire Fairness standard, Professor Subramanian endorses the kind of "hybrid,"
dual consent-based solution to unifying freezeout doctrine put forward by the court in Cox-i.e. that
Entire Fairness should not apply in cases where a special committee and a majority of the minority
approve of the transaction. It would seem then that Professor Subramanian believes that committees
will be able to push controllers to pay fair prices through negotiations even if the Entire Fairness stan-
dard is substantially relaxed. See Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 8.
788. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 613 ("...Weiss has recently turned his attention to the class action
settlement process in corporate law cases, most particularly in the courts of Delaware. Aside from
objecting in two cases himself, Weiss, along with Professor Lawrence J. White, an economist at New
York University, has published an article called File Early, then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes
Shareholder Class Actions that argues that certain features of Delaware's common law of corporations
have permitted the plaintiffs' bar to reap windfall profits by filing cases that have no benefit to stockhold-
ers.") (emphasis added).
789. See, e.g., Cox, 879 A.2d at 646.
790. The Cox court cites the objectors' view that "litigation of this kind is of no material benefit to
minority stockholders," id. at 624, but it does not present their evidence for that assertion, and thus
the evidence never comes under scrutiny
791. Id. at 613.
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The most significant feature of the court's analysis of these studies is that the
court reduces the Lynch Doctrine to a "club" that plaintiffs' lawyers wield to brow-
beat controllers into settling nonmeritorious cases. Indeed, even when Cox con-
cedes that minorities receive higher premiums in cash-out mergers than in tender
offer freezeouts (on average), it attributes this effect to Lynch's "extortion value,"
rather than crediting the positive effect of the fair price duty on the negotia-
tions.792 In Cox, claims filed under the Entire Fairness standard are merely a form
of currency that plaintiffs' lawyers use to obtain fees and settlements. Again, this
perspective fails to give meaningful consideration to the fair price duty's positive
contribution to minorities' welfare in negotiations with controllers. The courts
should be able to address most of the excesses that could arise in shareholder suits
against freezeouts under the Entire Fairness standard-i.e. by limiting the pay-
ment of fees to the lawyers, by limiting the scope of discovery, by screening com-
plaints for well plead facts evidencing unfair dealings and by dismissing claims
that allege mere valuation disputes. If one assumes (and we should) that the Dela-
ware courts are "not without a degree of sophistication" in these matters,793 then
the fair price duty should be allowed to do the work that the Delaware Supreme
Court intended it to do when it decided Lynch.
F FAIR DEALINGS AND Cox's REJECTION OF
THE INHERENT COERCION CONCEPT
1. The Substance of Fair Dealings
A finding that there has been genuine, free consent to the transaction is a
highly attractive option for resolving the problems attaching to freezeouts. This is
apparent from the discussion of fair dealings in Weinberger-which still provides
the most comprehensive discussion of fair dealing in freezeouts. In Weinberger
the court presents two approaches to a judicial analysis of fairness in freezeouts:
one of these focuses on the process through which the freezeout was negotiated.
As stated in Weinberger if the court found sufficient basis to believe that there
were vigorous, unrestrained negotiations between the controller and the minori-
ties' disinterested, informed representatives-this would establish a sufficiently
strong indicia of fairness. The defendants would ordinarily prevail in a lawsuit.
794
In sum, if truly free, uncoerced, informed consent to the freezeout could be estab-
lished, Weinberger says, then unfairness would not be a concern meriting further
judicial inquiry. Nevertheless, Weinberger and Lynch, suggest reasons why truly
free, informed consent is a near impossibility in the context of a freezeout-most
especially, that the controllers power advantages as corporate insiders and the
792. The court concludes that the Entire Fairness standard precludes timely dismissals, hence
invites nonmentorious cases which, in turn, are settled by controllers in order to avoid costly discov-
ery and other inefficiencies associated with further litigation. Id. at 631.
793. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107.
794. See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
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specter of inherent coercion undermine the presumption of genuine, freely-given
consent to a freezeout. Yet the attraction of the consent "construct" is compelling
and it drives the chancery court's calls for reforming freezeout doctrine. The issue
of consent in freezeouts thus warrants further consideration here. What motivates
the intense interest about freedom of choice for minorities in relation to the
potential sale of their shares in freezeouts?
2. Property Law Concerns
First, Lynch's Entire Fairness standard represents an attempt to address a
fundamental problem of property law that arises in the context of freezeouts. As
described earlier, the DGCL affords controllers the power to eliminate sharehold-
ers through a cash-out merger."' In effect, the controller can force the minority to
sell (surrender) their shares. This raises concerns from the perspective of property
law, even if fair value is paid. Indeed, the power possessed by controllers to com-
pel the surrender of the minorities' property interests in their stock is remarkable
as a matter of law. In effect, controllers' power in cash-out mergers is analogous
to the state's power of eminent domain. The state's power of eminent domain
is subject to strict constitutional limits and careful judicial oversight.796 Judicial
oversight of freezeouts under the Entire Fairness standard is an analog of the
federal courts' oversight over governmental takings of property, which are sub-
ject to meaningful constitutional due process guarantees. 797 If the minority truly
consent to the transaction, there would be no "taking," the property law problem
presented by the freezeout would be neutralized.
3. Institutional Checks and Balances in Corporate Law
A freezeout offer also poses a threat to the ordinary legal framework of cor-
porate governance. The Entire Fairness standard is a response to that institu-
tional threat.79  Once a controller is present, the routine allocation of decisional
authority established in corporate law is up-ended, as are the checks and bal-
ances inherent therein.7 99 The preeminent authority of the board of directors
in corporate affairs is generally acknowledged as the central axiom of corporate
law. °° As stated in the Cox opinion: "...the central idea of Delaware's approach
to corporation law is the empowerment of centralized management, in the form
795. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
796. For the most recent jurisprudence on eminent domain, see Kelo v. City of New London, Conn.,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (affirming local government's power to seize land for financial redevelopment
purposes consistent with the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
797. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V
798. See, e.g., McMullin, 765 A.2d at 920 ("When a majority of a corporation's voting shares are
owned by a single entity, there is a significant diminution in the voting power of the minority stock-
holders. Consequently, minority stockholders must rely for protection on the fiduciary duties owed to
them by the board of directors.").
799. See infra notes 800-03 and accompanying text.
800. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007); McMullin, 765 A. 2d at 916-17.
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of boards of directors and the subordinate officers they choose, to make disin-
terested business decisions. The business judgment rule exemplifies and ani-
mates this idea."8'' As this statement reflects, it is the board that has decisional
authority over corporate affairs-not the officers (who are appointed and may be
dismissed by the board) 802 and not the shareholders. Although they have power
to elect and remove the directors, they have virtually no direct decision making
authority over corporate conduct. This allocation of rights and powers is con-
sidered maximally efficient (though not perfectly so). Outside equity investors
are considered low-cost risk bearers. Professional executive officers bring par-
ticular business expertise to the firm's operations and administration. The board
recruits and supervises managerial talent, limits managers' self-seeking conduct,
and oversees systems of transparency and accountability that promote institu-
tional integrity and efficiency
803
Once there is a controller present, however, the preeminence and institutional
distinctness of the board is severely undermined. If the controller is an individual,
he or she will normally be on the board (and serve as a senior executive officer
of the company). 0 4 If the controller is a parent company, it will commonly elect
officers of the parent company to the subsidiary's board.0" Notwithstanding the
emphasis placed on independent directors since SOX's enactment, the presence
of the controller dampens the application of these mandates so that a controlled
company's board must include only three independents (as stated previously 06).
As noted in the Introduction, in theory the board owes duties to all the sharehold-
ers equally,0 7 but in practice the controller's interests will shape management's
and the board's composition and strategies. 808
801. Cox, 879 A.2d at 614.
802. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 142(b) (2007)
803. For an economics-oriented description of corporate governance arrangements, see, e.g., Mar-
golin and Kursh, supra note 166, at 414 ("The corporate form, characterized by the introduction of
outside equity investors, evolved to transfer the risk of firm operations from high-cost risk bearers
(management), to low-cost risk bearers (stockholders), but accomplishes this only at the expense of
relaxing hierarchical constraints on managerial malfeasance.").
804. See, e.g., Cysive, 836 A.2d at 533 ("This post trial opinion addresses stockholder-plaintiffs'
challenge to a management buy-out proposed by defendant Nelson Carbonell, the Chairman, Chief
Executive Officer, director, and largest stockholder of Cysive, Inc....").
805. In Pure, Unocal was limited by a shareholder agreement to five representatives on Pure's board
of eight. Of these, one was Unocal's treasurer; a second was Unocal's President and COO and a director
of Unocal; a third was a retired executive who had worked at Unocal for 34 years and still provided
consulting services to it; a fourth was "an executive for many years at Unocal before 1992;" a fifth was
"a close personal friend of Unocal's President and COO." The latter director was on Pure's special com-
mittee in fact. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 425-26.
806. See supra note 766.
807. See McMullin, 765 A.2d at 920 (noting board's responsibility in considering a merger to judge
whether the "transaction maximized value for all shareholders"); id. at 918 ("The Chemical Board
owed fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith to all Chemical shareholders in recommending a
sale of the entire corporation.").
808. Id. at 921-22 (describing the basis for overturning the court of chancery's dismissal of the
complaint allowing breach of fiduciary duty in a situation where the controller effectively pushed
through the sale of the company against the minority's best interests).
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A freezeout proposal is effectively a corporate governance "showdown." The
freezeout proposal originates with the controller, consistent with its private inter-
ests; it does not originate with the board, consistent with all the company's or
shareholders' best interests. Indeed, reflecting this reality, Weinberger rejected the
requirement that the controller prove a corporate-oriented purpose for eliminat-
ing the minority" 9 While the freezeout effects a fundamental corporate change,
the minority's votes are effectively useless. 8 0 As in Pure and Cox,"" where the
controller announces its unwillingness to sell to a third party, the market for
corporate control will be stymied. Even assuming a committee is established, it
would not have legal authority to go around the controller to the market or even
to authorize a financial restructuring.
8 12
The Entire Fairness standard invites the controller to constitute surrogates
for the usual institutions of corporate governance and their salutary effects by
empowering a special committee of independent directors with authority to nego-
tiate with the controller, and/or facilitating an informed vote by the majority of the
minority shares. Under the Lynch Doctrine, this does not set things back to the
"original position," so that deferential review is warranted. A vote by the majority
of the minority or committee ratification is not the same as assent by a majority of
all voting shares. However, under the Lynch doctrine, such consents would consti-
tute "strong evidence" of fairness. Nevertheless, even in the presence of such con-
sent, equity still has a meaningful role: a minority shareholder who can make out
a credible claim of unfairness in the freezeout can attempt to demonstrate such
unfairness to the court. Under the Cox Reforms, consistent with the court's stated
objective of facilitating controllers' ability to obtain dismissals on the pleadings,8"3
the court would have diminished responsibility in freezeouts. Dual Ratification
would mean the parties would be left to their private agreements in the freezeout:
contract law triumphs over fiduciary law.
Nor has the "market" really replaced judicial oversight under the Cox Reforms,
because they would not provide independent directors full authority to go to the
market to invite alternative offers or the authority to pursue a financial restructur-
ing. Under the Cox Reforms the controller can obtain deferential review upon the
basis of consents obtained under powerful constraints-i.e. while allowing the
committee, essentially, only the power to say "yes" or "no." True arms' length deal-
809. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
810. This conclusion is reflected, for example, in McMullin, 765 A.2d at 920 and Paramount
Commc'n, 637 A.2d at 42.
811. Pure, 808 A.2d at 429 (In its announcement of the tender offer freezeout, Unocal stated:
"...we are not interested in selling our shares in Pure."); Cox 879 A.2d 607-08 ("...the Family did
state that it would not sell its Cox shares or support a sale of Cox to a third party").
812. See, e.g., Pure, 808 A.2d at 446.
813. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 607 ("by giving defendants the real option to get rid of cases on the
pleadings, the integrity of the representative litigation process would be improved..."); id. at 619
("...it was impossible after Lynch to structure a merger with a controlling stockholder in a way that
permitted the defendants to obtain dismissal of the case on the pleadings."); iii at 130 ("As important,
this incentive would enable transactional planners to know that they can structure transactions in a
way that affords them the opportunity to obtain a dismissal on the complaint.").
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ing contemplates having the power not only to accept or reject the controller's offer
but also to search for alternatives. Parties negotiating at arms' length are not limited
to "thumbs up" or "thumbs down." Hence under the constrained Dual Ratifica-
tion process endorsed in the Cox opinion the minority shareholders would be left
stranded in an odd transactional limbo with neither the full power of the market
nor the full power of equity to adequately protect their interests. In sum, allowing
"business judgment deference" in freezeouts (even upon the Dual Ratification envi-
sioned in Cox) is a strange concept from the perspective of corporate governance.
Consent is an appealing idea for resolving the conflicts that arise on account of
the freezeout, but the underpinnings of "totally voluntary"814 consent in freezeouts
must be carefully considered before judicial deference is allowed.
4. Four Theoretical Perspectives on Voluntary Consent
There is considerable impetus behind the "pro- choice" model for fixing freeze-
out doctrine. It is at the heart of the reforms presented in Pure, Cox and Cysive,
as described herein.81 5 And Dual Ratification has been endorsed as an adequate
basis for deferential review by several scholars who have recently considered the
issue.8 16 Much of the allure of the free choice model for freezeout reform stems
from its "fit" with contemporary corporate legal theory. The Lynch Doctrine rests on
the view that the dynamics in freezeouts are sufficiently coercive that consents by
or on behalf of the minority shareholders cannot legitimately be presumed freely
given. Nevertheless, the allure of the Dual Ratification/free choice model for fixing
freezeouts is powerful given the choice-based, bargaining principles in private law
Theoretical frameworks in corporate law demonstrating this are presented in sum-
mary form below. They are: (i) neo-classical economic theory, (ii) agency theory,
(iii) team production theory, and (iv) civil society theory
Over the last twenty five years, neo-classical economic theory has influenced the
development of corporate law in important respects. Under the rubric of "law and
economics," this school of thought emphasizes corporate law's role in supporting
strong capital markets and economic growth.817 A basic tenet of neo-classical eco-
nomic theory is that people are rational, self-interested actors who will undertake
a transaction only if they believe doing so is in their mutual self-interest." 8 From
the perspective of law-and-economics, the role of corporate law is to faclilitate
814. See Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39 ("In the case of totally voluntary tender offers, as here, courts do
not impose any right of the shareholders to receive a particular price.").
815. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 444 n.43, 445; Cox, 879 A.2d at 606, 607, 643-44, 646; Cysive, 836
A.2d at 549-50.
816. See supra citations in note 5.
817. The role of law in supporting strong capital markets is considered in both the Pure and Cox
opinions. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 433-44; Cox, 879 A.2d at 646 (the Lynch Doctrine should be reformed
because it is inhibiting transactions that provide "efficiency for the economy in general").
818. For consideration of the role of economic thought in contemporary corporate law, see, e.g.,
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (Foundation Press 2002). For a more pro-
gressive analysis, see LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH (Carolina
Academic Press 2005).
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transactions, since they are presumed to increase wealth overall. Along these lines,
the consent by or on behalf of the minority shareholders in a freezeout would
suggest that the transaction is wealth-enhancing, and thus socially beneficial. If
consent was reliably rational, informed, and freely given, then the proper role of
the courts would be to "get out of the way" and leave the parties to their bargain.
Hence, if the Cox Reforms would reliably yield genuinely consensual freezeout
transactions, they would be an improvement in corporate law from the perspective
of neo-classical economic theory.
Corporate law has also been influenced by transaction cost economics, and in
particular its concern for the effects of agency costs on the corporations' cost of
capital. With Berle and Means' famous treatise in the distant background, s19 agency
theory focuses on the "separation between ownership and control," and its impli-
cations for managers and investors. 20 As Professors Gilson and Gordon have illu-
minated, once a controller is present agency costs run along two axes: controllers
are better monitors of managerial misconduct, so there will be lower managerial
agency costs for the equity holders, but the controller will engage in some degree of
private profit-taking, which will increase the agency costs borne by the minority821
The role of corporate law is to effect a system of organization which will decrease
agency costs overall, but to do so without creating new agency costs-for example,
by stimulating an inefficient amount of litigation. Freezeouts are such an occasion
for controllers to expropriate wealth from minorities, although the enforcement of
fiduciary duties through litigation might limit controllers' expropriation of wealth
through freezeouts. But for agency law-oriented scholars, litigation may increase
ohter forms of agency costs. These dangers of increased agency costs and wealth
destruction disappear if the freezeout transaction was genuinely consensual. Once
again, if Dual Ratification could reliably yield a consensual freezeout transaction,
then judicial oversight would be unnecessary. With informed, disinterested freely-
given consent, there would be no reason to worry about increased agency costs as
the result of the freezeout. The Cox Reforms would be an improvement in corpo-
rate law from the perspective of agency cost theory.
Team production theory is especially helpful as a framework for conceptualiz-
ing the role of the board and, the role of special committees in freezeouts 22 Team
production theory focuses on the limits of contracting over the factors of produc-
tion in the corporate enterprise. From the perspective of team production theory
the board's role is to support the fair and efficient distribution of the surplus
value produced by the corporate enterprise. In effect, the mediating hierarch's
819. ADOLPHE A. BERLE JR., AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
820. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 179.
821. Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5.
822. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 66; Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Emptri-
cal Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667
(2003). For discussion of team production's place in the evolution of corporate legal theory see Peter C.
Kostant, Team Production Theory and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 667
(2002).
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role ensures that the parties' will have less incentive to shirk or engage in self-
dealing because they will have more assurance of a fair return on their input
into the firm. Here again, if the special committee was properly doing its job as a
mediating hierarch in the freezeout based on an informed basis, then presumably
the transaction would not be unfair rent-seeking by the majority shareholder.
8 23
The norms of teamwork would not be undermined by the transaction. If the Cox
Reforms could guarantee that the special committee would function effectively as
an unconstrained, mediating hierarch, then where its approval was obtained for
a freezeout, judicial review would be unnecessary. The Cox Reforms would be an
improvement in corporate law.
Though civil society theory is less commonly applied to corporate law than
are the theories discussed above, it provides interesting insights into corporate
governance. From the perspective of civil society theory, corporations are part of
a broader network of nongovernmental organizations that counterbalance govern-
mental authority by providing a "space" for positive, free communal interchange.
8 2 4
Civil society theorists scrutinize and.encourage the features of institutions that make
them consistent with norms of democratic organization and participation, and thus
valuable social institutions. 25 The Lynch Doctrine's fair dealing requirement pro-
vides an example of these values in corporate governance. Hence, if a freezeout
occurred in the presence of the informed, free consent of the independent directors
and minority shareholders, then it would be an exemplar of civil society virtues.
Assuming the presence of such freely given consent, from the perspective of civil
society theory, the Cox Reforms would be an improvement in corporate law.
26
These four theoretical perspectives on corporate governance help illuminate
why the consent construct, as applied to freezeouts, is such a compelling one. The
problem is that the Cox Reforms are an improvement in corporate law under the
823. As used in contemporary corporate legal scholarship the term "rent-seeking" refers to the
pursuit of above market returns through the exploitation of an advantage nonsusceptible to competi-
tion, for example an anti-competitive regulation. For a study analyzing rent-seeking, see Sanjay Gupta
and Charles W Swenson, Rent Seeking by Agents of the Firm, 46J. LAw & EcoN. 253 (2003) (creating an
empirical model to measure rent-seeking by corporate executives and then applying it to firms' politi-
cal contributions to see if they track managers' interest in tax relief relevant to executive compensa-
tion). Admittedly, the board's placing the committee in the role of advocate for the minority, in facing
up to the controller, is a slight departure from the basic model, but the team production construct still
has relevance, especially with the board in the background and the controller looming.
824. See, e.g., DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY: AN APPLICATION IN SOCIETAL CONSTITU-
TIONALISM (New York University Press 2001).
825. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questionsfor Civil Society-Revivalists, 75
CHI .-KENT L. REv. 301 (2000).
826. At first glance, the Cox court's Dual Ratification proposal is consonant with these theoretical
frameworks as well; not only does the Cox court affirm the importance of voluntary consent, it requires
Dual Ratification unlike the court in Lynch that allows either shareholder or director consent to shift
the border of proof. The Cox court proposes that the two forms of consent are complementary to one
another; that they provide heightened protections to minority shareholders over Lynch. According to
Cox, directors are more effective negotiators, but the Cox court also allows for the possibility that the
independent director may be lazy or inept or less than independent and recommends a requirement
of minority shareholder ratification, as a check on the directors' diligence and judgment. See Cox, 879
A.2d at 618-19. However, there is a significant difference between employing consent as a burden
shifting device and using it as a rationale for limiting judicial review.
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above theories only if the consents of the committee and the minority shareholders
are genuinely freely given. The Lynch Doctrine maintains that inherent coercion
taints the consents and renders them unreliable as indicia of the true voluntariness
of the transaction. Nothing in Cox enhances the ability of committees or minority
shareholders to evaluate a freezeout in a truly uncoerced, unconstrained manner.
5. What Cox Says About Inherent Coercion
As described in Part IIl, in Pure the court affirmed that inherent coercion is
present in freezeouts based on tender offers and in those based on cash-out merg-
ers. What does the court say about inherent coercion in Cox? First, Cox claims that
inherent coercion is no longer a serious concern for freezeout doctrine because
the passage of time has made the idea outmoded. According to the court, commit-
tees and minorities can now say "no" if they want to. 27
Second, Cox employs several rhetorical devices to discredit, even ridicule, the con-
cern over inherent coercion in freezeouts. Because inherent coercion cannot be "dis-
proven," in Cox the court employs various rhetorical devices to mock and hence
"shrink" its importance. This use of rhetoric is an important aspect of the opinion
because the Cox Reforms rest on the presumption that committee's and minorities'
consents can be genuinely valid, and inherent coercion is not a real concern.
6. Independent Directors' Capacity to Say "No" Now?
At present, there are no empirical studies that support the conclusion that com-
mittees can reject unfair freezeout proposals. The few existing empirical analyses
of freezeouts that exist address different issues; they do not provide evidence that
helps to resolve this question.
828
Furthermore, whether committees in fact are free to reject inadequate freezeout
offers is a question that seems especially difficult to resolve empirically82 9 Such a
study would first need to identify which deals offered too low a price. This ques-
tion alone would involve a complex valuation exercise for each company in the
data set sampled. Using premiums over market price would not be a reliable indi-
cator of fair price, for the reasons discussed above. 830 It would be possible to gather
827. Cox, 879 A.2d at 647 ("By now, experience has proven that special committees and indepen-
dent board majorities are willing to say no to controllers. Experience has also shown that disinterested
stockholders, given a non-coercive choice, will reject low ball tender offers by controllers.").
828. We are only beginning to see empirical studies on freezeouts. In Cox the court was highly critical
of the only study that provides some data on committees' acceptances and rejections of controllers' offers,
see Subramanian, Theory & Evidence, supra note 23. There is information about settlement rates in suits
filed against freezeouts, but not information relevant to Cox's assertion about committees' disapprov-
als of unfair offers in Thompson and Thomas 11, supra note 51. Weiss and White's study also contains
empirical analysis of claims and settlements in freezeouts, but their data does not illuminate whether
directors have genuine freedom to disapprove unfair freezeouts. Weiss & White, supra note 641.
829. The question was hotly debated in the late 1980s when there were many leveraged buyouts.
See, e.g., William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 Bus.
LAW. 2055 (1990).
830. See supra note 767.
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data reflecting committee disapprovals, but impossible to ascertain the number of
times that committees were pressured into acquiescing to too low a price because
they feared worse for the minority if they resisted, or because they lacked adequate
authority to pursue financial or transactional alternatives. Though individual case
studies might be revealing, conducting this research with a data set large enough to
support robust conclusions would be extraordinarily difficult. Hence, it is highly
premature to conclude that we now know that committees can reject unfair pro-
posals, so that inherent coercion and judicial scrutiny for fairness is outmoded.
There may be valid policy reasons for wishing that committees had the resources
to resist unfair freezeouts, but there are solid reasons for skepticism.
Leaving aside empirical measures, social science evidence on group dynamics
does not present an encouraging picture of committees' capacity and propensity
to reject unfair deals.831 To the contrary, the emerging social science data reveals
that the persistent socio-demographic homogeneity in boards (and committees
as subsets thereof) tends to foster a "group cohesion" dynamic and hence various
cognitive biases that would lead directors (even outside directors) in the direc-
tion of being relatively conformist and passive in responding to proposals from
a controller.8 32 Nor are changes to the director election process that might force
greater diversity forthcoming. 33 Because at least with true majority controllers in
all likelihood the controller's representatives would occupy at least a majority of
the board seats, this means that their conformity and passivity would generally
lead to the freezeout proposal being approved. The power of controllers to influ-
ence the information that outside directors obtain would further perpetuate the
cognitive biases weighing in favor of their approving the offer.
8 34
The limits that protect directors from liability for breach of care also reinforce
committees' inclination not to "make waves."8 35 Saying "yes" would be the path of
831. See, e.g., Cox & Munsinger, supra note 90. On the subject of the organizational dynamics that
influence groups to avoid conflict and side with the popular perspective, see Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv.
L. REV. 1003 (1995).
832. Marleen A. O'Connor, Women Executives in Gladiatorial Corporate Cultures: The Behavioral
Dynamics of Gender, Ego and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 494 (2006); James D. Westphal, Defectionsfrom
the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity and the Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations, 42
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 161, 163-64 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 811 (2001)
("For a variety of reasons, the natural gravitational pull is away from diversity towards collegiality").
833. The "tightly-knit" nature of corporate boards, even after the recent financial accounting scan-
dals, is illustrated by the enormous outpouring of negative comment letters resulting from the SEC's
proposed conservative version of a shareholder nomination rule- See Proposed Rule: Security Holder
Director Nominations, SEC Rel. No. 34-48626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
834. The CEO is unlikely to take a position adverse to the controller and therefore may be unhelpful
to the outside directors in terms of what information is shared. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2005); James D. West-
phal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board Independence from Management, 43
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 511 (1998); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1282 (1982) (opining that outside directors' limited information about operating details limits
their utility in crucial respects).
835. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1055, 1138-39 (2006).
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least resistance. Saying "no," on the other hand, requires a greater investment of
time on the committee directors' part, and the time constraints that affect outside
directors are notorious."36 The unresolved problem of outside director compen-
sation also aggravates this problem. If outside directors are paid "too little" they
may lack a powerful incentive to devote substantial time to their committee work.
However, if outside directors are richly rewarded in a controlled company, they
may be unwilling to show "ingratitude" for this largesse by disapproving of a
freezeout offer.
37
The many corporate scandals that came to light after December 2001 also sug-
gest the limited efficacy of boards in preventing self-dealing by powerful corporate
insiders including controlling shareholders.838 In almost all of these scandals, the
companies had substantial numbers of outside directors on their boards; Enron
was exemplary in this fashion.839 In many of these cases the independent directors
approved transactions despite clear signs of self-dealing. 840 These recent scan-
dals and the financial losses they caused suggest that caution is warranted before
reducing the fiduciary protections afforded public investors on the rationale that
committees' oversight will be sufficient to protect them from controllers' over-
reaching. The court of chancery's careful scrutiny of the shabby work of the spe-
cial committee in the Emerging Communications tender offer freezeout provides
a cautionary tale in this respect.
8 41
Finally, it is worth remembering that Lynch was decided by the Delaware
Supreme Court only in 1994. Independent directors had already been "invented"
as a significant institution of corporate governance, but their ratification was not a
sufficient guarantee of fairness. In this respect Lynch's resolution that a committee's
836. For a discussion of the time constraints that may limit outside directors' utility, in relation to
executive compensation issues, see, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the
Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 266
.(2005).
837. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modem Busi-
ness Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (2002) (considering director
compensation).
838. Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of
Enron Corp. 1-17 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/
sicreport020102.pdf; William W Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REv. 1275, 1305-15 (2002) (describing extensive self dealing transactions at Enron); Robert Prentice,
Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 417, 428-34 (2003) (explaining how decisional heu-
ristics and cognitive biases can help explain the actions of various actors, including outside directors
in the Enron scandal); Arnoud WA. Boot &Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The
Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REv 356, 368-73
(2004) (noting that boards tend over time to internalize managers' values and therefore lose their
objectivity as they become unduly influenced by management's perspective). Special problems arise,
of course, in cases in which the controller is the senior executive officer. Note the case of Hollinger
International, Inc. where controlling shareholders allegedly looted $400 million over four years. Hol-
linger Inc. Says SEC May Bring a Civil Lawsuit Against It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at C2.
839. See Bratton, supra note 838, at 1332-34; Gordon, supra note 837, at 1241-44.
840. For facts relating to WorldCom's board, see, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F Supp.
2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
841. Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *140-47.
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consent is insufficient indicia of a freezeout's fairness to warrant application of the
business judgment rule cannot be relegated to bygone times, as Cox suggests.
7. Institutional Investors' Capacity to Say "No" Now?
The same caveats about the lack of evidence supporting committees' ability to
say "no" to unfair freezeout proposals applies to minority shareholders. We simply
do not possess such empirical evidence at this time regarding the ability of minor-
ity shareholders to say "no" to controllers.
In Cox the court places significant emphasis on the increased institutionaliza-
tion of the public equity markets as a source of empowerment for minorities in
freezeouts. 42 But corporate legal scholars have consistently been disappointed
by the level of coordinated action by institutional investors, especially in relation
to company specific matters. The factors that produce this effect are well docu-
mented.843 Even institutional investors face significant transaction costs in evaluat-
ing and opposing a freezeout offer. Coordinated action is costly and there are still
a variety of legal regulations8 44 and financial conflicts of interest"4" that discour-
age coordinated action among institutional investors. In addition, institutional
investors have differing financial incentives and investment strategies, 41 and this
842. Cox, 879 A.2d at 619, 647. Institutions are more likely to focus on individual firms where
there is a buyout offer, but the well-discussed limits to institutional investor activism are still powerful
in freezeouts. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities
Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 425-28 (2005); Edward Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 466-68 (1991). Furthermore, there
will also be conflicts between larger and smaller institutional investors in public companies.
843. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 811, 821-25 (1992) (describing financial conflicts of interest and legal regulations
that hinder greater institutional investor activism).
844. These rules are discussed in Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 520 (1990).
845. For an account of these conflicts, see Adrian Cadbury, & Ira M. Millstein, The New Agenda
for ICGN [International Corporate Governance Network],in 1506 PLI/Corp 673, 698-99, PLI, CORP. LAw
AND PRAC. COURSEBOOK HANDBOOK SERIES, Sept. 15-16, 2005 ("Conflicts of interest are an endemic insti-
tutional investor affliction. The problem is structural. For example, corporate pension fund managers
are retained by plan sponsors and may find themselves acting in the best interests of the corpora-
tion rather than the beneficiaries who have entrusted their retirement savings to the plan. Similarly,
trustees of public and union pension plans may seek to use their position to further political interests
at the expense of beneficiaries, for example, by using beneficiary funds to engage in litigation that is
politically motivated or to further "union" issues which may not bear on governance. Alternatively,
institutional investors may be reluctant to sue to recover fraud-related losses where those lawsuits
would be launched against other institutions with which they have a relationship. Banks that engage
in proprietary trading may inappropriately support those activities using information they gather from
clients in relation to trading intentions. These conflicts are increasing coming to the attention of regu-
lators. In fact, some regulatory intervention has already occurred in the institutional investor commu-
nity in the United States in relation to mutual funds. As a result of rules adopted on January 23, 2003,
the SEC requires investment companies and their advisers to disclose the fund's voting policies and
procedures, actual votes cast and how material conflicts of interest are dealt with.").
846. For a discussion see, e.g., Symposium, The Institutional Investor's Goalsfor Corporate Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL J. CORP. L. 35-69 (2000); Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Prin-
ciples in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 287-95, 314-32, 365-66, 385-86 (1990).
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diversity undermines their incentives and propensity to act in concert. In addi-
tion, institutional investors (especially hedge funds) are increasingly positioning
themselves to respond to short term market price changes, as intensified by the
role of arbitrageurs in corporate transactions. 847 These factors fit uneasily with the
likelihood that institutions will band together to hold out for their fair share of
going concern value when a controller offers a premium over the market price.
Indeed, the pervasively short-term orientation of contemporary securities markets
favors acquiescence to the controller's freezeout, 48 even if it offers minorities less
than their fair share of the gains from the transaction. Since investing is subject
to trends and social norms, a decision to oppose a freezeout at a premium might
even appear "irrational" read in the context of other investors' responses. 849 In any
event, the major losses suffered by such institutional investors in Enron and other
post 2001 corporate scandals850 and also the continued granting of mega-options
to executives even at underperforming companies with significant institutional
ownership8"' suggests limits to the wisdom of relying on institutional investors to
protect minorities' interests in freezeouts.
8. Cox's Use of Rhetoric to Discredit Inherent
Coercion and the Lynch Doctrine
The Cox court uses highly charged rhetoric to undermine the legitimacy of the
inherent coercion concept and hence the need for applying Entire Fairness in
freezeouts. These uses of rhetoric are analyzed below because they are suggestive
of the climate in which reforming freezeout doctrine is being considered. That
is, it appears to be safe (even for the court of chancery) to mock not only the
847. For statistics and commentary see e.g., Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge
Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975 (2006); see also
Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Owner-
ship, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). On the role and incentives of arbitrageurs, see Jim Hsieh & Ralph
A. Walkling, Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage in Acquisitions (Tuck Contemporary Corporate
Finance Issues III Conference Paper; Dice Center Working Paper No. 2003-14), available at http:/
papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=571022.
848. On the role of research analysts and the limits of rational choice in investing, see Jill E. Fisch,
Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality : The Case of the Research Analyst, 10 L\Ais & CLARK L. REV.
57 (2006).
849. For discussion of the problem of divergent time horizons, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal
Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005).
For discussion of the problem of "short-termism" as it affects investing and the economy, see Lawrence
E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189,
1209-10 (2003) (arguing that the pervasively short term focus of investing has infected the system of
corporate management in the United States); Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy
and Investment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 137 (1991) (examining the current state of American financial markets). For further discussion
of behavioral finance as it affects investors' decision making, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral
Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 792 (2002).
850. For example, the media reported pension fund losses attributed to Enron alone at $1.5 billion.
See Patrick McGeehan, 3 State Pension Funds Put Pressure on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at C1.
851. LuCiAN BEBCHUK &JESSIE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF ExEcuTivE
COMPENSATION (First Harvard University Press 2004).
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contribution of plaintiffs' lawyers to the system, but also the need for meaning-
ful judicial review in freezeouts. Cox's intense rhetoric suggests that the appeal of
contract-based norms over fiduciary norms is so powerful in corporate law that
to disagree is foolish, if not ridiculous. Because appearing foolish is painful, Cox's
rhetorical attack against inherent coercion may be quite effective in persuading
future courts' or commentators' against defending the legitimacy of inherent coer-
cion and Entire Fairness review in freezeouts.
a. Parody-Funny But Disturbing
The court's negative view of the inherent coercion concept-its intuition that the
concept is misplaced, mistaken and plain silly-is evident in the vehicle through
which it is "explained" in the Cox opinion. For purposes of convenience, this will be
called the "Primate Parable:1
852
All in all, it is perhaps fairest and more sensible to read Lynch as being premised on a
sincere concern that mergers with controlling stockholders involve an extraordinary
potential for the exploitation by powerful insiders of their informational advantages
and their voting clout. Facing the proverbial 800 pound gorilla who wants the rest of
the bananas all for himself, chimpanzees like independent directors and disinterested
stockholders could not be expected to make sure that the gorilla paid a fair price.
Therefore the residual protection of an unavoidable review of the financial fairness
whenever plaintiffs could raise a genuine dispute of fact about that issue was thought




The Primate Parable is intended to capture the reader's attention through a
radical departure from the usual rhetorical boundaries of corporate law cases. In
the above cited passage, inherent coercion "reads" as a strange departure from
the overall logic of corporate governance, which does not usually require refer-
ence to gorillas and chimpanzees to make sense of it. By presenting the "logic" of
the inherent coercion concept (the underpinning of the Lynch Doctrine) through
the Primate Parable, the court effectively marginalizes that concept. It makes the
inherent coercion concept look bizarre-an odd digression within the otherwise
rational jurisprudence of corporate governance.
Secondly, it is only a tiny move from bizarre to silly, and the references to goril-
las, chimpanzees and bananas implicitly provide license to laugh at the concept
of inherent coercion. Most of us know gorillas and chimpanzees only from zoos
and/or television cartoons, and bananas are the notorious stock of slapstick com-
edy So maybe the inherent coercion concept is just laughable?
The more closely one considers the Primate Parable the stranger and more offput-
ting the logic of inherent coercion becomes. Though the "800 pound gorilla" is a
cliche, it is also a grotesque metaphor. We don't want to look too closely at an 800
pound gorilla, maybe we should stop thinking about this overblown inherent coer-
cion concept too? Besides, gorillas do not pay for bananas-this inherent coercion
852. Cox, 879 A.2d at 617.
853. Id.
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stuff makes no sense! That is the reaction that the Primate Parable evokes, in a serious
and yet simultaneously comic, and thus brilliant, powerful mode of argumentation.
The analogy between independent directors, minority stockholders and chim-
panzees is also belittling. The natural response to reading it is to reject the com-
parison. Independent directors and minority stockholders are not analogous to
chimpanzees! If the inherent coercion concept is based on this false analogy, then
the inherent coercion concept is grounded on a major mistake.
It is worth noting that the Primate Parable is used as the vehicle to "explain"
inherent coercion not only in Cox, but also in the court's opinion in Pure,"5 4 and in
a law review article authored by Vice Chancellor Strine."5 ' This suggests that it reso-
nates deeply with the Vice Chancellor and is being used to convey something highly
important about the place of the inherent coercion concept in corporate law
Another reason that one should take the Primate Parable seriously is that dis-
crediting the continued legitimacy of the inherent coercion concept is critical
to the law reform espoused by the court in Cox, Pure and Cysive (i.e. eliminat-
ing Entire Fairness review of freezeouts in cases of Dual Ratification). Because
inherent coercion is not susceptible to being "disproven" at an empirical level (as
described above), the court endeavors to shrink its significance through humor-
ous disparagement. Poking fun at the inherent coercion concept does not dimin-
ish the importance of what is at stake, Cox contends that the Lynch Doctrine and
its concern about inherent coercion is damaging both the litigation system and
impairing economic efficiency
56
The Primate Parable has one other dimension worth noting. At bottom, the ques-
tion the court is grappling with is when the rule of law and resort to the courts are
fruitful. In essence, the Primate Parable mocks reliance on complex legal doctrines
and resort to the courts to resolve disputes in freezeouts. This logic also operates
through the contrast between primates and more highly reasoning homo sapiens.
If we are so much more intelligent, then why can't we resolve our differences on
our own, without resort to courts and overly complicated legal doctrines?
The Cox opinion uses a second stunning metaphor to discredit the Lynch
Doctrine. This one, too, suggests that the concern for inherent coercion is "over the
top;" that Entire Fairness review is distorting or perverting the system of litigation
and corporate governance. 57 This metaphor appears in the court's description of
the triangular settlement process involving committees, controllers and plaintiffs'
lawyers in lawsuits filed under the Lynch Doctrine:
As the objectors point out and this court has often noted in settlement hearings re-
garding these kinds of cases in the past, the ritualistic nature of a process almost
854. See Pure, 808 A.2d at 436.
855. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations,
27 DEL. J. Cow. L. 499, 509 (2002).
856. Cox, 879 A.2d at 646. This Article contends that Entire Fairness review in freezeouts is impor-
tant to maintaining the integrity of corporate fiduciary law and strong capital markets. See infra Part V
857. See also id. at 643 ("...Lynch has generated perverse incentives for both defense and plaintiffs'
counsel that cast doubt on the integrity of the representative litigation process").
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invariably resulting in the simultaneous bliss of three parties-the plaintiffs' law-
yers, the special committee, and the controlling stockholders-is a jurisprudential
triumph of an odd form of tantra.1
5
1
Like the reference to gorillas and chimpanzees, the opinion's references to "rit-
ual," "bliss," and "tantra" are so unusual in the lexicon of corporate law as to be
arresting. Describing settlement negotiations under the Lynch Doctrine through
an analogy to over-the-top emotions (bliss) and exotic spiritual or sexual practices
(tantra) makes the Lynch Doctrine appear excessive and even bizarre in its effects.
Read in the context of a formal legal opinion, these references are unsettling. The
court is inviting us to be uncomfortable with the Lynch Doctrine and its effects.
In its references to "bliss" and "tantra" the court is suggesting that the Lynch Doc-
trine has caused corporate law that governs freezeouts to spin out of control and
become decadent and disorderly 859 In this fashion Cox implicitly admonishes that
law reform is overdue.
These are the opinions most potent use of rhetoric, but the rest should be
noted as well because they operate cumulatively (albeit implicitly) in service of
the court's law reform agenda.
b. Inherent Coercion-A "Sociological Inference"
A further example of the court's use of rhetoric to discredit the Lynch Doctrine is
its reference to inherent coercion as a "sociological inference."8 6° By tying implicit
coercion to sociology, rather than economics or positive law, Cox once again mar-
ginalizes it within the lexicon of corporate law. Economics has been respected as
a legitimate science and source of inspiration for corporate law. In contrast, until
quite recently, sociology and the other social sciences were not acknowledged
as legitimate sources of authority for courts to rely upon in deciding corporate
cases.
86 1
Equally powerful is the court's statement that the inherent coercion core con-
cept underlying the Lynch Doctrine is based merely on an "inference."
c. A Pointed Rhetorical Question
In Cox, the court employs a pointed rhetorical question to undermine judicial
concern for inherent coercion. Rhetorical questions are not actual questions of
858. Id. at 621.
859. This is evident also where the Cox court describes the plaintiffs' lawyers as having a "food
fight" over who would be lead counsel. See Cox, 879 A.2d at 609.
860. Id. at 647.
861. The struggle for recognition of the Socio-Economics section of the American Association of
Law Schools is suggestive of this relative undervaluation of sociology, which is especially acute in the
area of corporate law. See, e.g., 1. Richard Gershon, Teaching Federal Income Taxation Using SocioEconom-
ics, 41 SAN. DIEGO L. REv. 201, 201 n.2 (2004) (citing Over 120 Law Teachersfrom 50 Member Schools
Sign Petition to Form Section on Law and Socio-Economics, SECTION ON Socio-EcoNo. NEWSL. (Ass'n of Am.
Law Sch. Washington D.C.), Jan. 1997, at 4).
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course, but rather masked declarations of certainty86 2 In just this discussion-end-
ing mode, the opinion states:
If both the independent directors and the disinterested stockholders are given the
ability to say no and do not, ought we not presumptively assume that the transaction
was fair?863
This rhetorical question appears near the conclusion of the opinion, after the
court's many objections to the Lynch Doctrine have been presented. It is intended
to evoke a positive response. "Yes! Dual Ratification should end the inquiry into
fairness in a freezeout!"
Furthermore, this rhetorical question contains a tautology. It assumes away the
problem of inherent coercion by positing that the committee and the minority
shareholders were given a genuine opportunity to reject the freezeout proposal.
This doubt about the total voluntariness of minorities' and committees' consents in
freezeouts is what motivates the invocation of the Entire Fairness standard under
the Lynch Doctrine in the first place.
d. Corporate Law-A Species of Commercial Law?
As part of its argument against continued adherence to the Entire Fairness stan-
dard for freezeouts, the Cox opinion makes a claim about corporate law's essential
nature and proper boundaries. The statement is extremely terse, but quite power-
ful in its effect for this reason. The claim is as follows: "This is corporate law, after
all, a species of commercial law...864
The statement quoted above achieves its rhetorical power through two defini-
tions: one is "species" and the other "commercial law." Taking the latter first, com-
mercial law is sometimes used broadly as a synonym for private law but it has a
narrower usage. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code governs numerous
areas of commercial law including for example sales, leases, negotiable instru-
ments, bank deposits, fund transfers, letters of credit, bulk sales, and warehouse
receipts. 61 It is unquestionably important to businesses and consumers to have
a clear and coherent system of commercial laws. But the above list illustrates
that the commercial law is more microeconomic in comparison to the kind of
macroeconomic effect that Cox elsewhere claims are relevant to corporate law
in general and the Lynch Doctrine in particular. For example, earlier in Cox the
court expressly claims that the Lynch Doctrine is inhibiting profitable transactions
that produce efficiency for the economy overall and liquidity for minorities in
862. Rhetorical questions are used to end discussions, rather than begin them. They imply that
the matter is so obvious that there can be only one intelligent viewpoint-the one that the speaker is
declaring to be self-evident.
863. Cox, 879 A.2d at 647.
864. Id.
865. For discussion of important concerns under the Uniform Commercial Code, see, e.g., Linda J.
Rusch, Is the Saga of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Revisions Over? A Brief Look at What NCCUSL
Finally Approved, 6 DEL. L. REv. 41 (2003).
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particular.8 6 And in Pure the court muses about whether endorsing Lynch or Solo-
mon would be more consistent with corporate law's objective of supporting strong
capital markets.8 67 By limiting the proper concerns of corporate law to commercial
law, then, the court is implicitly narrowing its appropriate focus.
This narrowing of the proper concerns of corporate law is accentuated by the
claim that corporate law is merely a "species" of commercial law. Within biological
classification, a species is the lowest level of taxonomic classification. By using the
term species, the court is fitting corporate law under the genus of commercial law,
in effect further shrinking the appropriate domain and concerns of corporate law.
By invoking the taxonomy of biological science, Cox makes the claim that corpo-
rate law is a sub-category of commercial law and advances the court's rhetorical
arguments that freezeout doctrine should move away from a focus on "Entire Fair-
ness," and let the parties negotiate on their own.
e. Creating Urgency through Hyperbole
The Cox opinion is rife with hyperbole that creates an air of urgency around its
law reform proposals. For example, strict adherence to the Entire Fairness stan-
dard for freezeouts has generated "perverse incentives"8  for both defense and
plaintiffs' counsel. It has "cast doubt on the integrity of the representative litigation
process." 16 9 The Lynch Doctrine has made it "impossible
8 70 for controllers "ever" 71
to avoid a review of a cash-out merger's financial fairness because "any" amended
complaints that the plaintiffs file could not be dismissed.872 According to the opin-
ion, it is an "undeniable reality that any merger with a controlling shareholder
is subject to review for fairness." 73 The Cox opinion contends that minorities'
claims of unfairness in freezeouts "cannot ever be dismissed" irrespective of their
merit.87 4 These are only a few examples of the court's use of hyperbole to convey
the urgency of limiting Entire Fairness review in freezeouts
8 7 5
V. PROPOSALS: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY STANDARDS FOR FREEZEOUTS
A. A UNIFIED DOCTRINE FOR FREEZEOUTS
The Delaware Court of Chancery's recent opinions in Pure, Cysive, and Cox
make an important contribution to illuminating the negative effects of having two
"tracks" in freezeout doctrine. As Pure and Cox contend, the structural differences
between tender offer freezeouts and cash-out mergers do not reflect substantially
866. Cox, 879 A.2d at 646.
867. Pure, 808 A.2d at 434-35.
868. Cox, 879 A.2d at 643.
869. Id.
870. Id. at 605.
871. Id.
872. Id. at 605, 609.
873. Id. at 617.
874. Id. at 605.
875. The Cox opinion does not hide its law reform agenda. Id. at 642.
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different capacities for overreaching by controllers.876 Minorities and committees
have no less reason to fear ex-post retribution from controllers if they oppose
a tender offer freezeout instead of a cash-out merger. And controllers' informa-
tional and timing advantages persist in freezeouts based on tender offers, as in
cash-out mergers. The greater force of the prisoner's dilemma in freezeouts based
on tender offers mandates applying equivalently rigorous fiduciary safeguards to
these transactions.
Just as importantly, the operation of different standards of fair price in the two
freezeout formats, in conjunction with the "hit or miss" nature of the appraisal
remedy has undermined the securities markets' capacity accurately to price con-
trollers' capacity for overreaching in freezeouts. The application of a fair price
duty in cash-out mergers and no fair price duty in tender offer freezeouts sends
mixed signals to the capital markets about the value of the minorities' shares. If
the markets do not fully reflect the substantial risks of opportunism presented by
tender offer freezeouts, then minorities are probably overpaying for their shares.
In the alternative, if the securities markets are accurately discounting the minori-
ties' shares to take account of controllers' potential for opportunism in tender offer
freezeouts, then this hole in the web of fiduciary prohibition against self dealing
may be driving up the cost of raising public equity capital. In either case, the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery's critique that excess complexity in freezeout doctrine
is inefficient is well founded in this context. It should be redressed through law
reform that would unify the fiduciary standards applicable to freezeouts.
Furthermore, as the analysis of Solomon and Glassman herein revealed, it isn't
clear that the supreme court ever intended for there to be two tracks in freezeout
doctrine. The Delaware Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to review a
genuine tender offer freezeout. The Solomon decision exhibits striking shortcom-
ings as landmark precedent. These shortcomings are evidence that the Delaware
Supreme Court never intended to validate a separate, looser framework of fidu-
ciary duties for freezeouts based on tender offers.
B. ENTIRE FAIRNESS AS THE STANDARD FOR FREEZEOUTS
The Entire Fairness standard represents the most appropriate basis for a uni-
fied doctrine for freezeouts. The Lynch doctrine's fair price promise has facili-
tated minority shareholders' capacity to command higher premiums in freezeout
negotiations than they can in negotiations where no fair price duty has applied.
In the absence of a fair price duty, controllers can take a variety of actions that
will force the trading price of the minorities' shares downward, and then profit
from such actions by compelling a freezeout. The more the market fears con-
trollers' capacity for coercion and overreaching, the deeper the discount will
become; the less the controller will have to pay in the freezeout-unless a fair
price duty applies. By extending Lynch's fair price duty to tender offer freezeouts,
876. Pure, 808 A.2d at 435 (arguing that the disparity between the Lynch doctrine and the stan-
dards applied to tender offer freezeouts "creates a possible incoherence in our law").
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corporate law can limit this kind of downward cycle and its negative effects for
minorities and corporations' cost of capital. In this respect, the application of
Entire Fairness review to controllers' cash-out mergers has provided a safeguard
against freezeouts in which controllers' gains come at the minorities' expense.
This same protection should apply in tender offer freezeouts.
The Lynch doctrine's concern about minorities' capacity for free choice in
freezeouts reflects that shareholders have a property interest in their shares which
cannot be "seized" by controllers without some meaningful due process, and
the payment of full value to the minority Second, the fair dealing aspect of the
Entire Fairness standard limits controllers' capacity to subordinate the distinct
institution that is the corporate board to their private interests. The Cox opinion
itself emphasizes that "empowerment of centralized management, in the form of
boards of directors ' is an axiomatic principle in corporate law, and one relevant
to freezeouts. Application of the Entire Fairness standard is further warranted
on account of the fact that target directors have not been recognized to possess
inherent fiduciary authority to explore transactional alternatives to a freezeout
over the opposition of a controller. This is an especially odd result given target
directors' broad discretion to defend against a hostile tender offer proposal from a
third party Target directors' defensive authority in freezeouts should be expanded
so it is on a par with their authority in third-party offers, but in the end this is a
matter separate and distinct from the standard of review applicable to controllers
in freezeouts.
The Cox Reforms would allow Dual Ratification to trigger deferential review in
a freezeout, and the court claims in Cox, that in doing so it would not diminish
the integrity-enforcing role of corporate law. However, the court is able to arrive
at this conclusion only by assuming away the essential concern underlying the
Lynch Doctrine, i.e. the concern for inherent coercion. The appeal of the "pro-
choice" solution for fixing freezeouts is powerful. But the court in Cox cannot
"disprove" the continued validity of inherent coercion and disparages it through
a variety of rhetorical devices. In an ideal world, people would freely bargain to
mutually beneficial outcomes and courts would not be involved. But minorities'
and committees' consents to freezeouts are not likely to be genuinely freely given
and should not be treated as the product of arms' length dealings. The absence
of strong fiduciary protections would further erode minorities' and committees'
capacity to resist unfair freezeout proposals.
C. THE LYNCH DOCTRINE Is NOT "BROKEN"
The Cox and Cysive opinions present a series of claims intended to prove that
adherence to the Entire Fairness standard for freezeouts has serious deleteri-
ous effects on the legal system and economy This Article has demonstrated that
these claims are exaggerated. The Lynch Doctrine is not a free pass for plaintiffs'
lawyers to proceed to discovery on mere allegations of unfairness especially mere
877. Cox, 879 A.2d at 614.
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allegations of unfair price. The courts have the ability to dismiss claims that
appear nonmeritorious and to keep fees to plaintiffs' lawyers in settlements in
check. They can do so, moreover, without endorsing the business judgment rule
as the presumptive standard for freezeouts.
Cox's objective of limiting shareholder suits in freezeouts is problematic. First,
minorities' ability to bring class action claims against freezeouts under Lynch's
Entire Fairness standard is essential to protecting their welfare. Second, limiting
equitable claims in freezeouts would not necessarily result in net reduction in
litigation against freezeouts, because there would likely be an offsetting increase
in appraisal and federal securities law actions. Finally, if claims in freezeouts are
routinely dismissed on the pleadings, then the Delaware courts will no longer be
developing the transactional choreography that has had a salutary effect on deal
making and corporate investment. The Cox court did not take this hidden cost
into account in its proposal.
D. AUCTIONS AND MARKET CHECKS
The Cox opinion contends that the business judgment rule should be the pre-
sumptive standard of review for freezeouts unless either the target directors or
minority shareholders have disapproved of the offer (or, so long as they both
approve of the offer). There are many problems with this proposal, as reviewed
above. In addition, the argument in favor of the business judgment rule in freeze-
outs ignores the fact that judicial deference is the exception and not the rule in
high stakes M&A transactions. For example, even the "ordinary" duty of care is
applied by courts with heightened scrupulousness in reviewing, sales to third
parties.""' Under Revlon the courts apply heightened scrutiny to sales of corpo-
rate control.878 And under Blasius the courts apply heightened scrutiny to actions
interfering with shareholders' voting rights, as may often occur in takeover bat-
tles.880 Furthermore, freezeouts involving defacto controllers actually involve sales
of control as interpreted under Revlon's progeny88 ' On this basis, the target's direc-
tors under present law have a duty to pursue an auction or market check to obtain
the best price reasonably available for the minorities' shares in responding to a de
facto controller's freezeouts. The new listing standards will require a majority of
independent directors on boards where there is only a defacto controller.882
Instead of imposing a fiduciary requirement of a market check or auction
in all freezeouts however, the courts should work from the standard-of-review
878. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.
663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (sustaining Delaware Court of Chancery's determination that merger satis-
fied the test of entire fairness even though board failed to meet its duty of care by failing to test the
market for other merger partners).
879. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d. 173 (Del. 1986).
880. Blasius v. Atlas Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
881. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
882. See SEC Rel. No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64154 (Nov. 12, 2003); NYSE, INC., NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.01 and 303.A.05, available at http://wwwnyse.com/lcm/lcm-section.htm.;
NASDAQ, INC., MANUAL § 4350(c), available at. http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/index.html.
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orientation reflected in the Lynch Doctrine. In pursuing a freezeout, controllers
should either truly empower the committee to negotiate at arms' length or their
transaction should be subject to scrutiny for fairness in the event of a shareholder
challenge. Where there is evidence that the controller's freezeout was accepted
by an independent committee after it had been empowered to pursue an auction
or market check, and was approved by a majority of the minority shares, then
the transaction should be eligible for deferential review. However, to ensure that
the market check or auction reveals evidence of the company's going concern
value, the controller would have to agree to be a seller if a bid emerged that was
higher than one it was willing to match. These circumstances would constitute
compelling evidence of arms length dealings and warrent judicial deference in
a challenged freezeouts. This strategy would give controllers the opportunity to
structure their freezeouts in a way that would provide for dismissals on the plead-
ings. If the controller is not willing to match a third party's bid at a higher value,
then there is no reason to presume that it is offering going concern value for the
minorities' shares, and no reason for the court to allow the freezeout judicial
deference.
E. BURDENS OF PROOF AND BURDEN SHIFTING GOING FORWARD
The Lynch Doctrine's insistence that controllers bear the initial burden of proof
in freezeouts is consistent with the basic judicial presumption in self-dealing
transactions. Hence, courts should continue to impose the burden of proof on
controllers in freezeouts in both formats. However, the Lynch Doctrine's burden-
shifting device has helped to provide an incentive for controllers to promote fair
dealing in freezeouts and to invite the scrutiny of minorities and independent
directors in their freezeouts. Although this Article rejects Cox's proposal that Dual
Ratification should trigger deferential review, the Cox opinion does make a pow-
erful case for the "complementarity" of Dual Ratification in freezeouts.88 3 Hence
Dual Ratification should be required in order for defendants to shift the burden of
proof to the plaintiffs. If there was Dual Ratification but not as auction or market
check, the plantiff would have to demonstrate the fundamental unfairness of the
freezeout in order to obtain a recovery
CONCLUSION
Corporate academics often analogize corporate law to contract law; many envi-
sion the corporation as a "nexus of contracts." The Cox Reforms would take this
analogy a step further by leaving controllers and minorities to the terms of their
bargains in freezeouts. The bargaining model is appealing, as is reducing unnec-
essary litigation. However, there are powerful reasons to doubt that committees
and minorities are capable of negotiating freely with controllers. On this basis,
883. Cox, 879 A.2d at 618-20. Id. at 619. ("These steps are in important ways complements and
not substitutes.").
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this Article concludes that courts should apply the Entire Fairness standard to
both cash-out mergers and tender offer freezeouts, except where a controller has
allowed a market check or auction conducted by independent directors to pro-
ceed prior to the approval of the freezeout. Instead of endorsing deferential review
for freezeouts, consistent with the Cox Reforms, courts in equity should continue
to have a meaningful role in developing standards of conduct and standards of
review for freezeouts, unless market forces have genuinely been allowed to oper-
ate for the benefit of minority shareholders. The costs of equity becoming more
tolerant of controllers' overreaching in freezeouts are potentially very large, surely
larger than recent freezeout cases from the Delaware Court of Chancery reflect.
